Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). · Go Syfert
Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the specific inclusion of one entity usually precludes the implication of another entity's inclusion in the same statutory provision”
16 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc. (innd, 2006-01-12)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc.
N.D. Ind. · 2006 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the specific inclusion of one entity usually precludes the implication of another entity's inclusion in the same statutory provision
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) In re Dayton R.
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we decline to expand the plain meaning of the statute by including great-grandparents as grandparents
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lott v. Alexander (2×) also: Cited "see"
Miss. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Chavers v. Hammac, 568 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Ala.Civ.App.1990); In re M.D.E., 297 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Colo.App.2013); Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303, 305-06 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); Skov v. Wicker, 272 Kan. 240 , 32 P.3d 1122, 1127-28 (2001); Cole v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 333, 334-35 (Ky.Ct.App.1987); People ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Paternity of R.J.S. v. Stockton
Ind. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maser Ex Rel. Maser v. Hicks (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See I.C. § 31-9-2-77; Ham-mons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (finding that when certain items or words are specified or *433 enumerated in a statute, other items or words not so specified or enumerated are, by implication, excluded).
discussed Cited "see" Nathan E. Mylet v. Santander Bank, N.A. (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same). [5] “[U]nder longstanding Indiana law, a defendant is not liable under a tort theory for any purely economic loss caused by its negligence ….” U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Integrity Land Title Corp., 929 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind. 2010) (citation and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1608-MF-2004 | June 9, 2017 Page 3 of 6 quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited "see" In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.D.E.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
We also observe that the plain and ordinary meaning of grandparent is "a parent's parent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 988 (2002); see Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303, 305-06 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (plain meaning of "grandparents" does not include great-grandparents; construing visitation statute); Skov v. Wicker, 272 Kan. 240 , 32 P.3d 1122, 1127-28 (2001) (same); Cole v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 333, 334-35 (Ky.Ct.App.1987) (same). .
cited Cited "see" In Re The Visitation of M.J. and J.J.: C.M. v. J.J. and I.J.
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); In re Guardianship of K.T., 743 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jasper HAMMONS, Jr., and Stella Hammons, Appellants-Petitioners,
v.
Cassandra JENKINS-GRIFFITH, Appellee-Respondent
67A01-0104-JV-145.
Indiana Court of Appeals.
Mar 13, 2002.
764 N.E.2d 303
2002 Ind. App. LEXIS 390
2002 WL 387269
Gail E. Bradley, Jr., Greencastle, IN, Attorney for Appellants., John R. McKay, Hickam & Lorenz, Spencer, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Mattingly-May, Baker, Najam.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #39,342 of 633,719
Citer courts: Indiana Court of Appeals (1) · Court of Appeals of Tennessee (1)

OPINION

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge.

Jasper Hammons, Jr. and Stella Ham-mons ("Great-Grandparents") petitioned the trial court to modify its order addressing the support and custody of their great-grandchild, S.E.B. They requested in their petition "the right to regular visitation with [S.E.B.]" (App. at 25.) The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, they raise two issues, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in dismissing their Petition to Modify, given their long-term relationship with S.E.B., and whether the trial court erred in dismissing their Petition to Modify without a hearing.

We affirm.

[*305] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

S.E.B. was born on November 2, 1998. A paternity action was filed, and on February 3, 1994, paternity was established. On November 16, 1995, the Great-Grandparents were appointed as guardians and given custody of S.E.B. That guardianship was terminated on March 19, 1997, and custody of S.E.B. was given to her mother, C.G. ("Mother"). In an Order filed on that date in the paternity action, the trial court stated:

8. The Court RECOMMENDS the following visitation schedule for visitation between the minor child and the former guardians, Jasper and Stella Hammons:
a. Two weeks of visitation during the summer. Mr. and Mrs. Hammons should give the natural mother at least thirty (80) days notice of the dates in which they exercise this visitation.
b. Alternating weekends, beginning March 8, 1997, from 9:00 o'clock a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 c'elock p.m. on Sunday.

(App. at 16.) (Emphasis in original.)

On May 22, 1998, Great-Grandparents filed a Petition to Modify in the paternity case. They asserted that Mother had not been allowing them the recommended visitation and they requested that the trial court order "a visitation schedule similar to that of a natural parent in Indiana dissolution cases, since the natural father ... does not exercise his visitation rights with [S.E.B.]." (App. at 25.)

No further action was taken until the Great-Grandparents requested that a hearing be set on their Petition. That hearing was scheduled for March 183, 2001. On February 2, 2001, Mother filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition to Modify. On February 28, 2001, the trial court dismissed the Petition to Modify without a hearing.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

A Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When reviewing a 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, we view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and we draw every reasonable inference in favor of that party. We will affirm a successful T.R. 12(B)(6) motion when a complaint states a set of facts that, even if true, would not support the relief requested in that complaint. Further, we will affirm the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the record. Right Reason Publications v. Silva, 691 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

Initially, we note that the trial court's Order of March 19, 1997, did not order visitation to the Great-Grandparents-it only recommended that such visitation take place. The Great-Grandparents' Petition to Modify essentially requested that the trial court change its recommended visitation to court-ordered visitation.

The trial court was correct when it dismissed the Great-Grandparents' Petition to Modify. Indiana Code § 31-17-5-1 et seq., ("the Grandparent Visitation Statute"), applies only to requests for visitation made by grandparents. The specific inclusion of one entity usually precludes the implication of another entity's inclusion in the same statutory provision. So, when certain items or words are specified or enumerated in a statute, other items or words not so specified or enumerated are, by implication, excluded. JKB, Sr. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 660 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The Great-Grandparents acknowledged in their petition that "they are not alsicl parent or grandparent," (App. at 25), and we decline[*306] to expand the plain meaning of the statute by including great-grandparents as "grandparents" [1] for purposes of the application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute.

Even if great-grandparents were considered as grandparents under the Grandparent Visitation Statute, it is clear that Great-Grandparents did not comply with Ind.Code § 31-17-5-8. That section provides that "(al proceeding for grandparent's visitation must be commenced by the filing of a petition entitled, 'In Re the visitation of '," and the petition must set forth the "names and relationship of ... the petitioning grandparent or grandparents." The term "must" is mandatory language; the Great-Grandparents' Petition to Modify therefore was not in compliance with the statute.

We are not without sympathy for Great-Grandparents, who had official custody of their great-granddaughter for approximately sixteen months, and apparently had unofficial custody for much longer. However, we are bound by the plain language of the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Great-Grandparents' Petition to Modify.

BAKER and NAJAM, JJ., concur.
1

. The title that includes the Grandparent Visitation Statute does not define "grandparent."