Carvalho v. City of Cambridge, 362 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Carvalho v. City of Cambridge, 362 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Willis v. Board of Selectmen of Easton (mass, 1989-06-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Willis v. Board of Selectmen of Easton
Mass. · 1989 · confidence medium
Carvalho v. Cambridge, 372 Mass. 464, 465 (1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rein v. Town of Marshfield
Mass. App. Ct. · 1983 · confidence medium
If there was ever doubt that a town cannot substitute accrued vacation or sick leave for payments due injured police officers under § 11 IF, it was laid to rest by Carvalho v. Cambridge, 372 Mass. 464, 465-466 (1977).
cited Cited "see" Town of Reading v. Reading Patrolmen's Ass'n
Mass. App. Ct. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carvalho v. Cambridge, 372 Mass. 464, 465-466 (1977); Cassidy v. Newton, 386 Mass. 1002 (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blair v. Board of Selectmen
Mass. App. Ct. · 1988 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Carvalho v. Cambridge, 372 Mass. 464 (1977), where the parties did not dispute the date of termination of § 11 IF benefits, and where the case, in any event, was decided prior to the 1982 requirement of PERA approval of disability retirements as the last step in such a retirement.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Anthony G. Carvalho vs. City of Cambridge
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Apr 29, 1977.
362 N.E.2d 522
1977 Mass. LEXIS 940
Edward A. Cunningham for the defendant., Matthew J. Ferraro for the plaintiff., Neil Rossman, for Cambridge Fire Fighters Local #30, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Hennessey, Quirico, Braucher, Wilkins, Abrams.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
Braucher, J.

The plaintiff, a firefighter, was incapacitated for duty because of injury sustained in the performance of his duty, without fault of his own, and hence was granted “leave without loss of pay” under G. L. c. 41, § 111F, as appearing in St. 1964, c. 149. We affirm a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Courts, Northern District, that the fire chief erroneously changed part of the leave period from injured leave to vacation.

The case was tried in a District Court on a statement of agreed facts. The plaintiff inhaled smoke while working at a fire on October 4, 1972, and was placed on injured leave on October 5, 1972. His application for disability retirement, dated October 15, 1972, was granted January 31, 1973, effective March 8,1973. By orders of the fire chief he was placed on vacation from November 5 to November 11, 1972, and from January 31 to March 8,1973.

The judge found for the defendant. On appeal the Appellate Division vacated the finding and returned the action to the trial court for determination of the plaintiff’s damages. The defendant appealed to this court, and we were informed in argument that there is no controversy as to the amount of damages.

The plaintiff was injured in the performance of his duty without fault of his own, and was therefore entitled to leave without loss of pay, for the duration of his incapacity, whether his incapacity was total or partial. Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 662 (1975). Vo-four v. Medford, 335 Mass. 403, 406 (1957). Nothing in the statute authorized the city to change the injured leave to vacation. Cf. Pettinella v. Worcester, 355 Mass. 412, 414 (1969) (payment for sick leave instead of injury leave).[*466] Under G. L. c. 41, § 111F, the injury leave terminated when the plaintiff was retired, effective March 8, 1973. At that time, if he had not been granted the vacation to which he was entitled, he was to be “paid, at the regular rate of compensation payable to him at the termination of his employment, an amount in lieu of such vacation.” G. L. c. 41, § 111E, as amended through St. 1956, c. 45. We do not regard time on injury leave as a “monetary or other allowance” for vacation within § 111E.

Order of Appellate Division affirmed.