Veliscescu v. Pauna, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). · Go Syfert
Search
Veliscescu v. Pauna, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schwenker v. Silberfein CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 ; Velicescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1523, fn. 1 [“Any issue relative to the granting of defendant’s motion to set aside the default can be presented on appeal from the judgment.”]; Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682 .) We therefore review on the merits.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lakeview Loan Servicing v. Hernandez CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198 , 207, fn. 2; Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137 ; Stevenson v. Turner (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 315, 317 ; see § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [providing for appeals from “an order made after a judgment”].) By contrast, an “order denying [a] motion to vacate default—made before entry of the default judgment—is not independently appealable.” (Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1465 (Jade K.); accord, Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 ; Shapiro, at p. 1137; Veliscescu v.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sorensen v. Lam CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
But an order “granting of [a] defendant’s motion to set aside [a] default can be presented on appeal from the judgment.” (Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1523, fn.1 [citing Code Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barker v. Di Lando CA1/2 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[e]stablished California decisional law provides that no appeal lies from an order granting a motion to vacate a default upon which no default judgment has been entered. [Citations.]” (Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 (Veliscescu); accord, Misic v. Segars (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154 [“When a trial court grants a motion to vacate a default, an appeal does not lie in the absence of entry of a default judgment”].) Here, although appellant indicated on his notice of appeal that he was appealing from a judgment after court trial, the record shows that he …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pryor v. Lyric Avenue Partnership 1 CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(See Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 [“no appeal lies from an order granting a motion to vacate a default upon which no default judgment has been entered”].) Similarly, an order sustaining a demurrer with leave to amend is not appealable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
An appellate court has no power to make appealable an order that is not appealable. {Velicescu v. Fauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1523 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 832 ].) In any event, the instant order is indeed appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding under CEQA, which proceeding could have been filed separately from the remaining claims.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CONSTANTIN VELISCESCU, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DAN PAUNA, Defendant and Respondent
B050647.
California Court of Appeal.
Jul 1, 1991.
231 Cal. App. 3d 1521
CONSTANTIN VELISCESCU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DAN PAUNA, Defendant and Respondent., Counsel, Berndt Lohr-Schmidt for Plaintiff and Appellant., Farano & Kieviet, Jeffrey L. Farano and Kimberly Briggs Berry for Defendant and Respondent.
Turner.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

TURNER, P. J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Constantin Velicescu, individually and doing business as Connie Construction Co., attempts to appeal from an order granting defendant Dan Fauna’s motion to vacate a default entered by the clerk of the trial court. Defendant correctly contends that the order was not appealable. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

II. Discussion

A. The Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Vacate a Clerk’s Entry of Default Was Not Appealable

Established California decisional law provides that no appeal lies from an order granting a motion to vacate a default upon which no default judgment has been entered. (Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [66 Cal.Rptr. 888]; cf. Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682 [222 Cal.Rptr. 340] [order denying motion to vacate clerk’s entry of default].) Also, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which contains a lengthy list of appealable orders and judgments, does not allow an appeal to be taken from an order granting a defendant’s default relief motion. In the present case, defendant’s default was entered by the clerk of the superior court on April 6, 1988. However, no default judgment was ever entered. As Division Seven of this appellate district noted in Winter v. Rice, supra, 176[*1523] Cal.App.3d at page 683, “[T]his court has no power to make appealable an order which is nonappeal able. [Citation.]” Accordingly, plaintiff’s purported appeal from the order granting defendant’s motion to vacate entry of default must be dismissed. [1]

Plaintiff’s citation to Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58-59 [90 Cal.Rptr. 78], is unpersuasive. In that case Division Four of this appellate district considered the merits of an appeal from an order granting relief from a clerk’s entry of default. However, the question whether an appeal may be taken from an order granting relief from default was not raised in Jackson. Further, the court did not consider the appealability of the order on its own motion. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398 [197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720].) Because the appealability issue was not raised or considered in Jackson, it is not authority for the proposition that such an order is appealable. (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [39 Cal.Rptr. 377, 393 P.2d 689].)

B.-D. *

III. Disposition

The attempted appeal from the nonappealable order of April 24, 1990, granting defendant’s motion to set aside a default, is dismissed. Defendant Dan Pauna is to recover his costs of proceedings in this court from plaintiff Constantin Velicescu, individually and dba Connie Construction Co.

Ashby, J., and Boren, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 18, 1991.

1

Any issue relative to the granting of defendant’s motion to set aside the default can be presented on appeal from the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).)

*

See footnote, ante, page 1521.