denial of a fair hearing in California

2024Here, the trial court stated that it was not section 1170.15 but section 667, subdivision (c)(6) that required mandatory imposition of consecutive terms for the violations of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2). “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Where ... a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the matter must be remanded for an informed determination.” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

2024His primary 28 argument is that the trial court’s “complete failure” to exercise its discretion not to impose the challenged fees and fines requires reversal of the sentencing order, as the “ ‘[f]ailure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights.’ ” (Quoting People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912 .) However, Jackson does not point to anything in this record that even suggests the trial court failed to comprehend or exercise its discretion in this case.

2026(Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 392 [“ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law 29 constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal’ ”].) Relying on Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1383 (Beasley), Dolores and Community contend the error is not reversible per se and we are required to conduct a harmless error analysis.

2022A “failure to exercise discretion is ‘itself an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79, 97 ; In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 .) “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes 13 While May’s notices of appeal identify both the denial of her motion for relief, as well as the underlying summary judgment order, her arguments made in briefing are limited only to the motion for relief and our analysis follows accordingly. 13 a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural

2024(Freeman, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 527 .) “[A]ny error in failing to grant a request for a continuance . . . is reversible only if it is tantamount to the denial of a fair hearing. [Citations.] There is no presumption of prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the burden to demonstrate prejudice is on the appellant.” (Id. at pp. 527–528.) We may not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, “in the absence of a clear abuse thereof appearing on the record.” (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984 .) The complaining party bears the burden to demonstrate from the record that a

2024We are cognizant that “ ‘[u]nnecessary continuances are wasteful, nonproductive, time-consuming and a fertile ground for criticism by the public of the courts.’ ” (Gardner v. Superior Court (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 335, 339 .) “Trial courts generally have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a request for a continuance.” (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 ; see also Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984 .) “[A]n abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when the denial of a continuance results in the denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudi

2024(See Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488 , 493–494 [discretionary continuance]; Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 865 [mandatory continuance].) There is no presumption of prejudice.

2016(See Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488, 494 [an error in failing to grant a request for a continuance is reversible only if it is tantamount to the denial of a fair hearing].) Also, we can discern no basis for finding the trial court erred when it denied mother’s request for a continuance to present expert testimony.

2026“Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.” (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 .) 7 “Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 306 .) But “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error wher

2022Furthermore, this district has said a trial court’s lack of knowledge regarding the scope of its discretion “may fall within a narrow class of sentencing issues that are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection.” (People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023 .) “Defendants are entitled to ‘sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court,’ and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 , quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 33

2026(See People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 743 ; In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1182 [“‘“Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal”’”].) Brown challenges the trial court’s finding that his childhood trauma was not a contributing factor to the offense.

2024(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 743 ; In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1182 [“Failure to exercise a discretion conferred 8 and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal”].) Franks challenges the trial court’s finding that his age was not a contributing factor in the offense.

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

1996Though the distinguished trial judge's preference was considered and in good faith, he should not have permitted his view to supersede that of the Legislature. [6] Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. ( In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1079, 1091 [ 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 875 ], review den.; see In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal. Rptr. 532 ] [Youth Authority commitment circumventing statutory procedures was prejudicial not

2026“Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.” (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 .) 7 “Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 306 .) But “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error wher

2024(Ibid.) “Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 306 .) Nonetheless, “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 .) 4

2022Furthermore, this district has said a trial court’s lack of knowledge regarding the scope of its discretion “may fall within a narrow class of sentencing issues that are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection.” (People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023 .) “Defendants are entitled to ‘sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court,’ and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 , quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 33

2022We conclude instead the matter must be remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing at which the court shall consider whether to exercise its discretion to substitute one of the lesser firearm use enhancements in place of the firearm discharge enhancement under section 12022.53(d). “‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Where, as here, a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understandin

2022A “failure to exercise discretion is ‘itself an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79, 97 ; In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 .) “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes 13 While May’s notices of appeal identify both the denial of her motion for relief, as well as the underlying summary judgment order, her arguments made in briefing are limited only to the motion for relief and our analysis follows accordingly. 13 a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural

2016As we recently confirmed in Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79, 97 [ 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 679 ]: a “failure to exercise discretion is ‘itself an abuse of discretion.’ (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ].) As we put it in Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 392 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ], ‘ “Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal.” ’ ” Moreover, the trial court’s statement

1986(See, e.g In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 444 ].) Such discretion is abused, however, where the lack of a continuance results in the denial of a fair hearing.

1986(See, e.g In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 444 ].) Such discretion is abused, however, where the lack of a continuance results in the denial of a fair hearing.

2024(See Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488 , 493–494 [discretionary continuance]; Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 865 [mandatory continuance].) There is no presumption of prejudice.

2011(See Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488, 493-494 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 922 ] [discretionary continuance]; Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 865 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 ] [mandatory continuance].) There is no presumption of prejudice.

2025However, where the subject of cross-examination concerns the matter at issue there can be no doubt that the refusal to permit such question[ing] results in a denial of a fair hearing.’ ” (McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes, Inc., supra, 199 Cal.App.2d at p. 507 .) For example, in Mueller v. J.

2024However, where the subject of cross-examination concerns the matter at issue there can be no doubt that the refusal to permit such question[ing] results in a denial of a fair hearing.’ ” (McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes, Inc. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 500, 507 .) When arguing in the trial court, Garcia asserted that Sowell sought the restraining order as “a form of retaliation” for past workplace disagreements, such as Garcia advocating for better working conditions.

2024Here, the trial court stated that it was not section 1170.15 but section 667, subdivision (c)(6) that required mandatory imposition of consecutive terms for the violations of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2). “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Where ... a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the matter must be remanded for an informed determination.” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

2022Furthermore, this district has said a trial court’s lack of knowledge regarding the scope of its discretion “may fall within a narrow class of sentencing issues that are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection.” (People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023 .) “Defendants are entitled to ‘sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court,’ and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 , quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 33

2024(Freeman, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 527 .) “[A]ny error in failing to grant a request for a continuance . . . is reversible only if it is tantamount to the denial of a fair hearing. [Citations.] There is no presumption of prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the burden to demonstrate prejudice is on the appellant.” (Id. at pp. 527–528.) We may not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, “in the absence of a clear abuse thereof appearing on the record.” (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984 .) The complaining party bears the burden to demonstrate from the record that a

2024We are cognizant that “ ‘[u]nnecessary continuances are wasteful, nonproductive, time-consuming and a fertile ground for criticism by the public of the courts.’ ” (Gardner v. Superior Court (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 335, 339 .) “Trial courts generally have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a request for a continuance.” (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 ; see also Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984 .) “[A]n abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when the denial of a continuance results in the denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudi

2023(Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677 .) 40 If Torricellas was denied a fair hearing on her grievances, that in itself is an injury.

2013(Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677 ; In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327 [due process claim subject to harmless error analysis when resort to speculation not required to determine outcome was unaffected].) Seychelle, however, does not show it was denied a fair hearing.

2021(In re I.G. (2004) 226 Cal.App.4th 380 , 386–387; In re Roger S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 [“By empowering the juvenile court to issue custody and restraining orders, the Legislature has expressed its belief that ‘the juvenile court is the appropriate place for these matters to be determined and that the juvenile court’s orders must be honored in later superior court proceedings.’ [Citation.]”].) “ ‘ “[A] ruling otherwise within the trial court’s power will nonetheless be set aside where it appears from the record that in issuing the ruling the court failed to exercise the discretion in i

2016(See In re L.A. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 413, 428 [“ ‘ “[f]ailure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ”].) We also note that the form on which the court issued the restraining order against Mack includes a provision allowing for the restrained party to visit with a child who is also protected by the restraining order’s terms.

2022A “failure to exercise discretion is ‘itself an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79, 97 ; In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 .) “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes 13 While May’s notices of appeal identify both the denial of her motion for relief, as well as the underlying summary judgment order, her arguments made in briefing are limited only to the motion for relief and our analysis follows accordingly. 13 a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural

2016As we recently confirmed in Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79, 97 [ 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 679 ]: a “failure to exercise discretion is ‘itself an abuse of discretion.’ (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ].) As we put it in Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 392 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ], ‘ “Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal.” ’ ” Moreover, the trial court’s statement

2019(E.g., Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523 , 527, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 [an abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when it results in the denial of a fair hearing or otherwise prejudices a party]; Coastside Fishing Club v. California Fish & Game Com . (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 397 , 428, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 [abuse of discretion does not require reversal unless the appellant shows the ruling was prejudicial-i.e., that it is reasonably probable the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error].) In the present case, while the zoning administrator ac

2019(E.g., Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523 , 527, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 [an abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when it results in the denial of a fair hearing or otherwise prejudices a party]; Coastside Fishing Club v. California Fish & Game Com . (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 397 , 428, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 [abuse of discretion does not require reversal unless the appellant shows the ruling was prejudicial-i.e., that it is reasonably probable the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error].) In the present case, while the zoning administrator ac

2016(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 , 948 P.2d 429 ]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 786 P.2d 892 ].) 1.

2016(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 , 948 P.2d 429 ]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 786 P.2d 892 ].) 1.