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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2021However, as we conclude below, this aspect of Tapia’s challenge fails because there was substantial evidence upon which the court could have found Tapia failed to show the extent of his pumping for reasonable and beneficial uses, and hence failed to show a basis for an allocation of production rights. 26. priority, such “equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, [is] to be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion.” (Ibid.) Thus, where (as here) the native supply is insufficient to meet the needs of all overliers, each overlier can be “limited to his proportion 2021(Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [a trial court “within limits, … may use its equitable powers to implement a physical solution”]; cf. Tehachapi-Cummings, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001 [correlative rights “means that each has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based upon his reasonable need” (italics added)].) Thus, when crafting a physical solution for an overdrafted groundwater basin where a court must allocate | 1 | 1 |
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambragreen1 sentence2021(Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [a trial court “within limits, … may use its equitable powers to implement a physical solution”]; cf. Tehachapi-Cummings, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001 [correlative rights “means that each has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based upon his reasonable need” (italics added)].) Thus, when crafting a physical solution for an overdrafted groundwater basin where a court must allocate | 1 | 1 |
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agencygreen2 sentences2021(Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [a trial court “within limits, … may use its equitable powers to implement a physical solution”]; cf. Tehachapi-Cummings, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001 [correlative rights “means that each has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based upon his reasonable need” (italics added)].) Thus, when crafting a physical solution for an overdrafted groundwater basin where a court must allocate 2021(Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [a trial court “within limits, … may use its equitable powers to implement a physical solution”]; cf. Tehachapi-Cummings, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001 [correlative rights “means that each has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based upon his reasonable need” (italics added)].) Thus, when crafting a physical solution for an overdrafted groundwater basin where a court must allocate | 1 | 1 |
Winter v. Ricegreen1 sentence2013(Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 ; cf. Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682 [order denying motion to vacate clerk’s entry of default].) Also, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which contains a lengthy list of appealable orders and judgments, does not allow an appeal to be taken from an order granting a defendant’s default relief motion.” (Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 .) As confirmed by the foregoing, the order granting Tapia’s motion to set aside the default is nonappealable. 2 DISPOSITION Tapia’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012(Roberts v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 558 .) Tapia’s privilege, however, did not extend past the time “sentence ha[d] been fixed and the judgment of conviction ha[d] become final.” (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 424 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 ].) 2012(Roberts v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 558 .) Tapia’s privilege, however, did not extend past the time “sentence ha[d] been fixed and the judgment of conviction ha[d] become final.” (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 424 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 ].) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dillardgreen2 sentences2005(Cf. People v. Dillard (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 261, 267 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 136 ].) c. 2005(Cf. People v. Dillard (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 261, 267 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 136 ].) c. | 1 | 1 |
Snipes v. City of Bakersfieldgreen2 sentences1994“Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 865 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 760 ].) Here, the trial court overruled the demurrer, on the ground that Tapia’s claim was not subject to the claim presentation requirements. 1994“Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 865 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 760 ].) Here, the trial court overruled the demurrer, on the ground that Tapia’s claim was not subject to the claim presentation requirements. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jae Lee v. United States
green
2 sentences2018And a defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial." ( Id. at p. ----, 137 S.Ct. at p. 1966 .) The reason is that "defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding whether to accept a plea. [Citation.] Where a defendant has no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a plea if the Government offers one." ( Ibid. ) Here, despite his claims to the contrary in his moving papers, the evidence at the time of trial and the 2018And a defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial." ( Id. at p. ----, 137 S.Ct. at p. 1966 .) The reason is that "defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding whether to accept a plea. [Citation.] Where a defendant has no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a plea if the Government offers one." ( Ibid. ) Here, despite his claims to the contrary in his moving papers, the evidence at the time of trial and the | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. D'Arcy
green
2 sentences2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion 2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Flood
green
1 sentence2021“Under established law, instructional error relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offense violates the defendant’s rights under both the United States and California Constitutions.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 479-480 .) Because CALCRIM No. 3404 was entirely duplicative of the other jury instructions, its absence did not deprive the jury of instructions on every essential element of the firearm enhancement or otherwise lessen the prosecution’s burden at trial. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Zamudio
green
2 sentences2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion 2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Olvera
green
2 sentences2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion 2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Ogunmowo
green
2 sentences2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion 2018We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Ogunmowo , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 76 , 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 529 ; People v. Olvera , supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 293, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 .) Although the focus of Tapia's motion | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Veliscescu v. Pauna
green
1 sentence2013(Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 ; cf. Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682 [order denying motion to vacate clerk’s entry of default].) Also, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which contains a lengthy list of appealable orders and judgments, does not allow an appeal to be taken from an order granting a defendant’s default relief motion.” (Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 .) As confirmed by the foregoing, the order granting Tapia’s motion to set aside the default is nonappealable. 2 DISPOSITION Tapia’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Leo v. Dunlap
green
1 sentence2013(Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 ; cf. Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682 [order denying motion to vacate clerk’s entry of default].) Also, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which contains a lengthy list of appealable orders and judgments, does not allow an appeal to be taken from an order granting a defendant’s default relief motion.” (Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 .) As confirmed by the foregoing, the order granting Tapia’s motion to set aside the default is nonappealable. 2 DISPOSITION Tapia’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Roberts v. United States
green
1 sentence2012(Roberts v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 558 .) Tapia’s privilege, however, did not extend past the time “sentence ha[d] been fixed and the judgment of conviction ha[d] become final.” (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 424 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 ].) | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Calder v. Bull
green
2 sentences2007Statutes of this sort do not implicate "the definition of, punishment of, and defenses to crimes," thus eliminating any possible ex post facto concern. (1 Witkin Epstein, supra , Introduction to Crimes, § 12, p. 28.) Nonetheless, as Tapia argued — as does Alcala — such laws may appear to have a "retrospective" effect, necessitating a review for a potential ex post facto violation. ( Tapia v. Superior Court, supra , 53 Cal.3d at pp. 299-300 .) Thus, we must examine the second prong of the Tapia test as it applies to Alcala because these statutes, by permitting the consolidation of charges and e 2007Statutes of this sort do not implicate "the definition of, punishment of, and defenses to crimes," thus eliminating any possible ex post facto concern. (1 Witkin Epstein, supra , Introduction to Crimes, § 12, p. 28.) Nonetheless, as Tapia argued — as does Alcala — such laws may appear to have a "retrospective" effect, necessitating a review for a potential ex post facto violation. ( Tapia v. Superior Court, supra , 53 Cal.3d at pp. 299-300 .) Thus, we must examine the second prong of the Tapia test as it applies to Alcala because these statutes, by permitting the consolidation of charges and e | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Carmell v. Texas
green
2 sentences2007Statutes of this sort do not implicate "the definition of, punishment of, and defenses to crimes," thus eliminating any possible ex post facto concern. (1 Witkin Epstein, supra , Introduction to Crimes, § 12, p. 28.) Nonetheless, as Tapia argued — as does Alcala — such laws may appear to have a "retrospective" effect, necessitating a review for a potential ex post facto violation. ( Tapia v. Superior Court, supra , 53 Cal.3d at pp. 299-300 .) Thus, we must examine the second prong of the Tapia test as it applies to Alcala because these statutes, by permitting the consolidation of charges and e 2007Statutes of this sort do not implicate "the definition of, punishment of, and defenses to crimes," thus eliminating any possible ex post facto concern. (1 Witkin Epstein, supra , Introduction to Crimes, § 12, p. 28.) Nonetheless, as Tapia argued — as does Alcala — such laws may appear to have a "retrospective" effect, necessitating a review for a potential ex post facto violation. ( Tapia v. Superior Court, supra , 53 Cal.3d at pp. 299-300 .) Thus, we must examine the second prong of the Tapia test as it applies to Alcala because these statutes, by permitting the consolidation of charges and e | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1998Williams reasoned that the defendant's "substantial personal rights" were adversely affected by the retrospective application of the statutory extension of the maximum period of probation and therefore violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. ( People v. Williams, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 4-5 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 464 .) Although the court used the "substantial personal rights" test for finding a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws, it is unclear whether the court would have reached a different result under the current Collins and Tapia analysis of ex post facto 1998Williams reasoned that the defendant's "substantial personal rights" were adversely affected by the retrospective application of the statutory extension of the maximum period of probation and therefore violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. ( People v. Williams, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 4-5 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 464 .) Although the court used the "substantial personal rights" test for finding a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws, it is unclear whether the court would have reached a different result under the current Collins and Tapia analysis of ex post facto | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Pro-Family Advocates v. Gomez
green
2 sentences1998Nevertheless, even if Williams might not have involved an ex post facto law under current standards, the court probably would have found that the amended statute must be applied prospectively because it adversely affected the legal consequences of the defendant's past conduct. [8] We perceive no apparent legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose in the provisions of 1997 section 1000 that would save it from otherwise being classified as an ex post facto law if applied to pre-1997 conduct. ( People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 89 , 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ; Pro-Family Advocate 1998Nevertheless, even if Williams might not have involved an ex post facto law under current standards, the court probably would have found that the amended statute must be applied prospectively because it adversely affected the legal consequences of the defendant's past conduct. [8] We perceive no apparent legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose in the provisions of 1997 section 1000 that would save it from otherwise being classified as an ex post facto law if applied to pre-1997 conduct. ( People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 89 , 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ; Pro-Family Advocate | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. McVickers
green
2 sentences1998Nevertheless, even if Williams might not have involved an ex post facto law under current standards, the court probably would have found that the amended statute must be applied prospectively because it adversely affected the legal consequences of the defendant's past conduct. [8] We perceive no apparent legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose in the provisions of 1997 section 1000 that would save it from otherwise being classified as an ex post facto law if applied to pre-1997 conduct. ( People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 89 , 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ; Pro-Family Advocate 1998Nevertheless, even if Williams might not have involved an ex post facto law under current standards, the court probably would have found that the amended statute must be applied prospectively because it adversely affected the legal consequences of the defendant's past conduct. [8] We perceive no apparent legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose in the provisions of 1997 section 1000 that would save it from otherwise being classified as an ex post facto law if applied to pre-1997 conduct. ( People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 89 , 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ; Pro-Family Advocate | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.