Senesac v. Senesac, 370 A.2d 214 (Vt. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Senesac v. Senesac, 370 A.2d 214 (Vt. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1987 · …in awarding custody and in decreeing visitation rights, the trial court has wide discretion. at p. 215 ✓
18 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Poulin v. Upham (vt, 1987-12-04)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Poulin v. Upham (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Vt. · 1987 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
in awarding custody and in decreeing visitation rights, the trial court has wide discretion.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milligan v. Milligan
Vt. · 1992 · confidence medium
Although we have held that property must normally be distributed between the parties, Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 215 (1976), it is appropriate to use a property award to discharge an obligation to provide support.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peckham v. Peckham
Vt. · 1988 · confidence medium
Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 215 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Price v. Price
Vt. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 141 Vt. 580, 581 , 450 A.2d 1155, 1155 (1982); Ohland v. Ohland, 141 Vt. 34, 39 , 442 A.2d 1306, 1309 (1982); Korshak v. Korshak, 140 Vt. 547, 550 , 442 A.2d 464, 466 (1982); Cameron v. Cameron, 137 Vt. 12, 14 , 398 A.2d 294, 295 (1979); Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529, 531 , 394 A.2d 1139, 1141 (1978); Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 215 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emmons v. Emmons (2×)
Vt. · 1982 · confidence medium
Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 215 (1976); Boone v. Boone, 133 Vt. 170, 173 , 333 A.2d 98, 100 (1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ohland v. Ohland
Vt. · 1982 · confidence medium
Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 215 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cameron v. Cameron
Vt. · 1979 · confidence medium
We set forth the principles of review for cases of this nature in Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 214-15 (1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bissonette v. Gambrel (2×)
Vt. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
We further note that the “trial judge has a broad discretion in determining what is in the best interests of *70 children____In many instances he will be able to draw upon his own common sense, his experience in life, and the common experience of mankind and be able to reach a reasoned judgment ____” Harris, 149 Vt. at 416 , 546 A.2d at 213 (quoting with approval Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Ky. 1983)); see also Senesac v. Senesac, 135 Vt. 24, 25 , 370 A.2d 214, 214-15 (1976).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lynda Senesac
v.
Joseph Maurice F. Senesac
326-75.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
Dec 23, 1976.
370 A.2d 214
1976 Vt. LEXIS 601
Langrock & Sperry, Middlebury, for Plaintiff., Gary D. McQuesten of Richard E. Davis Associates, Inc., Barre, for Defendant.
Barney, Daley, Larrow, Billings, Keyser.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 63%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Vermont (1)
Per Curiam.

This is an appeal by the defendant-husband from a divorce decree. The appeal is from portions of the order relating to the custody of the minor children, the visitation rights of the appellant, and the decree of the family residence to the children subject to the appellant’s life use. The life use is contingent upon his payment of taxes, mortgage installments, insurance, and maintenance costs. Findings of fact were not[*25] requested by either party nor made by the court. V.R.C.P. 52. Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in making the orders.

The trial court had before it conflicting evidence concerning the parties and their care of the minor children. In awarding custody and in decreeing visitation rights, the trial court has wide discretion. Its decision will not be revised by this Court unless the discretion was erroneously exercised, Boone v. Boone, 133 Vt. 170, 174, 333 A.2d 98 (1975), or was exercised upon unfounded' considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable in light of the evidence. Loeb v. Loeb, 120 Vt. 489, 492, 144 A.2d 825 (1958). The welfare of the children is determinative in the awarding of custody. McKinney v. Kelley, 120 Vt. 299, 302, 141 A.2d 660 (1957). On the record here, we are unable to hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The portion of the order relative to custody and visitation rights must be affirmed.

15 V.S.A. § 751 provides in part as follows:

In granting a divorce from bed and board, or an absolute divorce, or a decree annulling a marriage, upon petition of either party, the court shall decree such disposition of the property owned by the parties separately, jointly, or by the entirety, as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties. . . .

The trial court has broad discretion in the disposition of marital property between the parties. LaFarr v. LaFarr, 132 Vt. 191, 315 A.2d 235 (1974). Fault may be considered in the ascertainment of an equitable division. Boone v. Boone, supra, 133 Vt. at 173. The statute provides that the marital property, absent stipulation to the contrary, is to be disposed of between the parties. The trial court erred when it decreed the fee in the homestead to the children, and that portion of the order must be reversed.

The order with respect to custody and rights of visitation is affirmed. That portion of the order respecting property division of the parties’ homestead is reversed. The cause is remanded forthwith, and it is further ordered that the cause be advanced on the docket for early hearing.