Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 408 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 408 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 1999 · 2 courts · …where a nonconformity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself. ✓
145 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: South Lyme Property Owners Ass'n v. Town of Old Lyme (ctd, 2000-10-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) South Lyme Property Owners Ass'n v. Town of Old Lyme
D. Conn. · 2000 · confidence medium
Connecticut General Statutes § 8-2(a) provides that zoning regulations “shall not prohibit the continuance of any non-conforming use, building or structure existing at the time of the adoption of such regulations.” In Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 484 , 408 A.2d 243, 246 (1979) (quoting 2 Yokely, Zoning Law & Practice § 16-3 at 219), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that “[a] lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection.” Defendants, however, contend that the property interests Plaintiffs claim are “be…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Litchfield Planning Zoning, No. Cv-99-0079037s (Oct. 7, 1999)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
That this right may be passed on to others "in no way contradicts the recognized goal of eliminating non-conformities as quickly as possible since that policy must be carried out within the limits of permissible governmental action." Petruzzi , at 483.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keith v. Saco River Corridor Commission
Me. · 1983 · confidence medium
Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296 , 429 A.2d 883, 885 (1980); Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 408 A.2d 243, 246 (1979); People v. Smith, 38 Ill.App.3d 798 , 349 N.E.2d 91, 92 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (2×)
Conn. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 240 , 662 A.2d 1179 (1995); see Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 483–84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (nonconforming uses are vested rights protected by constitution); see also General Statutes § 8-2 (d) (4) (A) (‘‘[z]oning regulations . . . shall not . . . [p]rohibit the continuance of any nonconforming use, building or structure existing at the time of the adoption of such regulations’’).
discussed Cited "see" Mayer-Wittmann v. Zoning Board of Appeals (2×)
Conn. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 484 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (‘‘ ‘[a] lawfully established non- conforming use is a vested right and is entitled to consti- tutional protection’ ’’).
discussed Cited "see" Lord Family of Windsor, LLC v. PLANNING AND ZONING COM'N OF TOWN OF WINDSOR (2×)
Conn. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 484 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (“[zjoning is concerned with the use of specific existing buildings and lots, and not primarily with their ownership” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 235 Conn. 850, 857 , 670 A.2d 1271 (1996) (“zoning power may only be used to regulate the use, not the user of the land” [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited "see" Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 484 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Northeast Parking, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 480-83 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979). “[I]t is the ‘indisputable goal of zoning to reduce nonconforming to conforming uses with all the speed justice will tolerate.’ Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corporation, 173 Conn. 175, 181 , 377 A.2d 280 (1977).” Helbig v. Zoning Commission, supra, 185 Conn. 306 .
discussed Cited "see" City of Bridgeport v. Town of Stratford, No. Cv 89 0257140 (Jul. 21, 1997) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
Even though Sikorsky Airport is a nonconforming use, and the elimination of a nonconforming use is a goal of zoning; see Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 176 Conn. 479 , 484 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979); Molic v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 18 Conn. App. 159 , 164 , 556 A.2d 1049 (1989); see also Woodford v. Zoning Commission , 147 Conn. 30 , 33 , 156 A.2d 470 (1959) (if property is not rezoned, the elimination of a nonconforming use might ultimately be achieved); the improbability of eliminating Sikorsky Airport — a large, nonconforming use, with peculiar characteristics — considered along wi…
discussed Cited "see" Yerkes v. Town of Voluntown Zba, No. Cv 94 105711 (Sep. 3, 1996)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. ZBA, 176 Conn. 479 (1979), in which it was held that a landowner was entitled as a matter of right to convert a nonconforming church to a nonconforming home, where the nonconforming features were lot size, setback requirements, and so forth; see also Archembault v. Wadlow, 25 Conn. App. 375 , 381 (1991) (change in configuration resulting in increase of lot size, though still nonconforming, is not sufficient to deny a variance), and Adolphson v. ZBA, supra, 710 CT Page 5578-UU (change in nonconforming use acceptable where the nonconformity is not increased).
cited Cited "see" Nichols v. Board of Zoning Appeal of Cambridge
Mass. App. Ct. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Oxford, 176 Conn. 479, 484 (1979); Sukthankar’s Radnor Township Zoning Appeals, 2 Pa. Commw. 489, 494 (1971).
discussed Cited "see" Magnano v. Zoning Board of Appeals (2×)
Conn. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
In the present case there was unrefuted testimony that the owner was engaged in marketing the property with its valuable nonconforming use as an asset; see Petruzzi v. Zoning Board Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 484 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979); throughout the period following the day gas was last sold there. 4 The zoning board’s conclusion that the nonconforming use had not been discontinued was therefore neither unfair nor based on an invalid reason.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 482–83, 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (‘‘[t]he lot and building in question’’ qualified as legally protected nonconform- ing uses because they were lawful and in existence prior to enactment of zoning regulations).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kelley v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Norwalk, No. Cv98 0162660 S (Dec. 4, 2000)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 176 Conn. 479 , 481 (1979) (a building declared nonconforming under § 8-13a may still "change from one permitted use to another permitted use" § under § 8-2 ); Mulholland v. Fortunata , Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, Docket No. 527827 (March 3, 1994, Austin, J.) (" 8-13a ) applies to the resident itself and not the use of it as a two-family dwelling").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Appeal of Miserocchi
Vt. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 408 A.2d 243, 246-47 (Conn. 1979) (board must issue permit to plaintiffs seeking to alter interior of existing noncomplying building from one permitted use — church — to another permitted use — single family dwelling); Singh Sukthankar v. Hearing Bd. of Radnor Township, 280 A.2d 467, 470 (Pa. Commw.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kelley v. Norwalk Zoning Board of App., No. Cv 98 0162660 S (Feb. 11, 1999)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 176 Conn. 479 , 481 (1979) (a building declared nonconforming under § 8-13a may still "change from one permitted use to another permitted use" under § 8-2 ); Mulholland v. Fortunata , Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 527827 (March 3, 1994, Austin, J. ) ("8-13a applies to the residence itself and not the use of it as a two-family dwelling").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." City of West Haven v. Gamelin, No. Cvnh 9708-8389 (Aug. 17, 1998) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 481 n. 2, 408 A.2d 243 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jacobs v. Greenwich Zoning Board of Appeals, No. Cv95-145184 (Feb. 28, 1996) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (permitting the owner to change the use of the structure from one permitted use to another although the building no longer satisfied set-back requirements, commenting that none of the existing nonconformities were extended.) The Shores concede in their brief that the property is physically nonconforming (Brief of Defendants Shore, p. 12), but the physical nonconformity is not changing, and the gatehouse is being changed from one conforming use to another, which does not require a special permit.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Neumann v. Zoning Board of Appeals (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
The plaintiffs reliance on a claim of deprivation of a vested right in a nonconforming use; see, e.g., Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479 , 408 A.2d 243 (1979); simply misses the mark.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Michael J. Petruzzi Et Al.
v.
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Oxford
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Jan 16, 1979.
408 A.2d 243
1979 Conn. LEXIS 672
Frederick W. Krug, for the appellants (plaintiffs)., Robert J. TJskevich, for the appellee (defendant).
Cotter, Loiselle, Bogdanski, Longo, Peters.
Cited by 83 opinions  |  Published
[*480] Bogdanski, J.

On and before April 1, 1948, the property which is the subject of this appeal consisted of a lot 11,200 square feet in area with a frontage on a state road of 105 feet, and had located on it a one-story wooden frame building. This building was used as a church continuously up to 1975.

On April 1, 1948, the town of Oxford adopted its first zoning ordinance, which placed the subject property in residence district A. The use of the building as a church was and is a permitted use in residence district A, as is the use of the structure as a one-family detached residence. The effect of the 1948 ordinance was also to impose setback requirements, which the building did not meet. Later zoning enactments imposed additional area and frontage requirements which the property also could not meet. As a result, although neither the lot nor the building has changed in size or shape since 1948, the enactment of increasingly restrictive zoning ordinances has rendered both lot and building nonconforming.

In February of 1976, the plaintiffs purchased the subject property. In July of that year, they applied for a building permit in order to convert the building to a house for use as a single-family detached residence, a use permitted in residence district A. The building official of the town denied the application on the grounds that the property did not comply with the present area, setback and frontage requirements in article 5, §§ 4 and 5, of the zoning regulations. [1]

[*481] Thereafter the zoning hoard of appeals on December 21, 1976, denied the plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground that there was no evidence of any hardship to the plaintiffs since they knew the physical characteristics of the lot when they bought it. In effect, the zoning board found that the plaintiffs had created their own hardship and concluded that they should therefore not be granted relief. On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the court affirmed the board’s decision adding that the proposed use was in violation of article 2, § 5, of the Oxford zoning regulations, which provides that one nonconforming use may not be substituted for another. Upon the granting of their petition for certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

We note at the outset that the zoning board in its pleadings has admitted that the effect of the 1948 ordinance was to place the subject property within residence district A, and that the use of a structure as a one-family detached residence is the use permitted within such district. We note further that under the applicable provisions of the zoning regulations, the use of a building as a church is also a permitted use within such district. We further observe that there is nothing in Oxford’s zoning regulations which prohibits a change from one permitted use to another permitted use, with respect to a building or lot having a condition of legal nonconformity. [2] Singh Sukthankar v. Hearing Board of Radnor Township, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 489, 280 A.2d 467 (1971).

[*482] In light of the above, we conclude that article 2, § 5, of the zoning regulations, relied on by the trial eourt, has no applicability to the situation in this case and that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ appeal on that basis.

The Oxford zoning regulations provide that no building shall be altered except in conformity with article 2, § 11, and that no building shall be altered until a certificate of occupancy has been issued stating that the building conforms to the provisions of the zoning regulations as provided in article 2, § 12. The plaintiffs, therefore, were required to obtain a building permit in order to convert the existing frame building into a residence. In determining whether to issue the building permit, the building official was required to decide whether the proposed use was in conformity with the applicable regulations. In this ease, since the proposed use was a permitted use, the only issue before the building official was whether the lot and building met the requirements of the zoning regulations.

Article 2, § 2, provides: “Any building ... or use legally existing at the time of [the] promulgation of these Regulations may be continued, even though such building ... or use does not conform to the requirements of these Regulations.” Article 2, § 12, further provides: “Nothing in this Regulation shall require the removal, alteration or abandonment of, nor prevent the continuance of the use and occupancy of, a building lawfully existing on the date of the adoption of this Regulation, except as may be necessary for the safety of life or property (Emphasis added.)

The lot and building in question antedate the enactment of zoning in Oxford, and since neither[*483] the lot nor the building has changed in size or shape since before the enactment of zoning, they are entitled to the protections afforded by those sections of the regulations. Thus protected, the lot and building are legally existing nonconformities, and as to them the present provisions in article 5, §§ 4 and 5, as to lot size and setback requirements are of no force or effect.

It is well settled that “[t]he language of the ordinance must be given a construction which is reasonable under all the circumstances.” Planning & Zoning Commission v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 309, 216 A.2d 442 (1966). Article 2 and its provisions must be read together with article 5 to avoid self-contradiction and confusion. When that is done, the lot and building, as legally existing nonconformities, do, in fact, meet the requirements of the zoning regulations.

Moreover, the General Statutes also expressly provide that preexisting nonconforming lots and buildings are entitled to protection from restrictive zoning. Section 8-2 of the General Statutes provides in pertinent part: “Such regulations shall not prohibit the continuance of any nonconforming use, building or structure existing at the time of the adoption of such regulations.”

Where a nonconformity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself. “And the right is not forfeited by a purchaser who takes with knowledge of the regulations which are inconsistent with the existing use.” 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) § 6.37, p. 445. “A vested right, unless abandoned, to continue the nonconforming use is in the land .... [T]he right to a noneon[*484] forming use is a property right and . . . any provision of a statute or ordinance which takes away that right in an unreasonable manner, or in a manner not grounded on the public welfare, is invalid. A lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection.” 2 Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice, § 16-3, p. 219.

“Zoning is concerned with the use of specific existing buildings and lots, and not primarily with their ownership.” Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 28, 32, 54 A.2d 675 (1947). That such rights are vested and may be passed on to others in no way contradicts the recognized goal of eliminating nonconformities as quickly as possible, since that policy must be carried out within the limits of permissible governmental action.

Because a nonconforming lot and building have a vested right in continued existence, a purchaser who seeks to use such lot and building for a permitted use cannot be said to be seeking relief from hardship brought upon himself by virtue of his purchase. His right to use the lot and building for a permitted use is protected by law. Schultz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 332, 130 A.2d 789 (1957). Here, the plaintiffs seek nothing more than to alter the interior of an existing nonconforming building for a permitted use. In the absence of a finding that the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the building would endanger life or property, as set forth in article 2, § 12, of the zoning regulations, there is nothing in the Oxford regulations or the General Statutes to support the defendant’s refusal to issue the building permit. The record reveals that no such finding was made either by the building official or the board.

[*485] We conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the denial of the plaintiffs’ application for a building permit.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the appeal and directing the defendant hoard to order the issuance of a building permit.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

Article 5 of the Oxford zoning regulations provides, in part: “Section 4. . . . Bach lot shall have a minimum land area of one and one-half acres .... Bach lot shall also have a frontage of 175 feet or more on a publie street.

“Section 5. Setbacks. No building . . . shall extend within 30 feet of the . . . taking line of any State highway.”

2

“It is recognized that the distinction between a nonconforming building or structure and a nonconforming use of land is genuine and may be critical.” 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) § 6.01, p. 355.