In Re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1954). · Go Syfert
In Re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re the Matter of Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Appointed Counsel, Nancy Ann Baker, United States of America v. Anita J. Walton (ca9, 1982-12-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Matter of Attorney's Fees and Expenses of Appointed Counsel, Nancy Ann Baker, United States of America v. Anita J. Walton
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
These nonadversarial procedures established by the CJA convince us that the district judge’s certification of attorneys’ fees is an administrative act, see In re L.B. & W. 4217, 238 F.2d 163, 166 , 16 Alaska 277 (9th Cir.1956); In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668, 669 (D.C.Cir.1954); Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18, 22-23 (D.C.Cir.1953), and is consequently not one of the “final decisions” rendered appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . 3 See In re L.B. & W. 4217, 238 F.2d at 165 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James F. Smith, Appeal of Mark J. Rogers, Attorney. United States of America v. Jean Gristeau, Appeal of Thomas E. Bush, Attorney. Charles Edward Bunn v. Attorney General of the United States, Appeal of Jona Goldschmidt, Attorney
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See Application of L.B. & W. 4217, 238 F.2d 163, 165 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668, 669 (D.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Smith
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See Application of L.B. & W. 4217, 238 F.2d 163, 165 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668, 669 (D.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Judith Berkan
1st Cir. · 1981 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare In re Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1956) (denial of petition by court, in absence of assertion of a violation of a right, held not appealable) and In re Jacobi, 217 F.2d 668 (D.C.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re JACOBI
Misc. 374.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Jun 3, 1954.
217 F.2d 668
Mr. Alfred J. Jacobi, petitioner, pro se., Mr. Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondents.
Miller, Prettyman, Bazelon.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, directed to the Chief Judge and Associate Judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Permission to file the petition was granted by this court on August 14, 1953, upon a motion for leave to file it. The petition seeks a writ which would direct the Clerk of the District Court to file a notice of appeal and a designation of a record deposited by petitioner on or about November 3, 1952.

In 1931 petitioner filed an application for admission to the bar of the District Court. He took and passed the written examinations for admission to the bar in June, 1931, twenty-three years ago. A series of interviews or hearings followed over the years, the Committee on Admissions continuing to refuse to recommend his admission. In 1952 he filed a “Special Petition” for admission. Jacobi tells us this “Special Petition” was a device improvised by him. It did not purport to be filed against the Committee on Admissions. In response to it he received a personal letter from the Chief Judge of the District Court, saying that it was denied. Thereupon Jacobi attempted to appeal to this court from that letter. That attempt is the subject matter of the present proceeding.

[*669] This court held in Brooks v. Laws [1] that an application for admission to the bar does not constitute a proceeding which requires a judicial judgment. Upon such an application there is, we held, nothing which the Clerk of the court is required to enter upon the court docket, or which requires an open hearing upon evidence openly taken, or which requires a judicial determination upon the facts thus openly recorded. In this sense the application and its rejection are not a case or controversy. Failure or refusal to act favorably upon such an application does not constitute a judicial judgment or order and so is not appeal-able. Neither, we held, does correspondence from the court or the judges to the applicant constitute a judicial order or judgment.

The Rules of Civil Procedure make amply clear the manner in which one who has a cause of action may formulate it into a case or controversy within the procedural requirements for judicial determination. It is clear from Carver v. Clephane [2] cited in Brooks v. Laws, supra, that a person having what he believes to be a cause of action against the Committee on Admissions of the District Court because of alleged wrongs committed by that Committee, may lodge a complaint in a civil action against the Committee, which will receive judicial determination, which in turn will be an appealable judgment. Nothing in Brooks v. Laws is to the contrary. Such a complaint must, of course, meet the requirement of the Rules for a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the complainant is entitled to relief, and it must withstand attack upon the substance of the claim as a justiciable allegation of wrongdoing; and also, of course, the complainant bears the burden of proof if his claim withstands initial attack and goes to hearing.

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

1

. 1953, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 208 F.2d 18.