Appellant Torris Gilyard appeals his conviction for crimes related to the death of Terry Crawford. ^[1] On March 29, 2004, appellant[*801] Toris Gilyard participated in the armed robbery of three men, including Crawford, who were sitting in a car on a neighborhood street in Terrell County. During the encounter, co-indictee Kenneth Ponder fatally shot Crawford in the head with a shotgun. One of the two other men in the car testified that, after Ponder shot the victim, appellant, with his hand in his pocket simulating that he had a gun, took money and drugs from the witness. ^[2] Ponder also took money from the third man. Appellant and Ponder then fled the scene. The authorities located the murder weapon in the back yard of a house that was located about two hundred yards away from the murder scene.

The authorities interviewed appellant about the victim’s death three times. At the time of the first interview, appellant was in custody on an unrelated matter. He was given his Miranda 3 rights, waived them, and spoke to the authorities without the presence of counsel. He told the authorities that he witnessed Ponder, along with an unidentified man, approach the victims’ car and saw Ponder shoot the deceased victim. The second time appellant was interviewed by authorities, he was not in custody and came to the interview on his own accord. Again he was given Miranda rights, waived them, and spoke to the authorities without the presence of counsel. He repeated the same story he had provided during the first interview. The evidence showed that during his third voluntary interview with police, appellant admitted his presence at the crime scene and admitted that he was the person who stood on the passenger side of the victims’ vehicle during the robbery; however, he denied threatening the victims or stealing anything from the victims. Although made aware of his rights prior to each interrogation, appellant never invoked his right to remain silent or his right to have an attorney present. At trial, appellant took the stand and testified on direct examination that he did not immediately go to authorities or initially tell the truth about what happened because he was afraid of Ponder, who had not been apprehended by police, and because he was afraid of being charged with the crimes.

1. The evidence as described above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty as a party to the crimes for which he was charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478 (1) (689 SE2d 825) (2010).

[*802] 2. On appeal, appellant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to raise an objection during trial to the following colloquy during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of appellant:

Q: There’s no reason why you couldn’t that very night, if this was you just being suddenly forced to go down there and participate in a robbery with a total stranger with a shotgun, you could have run right on to the police department. In fact, you could have told your mama, a police officer.

A: I was scared.

Q: You were scared? Well, that’s what I want to know. What you [were] scared of?

A: I was scared that I was going to be charged with these charges for being there.

Q: But you wouldn’t, you think, if you came straight to the police and told them that, that you might look a little better than you do today?

Appellant contends this colloquy was an impermissible commentary by the State regarding his pre-arrest silence and, for that reason, objectionable. We disagree and, for reasons set forth below, we affirm.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant

must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 34 (4) (644 SE2d 837) (2007). Here, appellant cannot show any deficiency on the part of his attorney’s performance. Specifically, since appellant spoke with police without ever invoking his right to remain silent, the prosecutor’s line of questioning did not constitute impermissible commentary on appellant’s right to remain silent. Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. 842 (4) (684 SE2d 590) (2009); Dixon v. State, 303 Ga. App. 517 (6) (b) (693 SE2d 900) (2010). In fact, appellant himself opened the door to the prosecutor’s line of questioning when he

testified on direct examination that he lied to police ^[4] because he was scared of Ponder and because he did not want to be charged with the crimes that occurred. Appellant having voluntarily made statements to police, the prosecutor was free to explore any inconsistencies or omissions concerning those statements on cross-examination. Id. See also McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598 (11) (a) (458 SE2d 833) (1995) (prosecutor’s questioning was not improper commentary on defendant’s silence where the questions highlighted inconsistencies, namely that defendant made affirmative statements to police at the scene that he lost his memory and prosecutor asked why defendant did not tell police that he shot the victims in self-defense). Thus, because the prosecutor’s questions were proper, counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to make an objection that lacked merit. Jackson v. State, 288 Ga. 213 (2) (b) (702 SE2d 201) (2010). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding appellant did not carry his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed.