Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jose A. Castilla v. W&C Investments, LLC (txctapp3, 2026-06-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jose A. Castilla v. W&C Investments, LLC
txctapp3 · 2026 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). 5 Our task, then, is to determine whether the damages awarded were liquidated or unliquidated.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Greenworld Construction Materials & Services USA, LLC v. C&T Partnership
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. [] App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kyle M. Jaeger and Jaeger REO Holding Trust v. Scott Brown
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
And to obtain a judgment by default, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in the petition to state a cause of action. 28 In Texas, courts follow a “fair notice” standard, “which looks to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant.” 29 Thus, “[m]ere formalities, minor defects, and technical insufficiencies will not invalidate a default judgment where the petition 26Id. 241. 27Oliphant Fin., LLC v. Galaviz, 299 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, no pet.); Freeman v. Leasing …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hest Technologies, Inc., Trip Wire Entertainment, LLC, and Chris Canard v. PC Connection Sales Corp.
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RO-BT Investments, LLP v. Le Properties, LLC and Le Commercial, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See generally Whitaker, 218 S.W.3d at 220 (discussing liquidated damages); Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (same). 9 Apr. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, on pet.).5 We hold that Le failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence of damages.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oliphant Financial, LLC v. Galaviz
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kimberly Ann Harmon F/K/A Kimberly Ann Bitzer v. Alan Howard Bitzer
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Owners Ass = n , 819 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. App. C El Paso 1991, no writ) (quoting Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc ., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hahn v. Whiting Petroleum Corp. (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
First Nat'l Bank of Irving v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ) (citing Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ron Chitsey and Henry E. Chitsey v. Steven D. Carter Rosalie Easley Carter And Shay Voigt
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs. , 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ron Chitsey and Henry E. Chitsey v. Steven D. Carter Rosalie Easley Carter And Shay Voigt
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Siddiqui v. West Bellfort Property Owners Ass'n
Tex. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Thus, it was error for the trial court to award such relief because “[ajttomey’s fees are by their very nature unliquidated unless the exact amount is fixed by agreement.” Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Nettles v. Del Lingco, 638 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1982, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alvarado v. Reif
Tex. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
A liquidated claim under Rule 241 is a demand for an amount “which has been ascertained or settled by agreement of the parties or otherwise.” See Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Western Lumber Co. v. Chicago R.I. & G.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lakeside Leasing Corp. v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park Phase 3
Tex. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Tex.R.Civ.P. 243; Johnson v. Gisondi, 627 S.W.2d at 449 ; Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arnold v. Allen Center Co. 2
Tex. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sunbelt Tectonics, Inc. v. Ramirez
Tex. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Stark v. Nationwide Financial Corp., 610 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Higgins v. Smith
Tex. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Irlbeck v. John Deere Co.
Tex. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stark v. Nationwide Financial Corp.
Tex. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Clear Lake Center, L.P. v. Garden Ridge, L.P.
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.
discussed Cited "see" John L. Taylor v. State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See First Nat'l Bank v. Shockley , 663 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ) ("A liquidated claim is one that 'can be accurately calculated by the court, or under its direction, from the allegations contained in plaintiff's petition in the instrument in writing.'") (quoting Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc. , 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
discussed Cited "see" Justin Ryan McCarthy v. State
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See First Nat’l Bank v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no writ) (“A liquidated claim is one that ‘can be accurately calculated by the court, or under its direction, from the allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition in the instrument in writing.’”) 4 (quoting Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ.
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See First Nat’l Bank v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ) (“A liquidated claim is one that ‘can be accurately calculated by the court, or under its direction, from the allegations contained in plaintiffs petition in the instrument in writing.’ ”) (quoting Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Norman Industrial Development Corp.
Okla. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Freeman v. Leasing Assoc., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406 -07 (Tx.Ct.App.1974) [Lease agreement containing term "actually incurred" indicated outside limits of recovery for attorney fees.]. 22 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mo-Vac Service, Inc. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc.
Tex. App. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Kothman v. Lett, supra; San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 655-56 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1932, writ dism’d).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Winston Mortgage Co. v. Bevly
Tex. App. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bruce B. FREEMAN, Appellant,
v.
LEASING ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee
900.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Dec 19, 1973.
503 S.W.2d 406
1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2910
Roger T. Yokubaitis, Brantly Harris, Prappas, Caldwell & Moncure, Houston, for appellant., Arthur M. Glover, Jr., Iris Hefter Robinson, Hicks, Hirsch, Glover & Cochran, Houston, for appellee.
Coulson.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
COULSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by writ of error from a default judgment entered against defendant Bruce B. Freeman, appellant, and for Leasing Associates, Inc., appellee.

This suit involves the breach of two leasing contracts, one for an automobile and one for machinery. Copies of both contracts were attached to appellee’s petition in their entirety, setting forth the terms and monthly payments under the leases. The automobile lease provides, in a paragraph labeled “DEFAULTS”: “In addition thereto, Associates shall be entitled to recover from the Lessee . . . court costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred . in the enforcement ... of its rights hereunder.” The second lease has a similar provision. The petition averred that appellant was in default on both leases but failed to specify when the breaches occurred. The combined sum of $5,075.03 was prayed for under the leases “(a)fter applying all charges provided for in said leases and allowing all credits and offsets due,” plus $1,600.00 as “a reasonable attorney fee.” By a document entitled “Statement of Facts” submitted on appeal, both parties agreed that “no facts were given in evidence” before the trial judge. The judgment awarded $4,075.03, plus $1,350.00 as “reasonable attorney fees.”

The question presented is whether a claim in a default judgment is liquidated for the purpose of dispensing with proof under Rule 241, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, when the amount of damages cannot actually be determined from the instrument sued upon and the facts alleged.

Appellant asserts that both the default award and the attorneys fees are unliqui-dated claims and not proved by the leases. Appellee argues that the claim under the leases was liquidated and that a court can assess reasonable attorney’s fees without any evidence.

Rule 241, Tex.R.Civ.P., provides that after a default judgment has been taken on a liquidated claim proved by a written instrument, “damages shall be assessed by the court, or under its direction.” Rule 243, Tex.R.Civ.P., provides that if a claim is unliquidated or not proved by a written instrument, the trial court must hear evidence as to damages.

[*408] The instant case presents a claim which objectively must be considered liquidated; the leases provide for stated monthly payments for specific terms, and the appellant at some point ceased to make the payments. A literal reading of Rule 241 would thus indicate that no hearing on damages was required. However, appel-lee’s petition did not state when the default in payments occurred, but rather that ap-pellee had made the proper calculations and was entitled to the stated lump sum. The issue thus is whether a seemingly liquidated claim is unliquidated for the purposes of Rules 241 and 243 when the petition alleges insufficient facts.

The long-accepted definition of a “liquidated” claim under Rule 241 is a demand for an amount “which has been ascertained or settled by agreement of the parties or otherwise.” Western Lumber Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co., 180 S.W. 644, 646 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1915, no writ). Such a broad definition is hardly decisive, but at least two courts have said that a claim in a default judgment was liquidated because a court or its clerk could make an “accurate calculation” of the amount from the facts alleged in plaintiff’s petition. Williamson v. City of Eastland, 65 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1933, no writ); Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1931, no writ). The original statutory predecessor of Rule 241 stated that “the judge or clerk shall assess the damages.” Tex.Laws 1846, An Act To Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts § 24, at 370, 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1676 (1898). The Texas Supreme Court held under that statute that, when a default judgment was taken, the clerk was to ascertain the amount due from the writing, and the trial judge was to assess that sum as damages even if it were a lesser sum than prayed for in the petition. Holland v. Cook, 10 Tex. 244 (1853).

From these authorities, it is manifest that a literal reading of Rule 241, by which an objectively liquidated claim would dictate no hearing on damages, would defeat the original purpose of the rule. Under Rule 241 a claim is liquidated if the amount of damages can be accurately calculated by the court, or under its direction, from the allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition and the instrument in writing. To hold otherwise would mean that there would be no check upon the accuracy of a plaintiff’s claim in a default proceeding.

The terms of the leases entitled ap-pellee to attorney’s fees actually “incurred,” although this provision must necessarily be construed to set a maximum amount of what is reasonable. The leases do not merely provide for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees are by their very nature unliquidated unless the exact amount is fixed by agreement. Rule 243, Tex.R.Civ.P., therefore requires evidence to be heard on the amount to be awarded as attorney’s fees in this default judgment.

Reversed and remanded for a hearing on damages.