green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
61.9 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2023–2024 ·
…because drug residue was first seen on the defendant's hand while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant.
at p. 577
≈ altered
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases ·
…did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances
at p. 742
✓
Topic ↗
cited 3× by 1 distinct case ·
…the sworn allegations of fact did not as a matter of law support the ground alleged
at p. 742
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dana Mark Camann, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
because drug residue was first seen on the defendant's hand while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dana Mark Camann, Jr. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
because drug residue was first seen on the defendant's hand while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dana Mark Camann, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
because drug residue was first seen on the defendant's hand while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Roth
(3×)
Given that the officer's subjective motivation was irrelevant ( see People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; People v Wright , 98 NY2d at 658-659; People v Robinson , 97 NY2d at 349), County Court properly denied the motion without a hearing, as defendant failed to "allege a ground constituting [a] legal basis for the motion" (CPL 710.60 [3] [a]) and "[t]he sworn allegations of fact d[id] not as a matter of law support the ground alleged" (CPL 710.60 [3] [b]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Hodge
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Here, we conclude that the police "did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances" ( People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]; see People v Huddleston , 160 AD3d 1359 , 1361 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1149 [2018]; cf. Banks , 85 NY2d at 562-563 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Cooper (Nickolas)
Thus, Trooper Winkelman "acquired founded suspicion [that criminal activity was afoot] before the initial justification for detaining defendant had been exhausted" ( People v Coutant , 16 AD3d 772, 774 [2005]), and the short delay before Trooper Lavarnway could join him at defendant's vehicle did not render the seizure unlawful ( see People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010] ["as a matter of law, the officers did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances"]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Bethea
The observation of what the officer identified as cocaine pieces on defendant "provided [the officers with] probable cause to arrest and search defendant" ( People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The People v. Robert Hinshaw
That misunderstands our holding in Bushey; there, unlike here, the contents of the database report supplied the officer with probable cause of a traffic infraction before the stop of the defendant’s vehicle (id.). - 13 - - 14 - No. 46 imminent.10 The trooper’s subjective belief that the impound was based on some violation or illegality, honestly held, is insufficient unless it rests on some objective basis (see generally People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Jarrett
In order to complete their investigation of the traffic infraction, it was reasonable for the officers to prevent defendant from leaving, and they "did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances to address the traffic infraction" ( see People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Randall
When the officer saw defendant riding a bicycle unsafely and in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, the officer was entitled to stop defendant and order him off the bicycle, regardless of whether the officer’s initial intent was to give defendant an admonition instead of a ticket, and whether the officer also wished to investigate a suspicious handle protruding from defendant’s pocket (see People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Hale
We therefore conclude that the police “did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances” (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Hale
We therefore conclude that the police “did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances” (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Pealer
People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]). 2 Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. McLean
These traffic infractions gave the agent probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle; the “objective reasonableness” of this stop was not negated by the agent’s subjective intention to also investigate the possibility that defendant was involved in smuggling (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; accord People v Viele, 90 AD3d at 1239 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. McLean
These traffic infractions gave the agent probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle; the “objective reasonableness” of this stop was not negated by the agent’s subjective intention to also investigate the possibility that defendant was involved in smuggling (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; accord People v Viele, 90 AD3d at 1239 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Viele
Probable cause for the stop existed in light of the undisputed traffic violation and, as the subjective motivation to investigate other possible criminal activity “does not negate the objective reasonableness” of the stop (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; see People v Douglas, 42 AD3d 756, 757 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 922 [2007]), County Court properly denied the motion to suppress (see People v Wright, 98 NY2d 657, 658-659 [2002], cert denied 537 US 911 [2002]; People v Hawkins, 45 AD3d 989, 991 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1034 [2008]; People v Garcia, 30 AD3d 833, 834 [2006]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Glover
Here, the record supports the hearing court’s determination to credit a police officer’s testimony that he observed the defendant make a right turn without signaling, which justified the initial stop of his vehicle for a traffic infraction (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a]; People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; People v Leiva, 33 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2006]; People v Parris, 26 AD3d 393, 394 [2006]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jenkins
(2×)
Ind. December 4, 2009) (officer’s question prior to issuing ticket about whether defendant “had any dead bodies or anything in his car,” followed by request for consent to search, did not violate fourth amendment because time to inquire was only approximately two minutes out of twenty-two minute stop, and therefore “negligible” in context of entire stop); D.A. v. State, 10 So. 3d 674, 676-78 (Fla. App.) (despite having already decided not to issue summons for expired temporary registration, police officer properly asked driver whether vehicle contained anything illegal), review denie…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Singleton
(2×)
We conclude that, following the traffic stop, the police had probable cause to search defendant and the vehicle after they detected, based on their training and experience, the "odor of marihuana emanating from [the inside of the] vehicle" ( Rodriguez-Rivera , 203 AD3d at 1625 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Clanton , 151 AD3d 1576, 1577 [4th Dept 2017]; People v Cuffie , 109 AD3d 1200 , 1201 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1087 [2014]) and observed small pieces of marihuana strewn about the vehicle's interior ( see People v Bethea , 191 AD3d 1487, 1487-1488 [4th Dept 2021]…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Hall
(2×)
The test is an objective one, and the officer's subjective belief that there has been a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, whether correct or not, is not determinative ( see People v Estrella , 48 AD3d 1283, 1285 [4th Dept 2008], affd 10 NY3d 945 [2008], cert denied 555 US 1032 [2008]; see generally People v Edwards , 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Watson
"The credibility determinations of the Supreme Court following a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record" ( People v Cuyler , 95 AD3d 900, 900-901 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Casey , 149 AD3d 770, 771 ; People v Jemmott , 125 AD3d 1005, 1006 ). " [A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,' even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrela…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Lowe
The record of the suppression hearing establishes that the police officer had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and thus he was justified in asking defendant if there was anything in the vehicle that was illegal and in asking for defendant’s consent to search the vehicle (see People v Ponder, 43 AD3d 1398 , 1399 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 770 [2008]; see also People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010], rearg denied 14 NY3d 794 [2010]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York, Appellant,
v.
Thomas Edwards, Jr., Respondent
v.
Thomas Edwards, Jr., Respondent
87 SSM 6.
New York Court of Appeals.
Feb 16, 2010.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Michael J. Hillery of counsel), for appellant., Law Office of Susan V. Tipograph, New York City (Susan V. Tipo graph of counsel), for respondent.
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones Concur in Memorandum.
Cited by 25 opinions | Published
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, the motion to suppress tangible property denied and the judgment of County Court reinstated.
Defendant was driving a vehicle that was stopped by the police based on probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred. During the course of the officers’ investigation, cocaine residue was observed on defendant’s hand and he was arrested. Crack cocaine was discovered in his pocket and there was over a half pound of the drug in the car.
Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the police unlawfully extended the investigation of the traffic infraction because they suspected he might be involved with narcotics. Supreme Court denied the motion and defendant later pleaded guilty to drug and assault charges. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that once the police officers determined that a traffic infraction had occurred, the purpose for the detention was exhausted and the continued seizure was unlawful. We disagree.
The initial stop of defendant’s vehicle was permissible and the police officers’ subjective motivation to investigate possible drug activity does not negate the objective reasonableness of the officers’ actions (see People v Wright, 98 NY2d 657, 658-659 [2002]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 350 [2001]). In addition, here, as a matter of law, the officers did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances to address the traffic infraction (cf. People v Banks, 85 NY2d 558, 562 [1995], cert denied 516 US 868 [1995]). Rather, it was proper for the police officers to return to defendant’s vehicle in order to complete the traffic stop. Because drug residue was first seen while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant, and the subsequent impoundment and inventory search of the vehicle were valid. Consequently, suppression of the drugs is not required.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum.
[*743] On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, etc.