People v. Dickinson, 962 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 2011). · Go Syfert
People v. Dickinson, 962 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Middleton (nyappdiv, 2024-05-02)
Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2013 2019 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Middleton
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
The record does not reflect that the People required any waiver of speedy trial rights as a condition of further plea negotiations, nor does it contain any evidence of written communications from counsel purporting to waive defendant's speedy trial rights during the period at issue, and "[m]ere silence is not a waiver" ( People v Dickinson , 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Middleton
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
The record does not reflect that the People required any waiver of speedy trial rights as a condition of further plea negotiations, nor does it contain any evidence of written communications from counsel purporting to waive defendant's speedy trial rights during the period at issue, and "[m]ere silence is not a waiver" ( People v Dickinson , 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Wheeler
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Although we reiterate that "prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these" ( People v Dickinson , 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we nevertheless conclude that the People met their burden of demonstrating that defense counsel orally waived defendant's speedy trial rights in the early part of December 2013 to pursue a plea agreement, rendering the period associated therewith chargeable to defendant and excludable under the CPL 30.30 calculation until the waiver was revoked in or around June 2014 ( see P…
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. Leubner (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Although a defendant may waive his or her rights under CPL 30.30, such waiver must be explicit, and “[m]ere silence is not a waiver” (People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. Leubner (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Although a defendant may waive his or her rights under CPL 30.30, such waiver must be explicit, and “[m]ere silence is not a waiver” (People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v. Mark Jurgins (2×)
NY · 2015 · confidence medium
Waiver cannot be accomplished through silence (see People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rios
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
As the Court of Appeals has said, “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous waivers in situations like these.” (See People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011].) On balance, the defendant’s claim that 188 days should be charged to the People is supported by the record.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Smith
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
“While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30, the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral,” and the Court of Appeals has made clear that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” (People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Smith
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
“While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30, the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral,” and the Court of Appeals has made clear that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” (People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Dillon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
The People met their burden by establishing that defense counsel orally waived defendant's speedy trial rights within the statutory period, thus extending the time for the People to proceed with prosecution ( see People v Wheeler , 159 AD3d 1138 , 1141 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1123 [2018]; see generally People v Dickinson , 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011]).
discussed Cited "see" LEUBNER, JESSE L., PEOPLE v (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers” (People v Waldron, 6 NY3d 463, 468 ; see Dickinson, 18 NY3d at 836 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Lewins
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
If the People rely on consent under subdivision (4) (b) they must establish that such consent was “clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel” (People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992]; see also People v Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835 [2011]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Robert Guy Dickinson, Appellant
235.
New York Court of Appeals.
Dec 15, 2011.
962 N.E.2d 257
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Robert M. Winn, Granville, for appellant., Kevin C. Kortright, District Attorney, Fort Edward (Katherine G. Henley of counsel), for respondent., New York State Defenders Association, Albany (Alfred O’Connor of counsel), for New York State Defenders Association, amicus curiae.
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones Concur in Memorandum.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed.

It is undisputed that the People were not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the action, as CPL 30.30 (1) (a) requires, even after application of the exclusions listed in CPL 30.30 (4). The People’s only claim is that defendant waived his rights under CPL 30.30 by participating in plea negotiations for several months.

While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30 (People v Waldron, 6 NY3d 463 [2006]), the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral. Mere silence is not a waiver. We repeat our observation in Waldron that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” (id. at 468).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.