Lawes v. Bd. of Educ., 213 N.E.2d 667 (N.Y. 1965). · Go Syfert
Lawes v. Bd. of Educ., 213 N.E.2d 667 (N.Y. 1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
149 citation events (69 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Cited for
16 N.Y.2d at 306 Limiting school liability for student injury21 citing cases“notice of a particular danger at a particular time”2 citing courts quote it · 19 listed here
  • Tzimopoulos Ex Rel. Tzimopoulos v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 155 A.D.3d 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2017).published
    Schools are not, however, insurers of their students’ safety, and may not be held liable “ ‘for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another’ ” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49 , quoting Lawes v Board of…
  • Perez Ex Rel. Perez v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 141 A.D.3d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2016).published
    “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable ‘for every thoughtless or car…
  • Binani v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2015).published
    “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for *1081 they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable ‘for every thoughtless…
  • Feldman v. Merrick Union Free Sch. Dist., 122 A.D.3d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2014).published
    “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49 , citing Lawes v Board of Educ.…
  • Conklin v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 A.D.3d 1424 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).published 2 cites
    Schools are not, however, insurers of student safety and will not “be held liable ‘for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another’ ” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49 , quoting Lawes v Board of Educ. of…
  • Stephenson v. City of New York, 978 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 2012).published
    Schools are not, however, insurers of students’ safety and “cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable ‘for every thoughtless o…
  • Benavides v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 95 A.D.3d 809 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012).published
    “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable ‘for every thoughtless or car…
  • Stephenson v. City of New York, 85 A.D.3d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011).published
    Of course, “[s]chools are not insurers of safety” (Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49 , citing Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d 302, 306 [1965]), and cannot be held accountable for others’ acts when the students are outside their custody…
  • Nash v. Port Washington Union Free Sch. Dist., 83 A.D.3d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published
    “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable ‘for every thoughtless or car…
  • Lowe v. Meacham Child Care & Learning Ctr., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 1029 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    However, like schools, they are not insurers of the childrens’ safety (see Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d 302, 306 [1965]; Kandkhorov v Pinkhasov, 302 AD2d 432 [2003]).
Show 9 more citing cases
  • Brandy B. v. Eden Cent. Sch. Dist., 934 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 2010).published 2 cites
    It is well-settled that schools have a duty to adequately supervise their students, and “will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1…
  • Bellinger v. Ballston Spa Cent. Sch. Dist., 57 A.D.3d 1296 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).published
    “A school is not liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” (Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d 302, 306 [1965] [citations omitted]); thus, when a spontaneous and unintentional accident…
  • Paca v. City of New York, 51 A.D.3d 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).published
    In the context of injuries caused by fellow students, because a school cannot be held liable for “every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” (Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 16 NY2d 302, 306 [1965]), a p…
  • Doe v. Orange-Ulster Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 4 A.D.3d 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).published
    Schools owe a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge, and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]…
  • David v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 807 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 2003).published
    Although we have recognized that “[s]chools are not insurers of safety,” they are obligated to exercise such care of their students “as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances” (Mirand v City of New York, 84…
  • Opalek v. West Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 1 A.D.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003).published
    Although schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44,…
  • Hernandez v. Christopher Robin Academy, 276 A.D.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2000).published
    Furthermore, there is no evidence that the supervising teacher had “notice of a particular danger at a particular time” (Lawes v Board of Educ., supra, at 306).
  • Geywits v. Charlotte Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 98 A.D.3d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2012).published 2 cites
    School Dist., 15 NY3d 297, 302 [2010], quoting Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; see Lowes v Board of Educ. of City of NY., 16 NY2d 302, 306 [1965]; Decker v Dundee Cent.
  • Krumbiegel v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 37 A.D.3d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007).published
    However, “[s]chools are not insurers of safety . . . for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students” (Mirand v City of New York, supra at 49; see Lawes v Board of Educ.…
16 N.Y.2d at 305 Determining school duty of care regarding student safety14 citing cases“dangerous play comes to its notice while children are within its area of responsibility,”2 citing courts quote it
  • Aarons v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2024 NY Slip Op 33554(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2024).unpublished
    NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/07/2024 burdensome to instead have employees stationed at each of these locations to enforce its policy against carrying luggage while on the escalators (id. ["it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Amer…
  • S. G. v. Harlem Vil. Academy Charter Sch., 2023 NY Slip Op 01069 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2023).published
    (describing caretaker's responsibility "to take energetic steps to intervene . . . if dangerous play comes to its notice)
  • Amandola v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 130 A.D.3d 761 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2015).published
    The appellants’ moving papers also failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether a teacher failed to take “energetic steps to intervene” to prevent the infant plaintiff’s injuries at the hands of a group of his classmates (L…
  • Butera v. Vill. of Bellport, 128 A.D.3d 995 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2015).published
    A triable issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant’s employees were presented with a potentially dangerous situation and failed to take “energetic steps to intervene” in time to prevent campers from injuring another (Lawes v Board…
  • Buchholz v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 88 A.D.3d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published
    At his deposition, the security guard agreed with the plaintiff that he was standing only a few feet away when the assault occurred, but in contrast, testified that the assault occurred over the course of mere seconds, while the hallway wa…
  • Luciano v. Our Lady of Sorrows Sch., 79 A.D.3d 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    A triable issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant was presented with a potentially dangerous situation and failed to take “energetic steps to intervene” in time to prevent one student from injuring another (Lawes v Board of Educ.…
  • Doe v. Dep't of Educ., 54 A.D.3d 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).published
    In general, a school’s duty is to supervise its students with the same degree of care as a parent of ordinary prudence would exercise in comparable circumstances (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49 ; Lawes v Board of Educ. of Cit…
  • McLeod v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).published
    Moreover, a triable issue of fact also exists as to whether the school safety officer who witnessed the fight failed to take “energetic steps to intervene” in time to prevent the infant plaintiffs injuries (Lawes v Board of Educ. of City o…
  • Morning v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 27 A.D.3d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).published
    In order to impose liability for negligent supervision, a school must have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of a particular danger at a particular time (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; Lawes v Board of Educ.…
  • Siller v. Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 18 A.D.3d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005).published
    Viewing the evidence submitted in opposition to the motion in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is an issue as to whether a gym teacher who witnessed the start of the fight was presented with a potentially dangerous situatio…
Show 4 more citing cases
  • Lindaman v. Vestal Cent. Sch. Dist., 12 A.D.3d 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004).published
    While schools are not insurers of the safety of their students, they are under a duty to exercise the same degree of care as would a reasonably prudent parent placed in comparable circumstances (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 4…
  • Fraioli v. City of New Rochelle, 6 A.D.3d 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).published
    A school has a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward its students as would a reasonably prudent parent under comparable circumstances (see Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d 302, 305 [1965]; Hoose v Drumm, 281 NY 54,…
  • Murray v. Rsch. Found. of the State Univ., 184 Misc. 2d 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).published
    As set forth in the seminal case of Hoose v Drumm ( 281 NY 54, 57-58 [1939]), “a teacher owes it to his charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances.” (Mirand v City of Ne…
  • Fuller v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 206 A.D.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).published
    The trial court properly determined that, even though the infant plaintiff may have been larger than most of her classmates, and had spent less time practicing than the others, she had successfully performed the exercise at least once befo…
16 N.Y.2d at 304 BERGAN, J. Plaintiff Nuvia Alicia Lawes, a pupil at Public School No. 144 in Brooklyn, was struck by a snowball thrown by a fellow pupil while she was on her…4 citing casesopening of page *304 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • I.S. v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 193 A.D.3d 896 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2021).published
    "However, schools are not the insurers of the safety of their students, 'perfection in supervision' is not required, and schools are not liable for 'every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another'" ( Armellino v Th…
  • Simonides Ex Rel. Simonides v. Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 140 A.D.3d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2016).published
    Thus, “ ‘perfection in supervision’ is not required” of a school (Armellino v Thomase, 72 AD3d 849, 849 [2010], quoting Lawes v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 NY2d 302, 304 [1965]). *730 Here, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, th…
  • Armellino v. Thomase, 72 A.D.3d 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    However, schools are not the insurers of the safety of their students, “perfection in supervision” is not required, and schools are not liable for “every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” (Lawes v Board of…
  • Ferraro v. North Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 69 A.D.3d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    Although schools are not held to a standard of “perfection in supervision,” they nevertheless “ ‘owe[ ] it to [their] charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances’ ” (Lawe…
213 N.E.2d at 668 cited at this page1 citing case
213 N.E.2d at 686 cited at this page1 citing case
Other citing cases9 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Nuvia A. Lawes, an Infant, by Her Guardian Ad Litem, Leon Lawes, Et Al., Respondents,
v.
Board of Education of the City of New York, Appellant, Et Al., Defendant
New York Court of Appeals.
Dec 30, 1965.
Published opinion
213 N.E.2d 667
1965 N.Y. LEXIS 913
Leo A. Larkin, Corporation Counsel (Seymour B. Quel of counsel), for appellant., Norman Bard and Max Jackrel for respondents.
Bergan, Burke.
Cited by 115 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Bergan, J.

Plaintiff Nuvia Alicia Lawes, a pupil at Public School No. 144 in Brooklyn, was struck by a snowball thrown by a fellow pupil while she was on her way from her home to her classroom after lunch on February 17, 1960. Plaintiff, then 11 years old, suffered a serious eye injury. A judgment for $45,000 has been rendered against the Board of Education and affirmed by a divided Appellate Division.

The snowball was thrown on school property in a yard between the street and school entrance, but this was not during a recreation period. Children were then on the property on their way into the school after having been home to lunch. The school had made a rule against snowball throwing and plaintiff’s teacher had warned her pupils not to throw snowballs.

If a school is to become liable to one pupil for a snowball thrown at him by a fellow pupil, the rule governing such responsibility should be laid down clearly and be precise enough to be generally understood in the schools.

No one grows up in this climate without throwing snowballs and being hit by them. If snow is on the ground as children come to school, it would require intensive policing, almost child by child, to take all snowball throwing out of play. It is unreasonable to demand or expect such perfection in supervision from ordinary teachers or ordinary school management; and a fair test of reasonable care does not demand it.

[*305] The classic New York statement of the measure of school care for children is laid out in Judge Loughran’s noted opinion in Hoose v. Drumm (281 N. Y. 54, 57-58): “ Teachers have watched over the play of their pupils time out of mind. At recess periods, not less than in the class room, a teacher owes it to his charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances.”

A parent of ordinary prudence would not invariably stop his children from making and throwing snowballs. Indeed, he might encourage it. He would stop dangerous throwing, if he learned hard frozen snow or ice had come into play, or the pelting of one child by several others, but ordinary snowball throwing would not necessarily be stopped.

A reasonable measure of a school’s responsibility for snowball throwing is to control or prevent it during recreation periods according to its best judgment of conditions, and to take energetic steps to intervene at other times if dangerous play comes to its notice while children are within its area of responsibility.

The facts in the present case do not spell out any notice of special danger. There is no proof whatever in the record that teachers had notice of any other snowball throwing on the day plaintiff was hit. Proof that a snowball was thrown on the previous day is very thin and, even if fully credited, would not give fair notice of the kind of continued danger which should have been prevented by the active intervention of teachers.

A fellow pupil and friend of plaintiff testified that she was struck by a snowball on February 16 and that she reported this to a teacher. She did not testify that she reported that she was injured. She said: “ I told her I got hit. Somebody hit me with a snowball.”

The teacher denied having been told this and the Education Department records marked for identification, which the trial court refused to receive, show that this pupil reported in writing that she had been struck by a snowball, not before, but some five weeks after, plaintiff’s injury.

No requirement on this kind of a record is imposed on teachers to enforce the rule against snowballs by standing outside in the cold to watch to see that children do not violate the rule as they come into the school. And it is an undue burden on the school to impose a liability because teachers did not stand outside[*306] for active intervention in the circumstances shown by this record.

A school is not liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another (Hoose v. Drumm, 281 N. Y. 54, supra; Ohman v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 300 N. Y. 306; Wilber v. City of Binghamton, 296 N. Y. 950; Clark v. City of Buffalo, 288 N. Y. 62). For is liability invariably to fall on it because a school rule has been violated and an injury has been caused by another pupil (Maurer v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 294 N. Y. 672).

It is not easy to find a decided case either in New York or other jurisdictions where a school has been cast in liability for a snowball thrown by one pupil at another, and no authority sustaining- such a liability is cited by respondents. (Cf. 78 C. J. S., Schools and School Districts, § 320, pp. 1321-1325.)

In its result the judgment in this case imposes a greatly enlarged risk of liability on a school without showing notice of a particular danger at a particular time. A long line of decisions should cause us to proceed warily toward such an enlarged area of liability. (See, e.g., Ohman v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., supra, a thrown lead pencil; Wilber v. City of Binghamton, supra, a batted stone; May v. Board of Educ. Union Free School Dist. No. 1, 295 N. Y. 948, cinders in the schoolyard pavement; Maurer v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., supra, inadequately supervised swimming, and Clark v. City of Buffalo, supra, a thrown piece of glass.)

The order should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs.

Dissent

Burke, J. (dissenting).

The majority opinion has correctly outlined the duty of care imposed by law upon a school for the protection of its students in a case such as this, i.e., “A reasonable measure of a school’s responsibility for snowball throwing is to control or prevent it during- recreation periods according to its best judgment of conditions, and to take energetic steps to intervene at other times if dangerous play comes to its notice while children are within its area of responsibility.” However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that as a matter of law the Board of Education did not breach this duty, notwithstanding contrary findings of fact affirmed in the Appellate Division.

[*307] Although the plaintiff was passing through the schoolyard on her way into the school, the other children were not merely passing through. They had returned from their lunch and were playing in the schoolyard awaiting the commencement of their afternoon classes. That the remainder of a luncheon recess, after school children have returned from lunch and are playing in the schoolyard, is a ‘ ‘ recreation period ” as used by the majority in defining the board’s duty is hardly controvertible. Furthermore, a duty of supervision over such playground activity is clearly imposed upon the Board of Education by subdivision 16 of section 1709 of the Education Law. (Decker v. Dundee Cent. School Dist., 4 N Y 2d 462, 464 [1958].) In recognition of this duty, the school authorities promulgated a regulation forbidding the throwing of snowballs on the school premises. Once this particular standard of care was adopted, whether or not it was reasonably complied with was a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. The Appellate Division unanimously agreed that plaintiff had established a prima facie case; the principal cause for the dissent was the admissibility of certain evidence, not a disagreement as to the duty imposed upon the Board of Education. That the snowball throwing was a dangerous activity, that the school authorities had notice thereof, and that they failed to act reasonably under the circumstances, proximately causing plaintiff’s damages, are affirmed findings of fact which cannot be disputed here. For these reasons I would affirm in all respects.

Judges Dye, Fuld, Van Voorhis and Scileppi concur with Judge Bergan; Judge Burke dissents in an opinion in which Chief Judge Desmohd concurs.

Order reversed, etc.