Clifford R. West v. Edward J. Devitt, Chief Dist. Judge, United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Minnesota, 311 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1963). · Go Syfert
Clifford R. West v. Edward J. Devitt, Chief Dist. Judge, United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Minnesota, 311 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events across 8 distinct courts.
Cited for
At page 788 Waiver of jury trial right through conduct8 citing casesThe mere fact that petitioner had changed his mind would not of itself require the court to set aside the procedural order made.2 citing courts put it this way
  • Larkin T. FLOYD, Appellant, v. KELLOGG SALES Co., Appellee, 841 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1988).published
    Also, a litigant may by conduct waive the right to a jury trial, West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir.1963), or objections to personal jurisdiction, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 , 84 S.Ct. 411, 414 ,…
  • Rodney v. Wise, 500 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1985).published
    Co., supra; Hanlon v. Providence College, supra at 538-539; West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir.1963); County (Social) Club of Savannah Inc. v. Sutherland, 411 F.2d 599 , 600 (5th Cir. 1969).
  • Lowell Palmer v. United States of Am., United States of Am., Third-Party v. Donald Paul Fisher, Third-Party, 652 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1981).published 2 cites
    E. g., Amburgey v. Cassady, 507 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
  • Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971).published
    Cf. West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1963).
  • J. D. Bradley v. Maryland Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1967).published
    See Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 284 , 20 L.Ed. 395 (1870); Smith v. Cushman Motor Works, Inc., 178 F.2d 953, 954 (8 Cir. 1950); West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8 Cir. 1963).
  • Raymond J. Hanlon v. Providence Coll., 615 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1980).published
    See West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1963); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38.45, at 344.2-3 (2d ed. 1979).
  • Sewell v. Jefferson Cnty. Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1989).published
    (The mere fact that petitioner had changed his mind would not of itself require the court to set aside the procedural order made.)
  • Sewell v. Jefferson Cnty. Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988).published
    (The mere fact that petitioner had changed his mind would not of itself require the court to set aside the procedural order made.)
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Clifford R. WEST, Petitioner,
v.
Edward J. DEVITT, Chief District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Respondent
17247.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jan 15, 1963.
Published opinion
311 F.2d 787
1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6443
Douglas MacLeod, St. Louis, Mo., S. Eldridge Sampliner, Cleveland, Ohio, and Harry Alan Sherman, Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner., Edward B. Hayes and C. R. Peterson, of Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Ill., and Henry Halladay and Curtis Roy of Dorsey, Owen, Marquart, Windhorst & West, Minneapolis, Minn., for respondent.
Johnsen, Matthes, Per Curiam.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Petitioner’s motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus or prohibition without payment of docketing fee is granted, under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1916. The application to have a writ issued is, however, denied.

The writ was sought in relation to an action to recover for injuries from unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure under the admiralty and maritime laws of the United States. The object was to prevent respondent, as judge, from engaging in a prior determination of the issue of laches as to the commencement of the suit, and to compel him to make the question a part of the jury trial on the merits of the case.

The court had indicated its intention to deal with the issue of laches in this separate manner, and counsel for both parties had expressed their assent to having it so handled. Counsel for petitioner specifically declared that “we would certainly concur in an order * * * setting the issue of laches * * * for trial before the case on the merits”. Thus, even if the issue of laches involved questions which a jury might otherwise have been entitled to resolve in the situation, there clearly was a withdrawal or waiver, by the assent expressed, of such demand for jury trial as existed with respect to those questions; and the withdrawal satisfied the requirement of Rule 38(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., of having the consent of both parties. The mere fact that petitioner had changed his mind would not of itself require the court to set aside the procedural order made.

But apart from the matter of waiver, petitioner has neither alleged nor shown that the equitable defense of laches did or could involve any common questions of fact with the merits of petitioner’s claim, as a basis for requiring them to be resolved by the jury instead of through an exercise of the court’s equity jurisdiction. Petitioner, therefore, has failed to bring the situation within Dairy Queen, Inc., v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44, as a basis on which to predicate his application for a writ.

Writ denied.