Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People of Michigan v. Mark Owen Anderson (michctapp, 2026-02-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Mark Owen Anderson
Mich. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v Powers, 275 Wis 2d 456, 460 ; 2004 WI App 143 ; 685 NW2d 869 (2004) (drug store clerk reported to 911 that “an intoxicated man had come in to -3- make purchases at the store buying beer, a little outfit, and something else[]” and provided a description of the defendant’s truck); Wilson v Idaho Transp Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 273-274 ; 32 P3d 164 (App, 2001) (homeowner called 911, identified herself and the car the defendant was driving, and reported that the defendant “had been drinking and shortly thereafter drove off in his truck” and “had been threatening peopl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francen v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles (2×)
Colo. · 2014 · confidence medium
Seq, e.g., Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150, 152 (Colo.App.2009); Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831 (Colo.App.1992); Wallace v. Dep't of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181, 182 (Colo.App.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Powers
Wis. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McChesney v. State (2×)
Wyo. · 1999 · confidence medium
If and when the vehicle is located, the officer involved observes long enough to decide if there is probable cause to believe the driver is `driving under the influence.' If there is, a stop is made." REDDI still ridding roads of drunk drivers, DESTINATIONS, Vol. 5, Issue No. 1, Summer 1998, at 9. [1] We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Declaration of Independence—1776. [2] The cases cited in support of the telling sta…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Slater (2×)
Kan. · 1999 · confidence medium
See People v. Willard, 183 Cal. App.3d Supp. at 8 (motorist in car beside an officer in moving traffic told the officer that the driver of another car was drunk and pointed to the car); Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d at 831-32 (clerk at a gas station reported to a dispatcher that an intoxicated male was getting into a car and the clerk later pointed the car out to the officer); State v. Sampson, 669 A.2d at 1328 (although anonymous, a reasonable inference showed that informant was an employee of a doughnut shop); Playle v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 439 N.W.2d at 748 (caller identified himse…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kaysville City v. Mulcahy
Utah Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Goodlataw v. State, 847 P.2d 589, 590-91 (Alaska.Ct.App.1993); State v. Robles, 171 Ariz. 441 , 831 P.2d 440, 441-43 (Ct.App.1992); People v. Willard, 183 Cal.App.3d Supp. 5 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 895, 896-97 (Super.Ct.1986); Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Colo.Ct.App.1992); State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216, 218-19 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); State v. Butler, 224 Ga.App. 397 , 480 S.E.2d 387, 388-89 (1997); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408-09 (Iowa.Ct.App.1991); State v. Tucker, 19 Kan.
discussed Cited "see" Hanson v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div. (2×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peterson, 833 P.2d at 831 ; see also Nefzger v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224 , 229 (Colo.1987) (concluding that the police had a reasonable suspicion to support an initial traffic stop, and thereby rejecting driver's contention that improper stop invalidated subsequent arrest and license revocation flowing from the stop); *9 Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150 , 152 (Colo.App.2009) (a licensee may properly raise issues concerning the legality of initial investigatory stop); Shafron v. Cooke, 190 P.3d 812 , 814 (Colo.App.2008) (a driver committed a traffic infraction that justified a …
examined Cited "see" Baldwin v. Huber (4×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831 (Colo.App.1992); Wallace v. Dep't of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181, 182 (Colo. App.1989); see also Meyer, 143 P.3d at 1185-86 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Long v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division
Colo. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Francen v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 2012 COA 110 , ¶ 28, - P.3d -, 2012 WL 2581029 (the plain language of the relevant statutes does not require, or even allow, a hearing officer or an appellate court to determine the lawfulness of the initial contact in a revocation proceeding under section 42-2-126), and Fallon v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 250 P.3d 691, 695 (Colo.App.2010) ("whether a licensee in a revocation hearing may properly argue that his stop and arrest were not supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause and that evidence resulting from them should, therefore, be exclu…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas Alan PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John TIPTON, as Executive Director of the Department of Revenue of the State of Colorado, Motor Vehicle Division, Defendant-Appellee
91CA0328.
Colorado Court of Appeals.
Jan 30, 1992.
833 P.2d 830
1992 Colo. App. LEXIS 28
1992 WL 13819
Robert T. Bettenberg, Wheat Ridge, for plaintiff-appellant., Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Mark W. Ger-ganoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellee.
Jones, Metzger, Ruland.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

Opinion by

Judge JONES.

Plaintiff, Thomas Alan Peterson, appeals from the district court judgment affirming the revocation of his driver’s license by the Department of Revenue for driving with an excessive blood alcohol content. We affirm.

Initially, contrary to the Department’s argument and the district court’s ruling, we conclude that questions as to the legality of the initial motor vehicle stop and subsequent arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) may properly be raised as issues in driver’s license revocation proceedings under § 42-2-122.1, C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17). Wallace v. Department of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181 (Colo.App.1989). See Nefzger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224 (Colo.1987).

In addition, although the holding in Wallace may have involved a previous version of § 42-2-122.1, we note that this result remains unchanged by the subsequent amendments to the statute currently in effect and applicable to plaintiff’s January 30, 1990, DUI arrest at issue here. Even under the provisions of the express consent statute currently in effect, a police officer is not authorized to request and to direct an arrested driver to submit to alcohol testing absent “probable cause” for the DUI arrest, and, by implication, absent reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. See § 42-4-1202(3)(a)(II), C.R.S. (1991 Cum. Supp.). Thus, although the validity of the initial stop and the subsequent DUI arrest may not be necessary elements to a revocation action under § 42-2-122.1, we conclude that a driver may properly raise such issues as a defense in such revocation proceedings. See § 42-2-122.1(8)(c), C.R.S. (1991 Cum.Supp.); Wallace v. Department of Revenue, supra; Nefzger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, supra.

Plaintiff contends that the revocation cannot be sustained because there was no reasonable suspicion which justified the initial investigatory stop of his vehicle by the police. We find no merit in this contention.

The facts as to the merits of the reasonable suspicion issue raised by plaintiff are not in dispute, and thus, we can resolve the dispute as a matter of law.

At the revocation hearing, the arresting officer testified that, while he was on routine patrol he received a police dispatch call reporting that a clerk at a certain gas station stated that an intoxicated white male was getting into a white Corsica and was leaving the station right then. The arresting officer was only one block away from the gas station at that time and saw the white Corsica leaving the lot, so he turned and followed it. As the officer[*832] drove by the gas station, a clerk in the station pointed towards the Corsica. Thus, the dispatch call was irrefutably linked to a person who, by her non-verbal communications, emphatically gave further weight to the officer’s suspicion that the driver of the white vehicle was driving in an intoxicated state. Based on that information and his perceptions, the arresting officer stopped plaintiffs vehicle, the white Corsica, shortly thereafter on suspicion of DUI, although he acknowledged that he did not observe any other driving violations.

Even absent other driving violations, an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle is permissible when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver is committing or has committed a drunk driving offense. See § 42-4-1202.1, C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17) (expressly authorizing such investigatory stops). See also Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 38 Colo.App. 230, 556 P.2d 488 (1976) (rejecting argument that any traffic violation separate and distinct from drunk driving offense was necessary to invoke the requirements of the former implied consent law).

In determining the validity of an investigatory stop, the first inquiry is whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the police officer which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify the intrusion into the individual’s personal security. People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190 (Colo.1990); People v. Mascarenas, 726 P.2d 644 (Colo.1986).

We conclude that the investigatory stop in this case was justified under the reasonable suspicion standard. Here, the arresting officer’s observations, including the clerk’s communications to him almost immediately after the report must have been given, were sufficient to provide him with a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the white vehicle was driving under the influence, and the investigatory stop was therefore justified. See § 42-4-1202.1; People v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552 (Colo.1989); People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo.1988). Thus, the hearing officer and the district court properly rejected plaintiff’s challenges to the validity of the initial investigatory stop.

Moreover, it is undisputed that, following the initial stop, the information obtained by the arresting officer provided him with probable cause for plaintiff’s DUI arrest and that plaintiff thereafter submitted to a breath test, which showed an alcohol concentration of .257 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Accordingly, the hearing officer properly revoked plaintiff’s driver’s license pursuant to § 42-2-122.1, and the district court properly upheld the revocation.

The judgment is affirmed.

METZGER and RULAND, JJ., concur.