City of Nat'l City v. Fritz, 204 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1949). · Go Syfert
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City of Nat'l City v. Fritz, 204 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1949). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
39 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Villatoro (cal, 2012-07-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1957 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1957 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Villatoro
Cal. · 2012 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) Moreover, the inference the challenged instruction encourages is not a permissible one.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ziesmer v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
(Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 744 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 869 , 759 P.2d 504 ]; City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) Section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(A), like section 1382, pertains to dismissal of criminal cases.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Apartment Ass'n v. City of Stockton
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
As we will show, Stockton’s claim fails under article XII, because it had no vested right under its charter at the time of the passage of article XII to impose the kind of regulation in issue in this case. 10 A. Article XI, section 9, derives from former article XI, section 19.* 11 It was enacted by a legislative initiative on October 11, 1911, because “[t]here was some doubt whether municipal corporations could acquire and operate such enterprises . . . .” (City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) At the time of its passage only a chartered municipal cor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Breedlove v. Municipal Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
(Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 972, 977 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 220 ]; City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) Nor do cases cited by the People support the addition of unspecified exceptions to section 1204.5.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Korean American Legal Advocacy Foundation v. City of Los Angeles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) Thus, we reject an interpretation of section 23790 which would permit any and all acts theoretically beyond the control of a *398 licensee to constitute exceptions to the requirement of “continuous operations.” As plaintiffs’ businesses have been closed since 1992 they are not in continuous operation and by definition have undergone a substantial change in the mode or character of operation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schmidt v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1989 · confidence medium
Such a construction not only violates the settled principle that exceptions to a statute must be narrowly construed and will not be extended beyond the import of their terms ( City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 972, 977 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 220 ]), but also it finds no support in either the language of the section nor in its legislative history.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Melton
Cal. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) The rule of strict construction of exceptions is not opposed to the requirement of liberal construction of the codes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. Chamberlain
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; In re Goddard (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 132 [ 74 P.2d 818 ].) Section 917.4 does not by express language or reasoned implication suggest the general rule of section 916 does not apply to persons situated as Barnes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Julius Goldman's Egg City v. Air Pollution Control District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) The statute involved here provides a handful of fairly narrow exceptions to the permit system for enforcement of air pollution control standards established in Health and Safety Code section 42300 et seq. 1 As relevant, the operative language exempts from permit requirements “equipment used in agricultural operations in...the raising of fowl.. ..” In construing this exemption, we are mindful of the rule that “[w]e are required to give effect to statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language em…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. Board of Administration
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Such a restrictive interpretation follows the principles that “exceptions in a statute are to be strictly construed.” (City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; see also Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21 Cal.3d 527 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 580 P.2d 657 ].) While “pension statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of the applicant so as to effectuate, rather than defeat, their avowed purpose of providing benefits for the employee and his family” (Cavitt v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 623, 626 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 690 ], italics added; see also Goins…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Caudillo (2×)
Cal. · 1978 · confidence medium
It is an established rule of statutory construction that similar statutes should be construed in light of one another (City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; Frediani v. Ota (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 127, 133 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 912 ]), and that when statutes are in pari materia similar phrases appearing in each should be given like meanings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Marriage of Brigden
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
Proc., § 1858; City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 972, 977 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 220 ].) Moreover, a narrow construction of the clause is required because the award of an asset to one spouse alone involves the elimination of the other spouse’s prior equal interest in that asset.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marrujo v. Hunt (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
Proc., § 1858; In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 393 [ 333 P.2d 339 ].) (4) Parts of an amended statute not affected by the amendment will be given the same construction they received before the amendment. ( Brailsford v. Blue (1962) 57 Cal.2d 335, 339 [ 19 Cal. Rptr. 485 , 369 P.2d 13 ].) (5) An exception contained in a statute to the general rule laid down therein must be strictly construed. ( City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; Dufton v. Daniels (1923) 190 Cal. 577, 580 [ 213 P. 949 ].) (2b) As they read prior to their amendment in 1971, section 3859…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Taft v. West Kern County Water District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1968 · confidence medium
City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ], indicates that “the construction and maintenance of a sewer system is not a ‘public utility,’ ” and in the Public Utilities Act no mention is made of sewers as public utilities.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Glenbrook Development Co. v. City of Brea
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ] ; LaMesa Homes Co. v. LaMesa etc. Irr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Geyer
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co., 50 Cal.2d 182, 188-189 [ 323 P.2d 753 ] ; City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; Ebert v. State of California, 33 Cal.2d 502, 509 [ 202 P.2d 1022 ].) In the instant case, moreover, since sections 16451 and 16454 were, prior to 1959, both part of former section 415, the rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be read together and construed to achieve harmony between the parts is also applicable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adoption of Sewall
Cal. Ct. App. · 1966 · confidence medium
(City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ].) Section 221, Civil Code, as amended in 1951, reads in part as follows: “Any unmarried minor child may be adopted by any adult person, in the cases and subject to the rules prescribed in this chapter other than in Section 227p, and any adult person or married minor child may be adopted by any other adult person in the cases and subject to the rules prescribed in Section 227p.” By the terms of section 221, the rules prescribed by section 227d apply to adoptions of infants; but only 227p applies to adoptions of adults.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1960 · confidence medium
XI, § 11.) (Harter v. Barkley, 158 Cal. 742 [ 112 P. 556 ]; City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ], See also Southern Calif.
discussed Cited "see" City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Cmty. Servs. Dist.
Cal. Ct. App. 5th · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
Utility Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1005 , 1018, fn. 12, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 ( Lafayette ) [ § 53091(e) ]; accord, National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635 , 636, 204 P.2d 7 [statutory exemptions "are to be strictly construed"].) Because the second sentence of section 53091(e) is an exception to the exemption-i.e., it requires application of the rule in subdivision (a)-no such limitation is placed on our construction of the language.
discussed Cited "see" City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowead Comm. Serv. Dist.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
Utility Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1018, fn. 12 (Lafayette) [§ 53091(e)]; accord, National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [statutory exemptions "are to be strictly construed"].) Because the second sentence of section 53091(e) is an exception to the exemption—i.e., it requires application of the rule in subdivision (a)—no such limitation is placed on our construction of the language.
discussed Cited "see" Schweisinger v. Jones
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
(See Collins v. Riley (1944) 24 Cal.2d 912, 915-916 [ 152 P.2d 169 ] [constitutional limitation on amount of legislative compensation as to particular items of legislative expense does not limit amount as to others; if other limits were desired, they would have been spelled out]; see City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [ 204 P.2d 7 ] [exceptions narrowly construed].) The California Constitution “is not a grant of power but rather a limitation or restriction upon the powers of the Legislature [citations] and ‘. . . we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Untitled California Attorney General Opinion
Cal. Att'y Gen. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196 ; De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 106 .) That tenet has particular force here because the Legislature has preceded the specific enumeration with the word "only", which is itself a word "'of restriction as to that which it qualifies and of exclusion as to other things.'" (White Stores v. Atkins (Tenn. 1957) 303 S.W.2d 720, 726 ; see also, People v. Fair (1972) 43 Cal. 137, 146-147 .) Further, we are also taught that exceptions are usually strictly construed (City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 ; 5 86-703 P…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles (2×)
Cal. · 1958 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 638-639 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Mulville v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737 [ 192 P. 702 ]; McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 163 [ 44 P. 358 , 53 Am.St.Rep. 191 , 31 L.R.A. 794 ]; see also City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d 635, 637 [ 204 P.2d 7 ]; City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 312-313 [ 184 P. 397 ].) The Marin case itself recognized and applied the established rule that a utility's rights in the public streets are taken subject to the paramount right of public travel, and as stated above, the same rule applies between public utili…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The CITY OF NATIONAL CITY Et Al., Petitioners,
v.
GILBERT E. FRITZ, as City Mayor, Etc., Et Al., Respondents
L. A. 20857.
California Supreme Court.
Mar 22, 1949.
204 P.2d 7
1949 Cal. LEXIS 222
Burke, Marshall & Burke and Daniel G. Marshall for Petitioners., Merideth L. Campbell, City Attorney, for Respondents.
Carter, Edmonds.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
CARTER, J.

The controversy in this proceeding involves the interpretation of a statute authorizing the establishment by municipal corporations of capital outlay funds (Stats. 1937, p. 1995, as amended last in 1945; Stats. 1945, p. 1867).

That act provides that the governing body of any city “empowered to levy and collect assessments or taxes may by ordinance provide for the levy and collection of assessments or taxes for the creation and accumulation of a fund for capital outlays. ’ ’ The general limitation on the right to impose taxes applies. “At any time after the creation of such a fund such governing body may transfer to such fund any unincumbered surplus funds remaining on hand in such city,... at the end of any fiscal year.

“Whenever such fund is created in the manner aforesaid it shall remain inviolate for the making of any capital outlays and no moneys shall be disbursed therefrom excepting for such a purpose; . . . .

“The term ‘capital outlays’ shall not he construed to include the construction, acquisition, extensions of, or additions to, [*636] utilities, other them utilities for the furnishing of water supply.” (Emphasis added.)

In the instant case the city council passed an ordinance purporting to create a capital outlay fund pursuant to the act. There is a dispute in regard to whether the ordinance in fact achieved that end inasmuch as it did not provide for the levy of taxes or assessments for the creation of the fund. It merely created the fund. But in view of the result reached herein, it is not necessary to resolve that question. From the receipts from sale of real property of the city to the United States, $983,800.29 was ordered deposited in the fund by the city council and it is now there and unencumbered. The council has awarded contracts for the construction of sewers in the city in the sum of $675,287.77 but respondent mayor of the city refuses to sign the contracts, and respondent clerk refuses to transfer said sum to the general fund to meet the payments under those contracts, claiming that moneys in the capital outlay fund cannot be used for sewer purposes under the above quoted act for the reason that a sewer is a utility as used in the last sentence dealing with things for which the fund cannot be used. Petitioners, on the other hand, take the position (among others) that a sewer is not a utility as that term is used in the act. With the latter contention we agree for the following reasons.

The unqualified word “utility” has a broad meaning. It is defined as ‘ quality or state of being useful; usefulness; profitableness to some desired end.” (Webster’s New Internat. Diet. (2d ed.) p. 2808.) (See also Interstate National Gas Co. v. Gulley, 4 F.Supp. 697, 699.) If that definition were applied to the statute in question, there would be practically no activity in which the city could use the money from the capital outlay fund because practically all of its property and public services are presumably for useful purposes. Thus the exception in the act (the italicized part thereof) for which funds may not be used would be broader than the main purpose of the act to authorize the creation of, and levy of taxes for, a capital outlay fund. Practically the only use that could be made of the fund would be for a water supply which is an exception carved out of an exception. These factors, coupled with the rule that exceptions in a statute are to be strictly construed (Hurst v. City & County of San Francisco, ante, p. 298 [201 P.2d 805]; McAlpine v. Baumgartner, 10 Cal.2d 409 [74 P.2d 753]; Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 577 [213 P. 949]; Forbes v. City of Los [*637] Angeles, 101 Cal.App. 781 [282 P. 528]; Crawford, Statutory Construction, § 299), require that the word “utility” be interpreted to mean a “public utility,” for as will be seen, that term as used here has a more narrow meaning than “utility.”

We are convinced that the construction and maintenance of a sewer system is not a “public utility” within the meaning of the act. Generally speaking statutes should be construed in the light of other statutes dealing with the same subject matter. (In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134]; Stillwell v. State Bar, 29 Cal.2d 119 [178 P.2d 313].) The term “public utilities, ’ ’ with reference to the power of a municipal corporation to acquire and operate them, customarily embraces an enterprise which was usually engaged in by private corporations or individuals such as supplying water and electricity to the inhabitants. In this state it never has been the custom to have sewers operated privately. There was some doubt whether municipal corporations could acquire and operate such enterprises (public utilities) until the amendment to the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 19) in 1911 authorizing such corporations to supply their inhabitants with light, water, power, heat, transportation and means of communications (18 Cal.Jur. 1076), but the power of municipal corporations to construct and maintain sewers has always been broad and unquestioned; the power may be derived from the authority to construct and maintain streets. (See Harter v. Barkley, 158 Cal. 742 [112 P. 556]; Kramer v. Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 668 [82 P. 334]; McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 163 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A. 794]; City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 313 [184 P. 397]). The Public Utilities Act of this state lists many activities as “public utilities” but no mention is made of sewers (Stats. 1915, p. 115, as amended).

For the foregoing reasons it is clear that the term “utilities” as used in the exception in the statute in question does not include sewers. The fund here involved may, therefore, be used for construction of sewers.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed for.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

EDMONDS, J.

Again the court has rendered what I consider to be an advisory opinion in a collusive proceeding[*638] brought by a city against two of its officers. The result is a decision which places the stamp of the highest judicial approval upon financial transactions which affect every taxpayer of the city without any truly adversary presentation of the merits of the controversy. Moreover, the construction of the statute authorizing the establishment of a capital outlay fund may now be the unquestioned basis for action by the governing body qf other cities. For the reasons I have stated in City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal.2d 664, 668 [151 P.2d 5, 153 A.L.R. 956]; City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 707 [140 P.2d 666]; City and County of San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Cal.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 369], I believe that this procedure is contrary to fundamental principles of the administration of justice.