Solon Snowden v. The Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island, 338 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1964). · Go Syfert
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Solon Snowden v. The Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island, 338 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Texas Export Development Corporation v. Schleder (texapp, 1974-12-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Export Development Corporation v. Schleder
Tex. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
Snowden v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 338 F.2d 995, 996 (5th Cir. 1964); Kuper v. Schmidt, 161 Tex. 189 , 338 S.W.2d 948, 952 (1960); Howeth v. Davenport, 311 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Jones v. Hubbard, 302 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1957, writ ref’d n. r. e.); and Dean v. Allied Oil Co., 261 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1953, writ dism’d).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Darden v. Harrison (2×)
Tex. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Snowden v. Franklin National Bank of Long Island, 338 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1964).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Solon SNOWDEN, Appellant,
v.
the FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK OF LONG ISLAND, Appellee
21549_1.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 1, 1964.
338 F.2d 995
Elgar L. Robertson, Dallas, Tex., for appellant., Yandell Rogers, Jr., Morris I. Jaffe, Harold Hoffman, Wynne, Jaffe & Tinsley, Dallas, Tex., for appellee.
Tuttle, Brown, Gewin.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

The question here is whether the trial Court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Bank against the Appellant-Maker on his promissory note.

Appellant urges that the note was made for purpose of accommodation on a pre-existing debt and was without consideration. As to this there is clearly no genuine issue. The detailed factual affidavits, adduced in support of the Bank’s motion, F.R.Civ.P. 56, were not controverted as to the critical fact that Appellant executed a note for $10,000 which amount was delivered to a third party (Sovereign Resources, Inc.) pursuant to Appellant’s express written direction.

The balance of the case concerns Appellant’s allegations that the note, although purporting to bind him, was actually executed because he was assured that the corporation, the recipient of the funds under his note, had adequate[*996] collateral, and that he would never be held personally accountable. [1] As a matter of Texas law, this allegation states no defense. Under the familiar accepted Texas principles, this parol evidence would not be admissible because it negates the very obligation of the writing. Jones v. Hubbard, Tex.Civ.App. writ ref. n.r.e., 1957, 302 S.W.2d 493; Howeth v. Davenport, Tex.Civ.App. writ ref. n.r.e., 1958, 311 S.W.2d 480. The cases urged by Appellant, McFarland v. Shaw, State Banking Commissioner, Tex.Com.App. (opinion adopted), 1932, 45 S.W.2d 193; Dallas Teachers Credit Union v. Sweeny, Tex.Civ.App. writ dism’d, 1959, 326 S. W.2d 244, are not to the contrary, and this ease does not come within them.

Affirmed.

1

. This same allegation also serves as the basis for Appellant’s arguments that lie signed the note only as guarantor or surety, or that he was fraudulently induced to make the note. As to these, the record also demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of fact.