At page 733 Requiring agency to explain decision's relevance to act's purposes17 citing casesFCC must “do more than enumerate factual differences, if any, between appellant and the other eases; it must explain the relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Federal Communications Act
- Anderson v. United States Sec'y of Agric., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2006).publishedThe agency must “explain the relevance of those [arbitary] differences to the purposes of the [Act].” Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Mobile Relay Assocs. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 457 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).publishedBecause the Commission did not “explain the relevance of those differences [between NBC and the radio station] to the purposes of the Federal Communications Act,” we remanded the matter for it to explain its decision to treat the two renew…
- United States v. Reco Vondell Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).published See, e.g., New Orleans Channel 20, Inc. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 361, 366 (D.C.Cir.1987); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Petroleum Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 22 F.3d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).publishedSee, e.g., New Orleans Channel 20, Inc. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 361, 366 (D.C.Cir.1987); Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 , 1331 (D.C.Cir.1978); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Petroleum Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n United States of Am., McCaw Cellular Commc'ns, Inc., Intervenor. Rvc Servs., Inc., D/B/A Coastel Commc'ns Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n United States of Am., Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. Houston Cellular Tel. Co. Galveston Cellular Tel. Co. Alltel Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. McCaw Cellular Commc'ns, Inc., Intervenors, 22 F.3d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).publishedSee, e.g., New Orleans Channel 20, Inc. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 361, 366 (D.C.Cir.1987); Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 , 1331 (D.C.Cir.1978); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., Domino Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 652 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1981).published Although in the abstract this proposition is both sensible and correct, cf. Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C.Cir.1975); United States v. Udy, 381 F.2d 455, 458 (10th Cir. 1967); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir…
- Pub. Media Ctr. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978).publishedIn particular, we recognize the principle established in Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 244 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965) that the Commission is under a continuing obligation to “explain its reasons and do more than enumerat…
- Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Elyria-Lorain Broad. Co., Intervenors. Owosso Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States of Am. & Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Ksl, Inc., Intervenor. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & the United States of Am., Ksl, Inc., Intervenor. Wjag, Inc. v. United States of Am. & Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Whas, Inc., Louisiana Television Broad. Corp., Intervenors. The Ogden Newspapers, Inc. v. United States of Am. & Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Ksl, Inc., Intervenor (Two Cases). Daily Tel. Printing Co. v. United States of Am. & Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Whas, Inc., Louisiana Television Broad. Corp., Ksl, Inc., Intervenors. Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Ksl, Inc., Intervenor. The Brockway Co. v. United States of Am. & Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Ksl, Inc., Intervenor. Gray Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Ksl, Inc., Intervenor, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).publishedThe Commission "must do more than enumerate factual differences, . . . it must explain the relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Federal Communication Act." Melody Music v. F.C.C., 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (…
- Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).publishedThe Commission “must do more than enumerate factual differences, ... it must explain the relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Federal Communication Act.” Melody Music v. F.C.C., 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (19…
- The Greyhound Corp. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n & United States of Am., 551 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977).publishedC., 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 244 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965).
Show 6 more citing cases
- Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).publishedSee Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 175 , 454 F.2d 1018 , 1026-27 (1971); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965). 56 .
- Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).published C., 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 244 , 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965) 49 See 180 NLRB at 788.
- Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Democratic Nat'l Comm. & Repub. Nat'l Comm., Intervenors. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Repub. Nat'l Comm., Intervenor, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).publishedDavis, supra Note 53, Sec. 16.12 55 Melody Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 120 U.S. App.D.C. 241, 244, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965).
- Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).publishedMelody Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 120 U.S. App.D.C. 241, 244, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (1965).
- Adams Telcom, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n United States of Am., Am. Pcs, L.P., Intervenors, 38 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1995).published(FCC must “do more than enumerate factual differences, if any, between appellant and the other eases; it must explain the relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Federal Communications Act)
- Henry W. Maier v. The Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & the United States of Am., Wtmj, Inc., Intervenor-Respondent, 735 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1984).published See, e.g., Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C.Cir.1965).
At page 732 rendered his opinion, stating in pertinent part: “NBC contends that it was duped, and that it acted promptly to protect the public interest as soon as it…9 citing cases
- RKO Gen., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981).publishedSee, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 , 1026 (D.C.Cir.1971); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Rko Gen., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Multi-State Commc'ns, Inc., Intervenor. Rko Gen., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Fid. Television, Inc., Multi-State Commc'ns, Inc., Intervenors. Rko Gen., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Fid. Television, Inc., New England Television Corp., Dudley Station Corp., Multi-State Commc'ns, Inc., Cmty. Broad. of Boston, Inc., Intervenors, 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981).publishedSee, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 , 1026 (D.C.Cir.1971); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Leroy Garrett, Trading as Garrett Broad. Serv. (Weup) v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975).publishedD.C. 241, 243-244, 345 F.2d 730, 732-733 (1965). 26 .
- White v. Bloomberg, 345 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1972).publishedCf. Melody Music, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241 , 345 F.2d 730, 732-33 (1965).
- Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).publishedMelody Music, Incorporated v. FCC, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 241 , 345 F.2d 730, 732-733 (1965).
- Mtn Solu LTD Inc v. FCC, 197 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1999).published See Melody Music v. F.C.C., 345 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C.
- Mountain Solutions, Ltd. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 197 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1999).published See Melody Music v. F.C.C., 345 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C.Cir.1965).
- Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Commissioners v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Ad Hoc Telecomm. Users Comm., Intervenors. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Dist. of Columbia v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., United Tel. Sys., Inc., Intervenors. People of the State of California & the Pub. Utils. Comm'n of the State of California v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., S. Pac. Commc'ns Co., Intervenors. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Intervenors. Lexitel Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., United Tel. Sys., Inc., Intervenors. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., MCI Telecomm. Corp., Intervenors. North Am. Tel. Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Gte Sprint Commc'ns Corp., Intervenors. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Gte Serv. Corp., Intervenors. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Dist. of Columbia v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Gte Sprint Commc'ns Corp., Intervenors. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., W. Union Tel. Co., Intervenors. United States Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Gte Sprint Commc'ns Corp., Intervenors. Telesphere Network, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., Am. Broad. Companies, Intervenors. Ass'n of Long Distance Tel. Companies v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & United States of Am., W. Union Tel. Co., Intervenors, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).publishedSee also Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732-33 (D.C.Cir.1965). 271 The FCC's response to ARINC's objections is twofold.
- Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Commissioners v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).publishedSee also Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732-33 (D.C.Cir.1965).
Other citing cases
- Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).published
- Harry Joseph Pollack & Arthur Morton Pollack v. Joy R. Simonson, 350 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965).published
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee
Reporter's Syllabus editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion
Mr. Marcus Cohn, Washington, D.C., with whom Messrs. Paul Dobin and Stanley S. Neustadt, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. John Conlin, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, with whom Messrs. Henry Geller, Gen. Counsel, and Daniel R. Ohlbaum, deputy Gen. Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, were on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Howard Jay Braun, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and FAHY and WRIGHT, Circuit judges.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
Lead Opinion
The Federal Communications Commission refused to renew appellant’s license to operate WGMA, a standard radio broadcast station in Hollywood, Florida. Appellant’s only shareholders, Daniel En-right and Jack Barry, produced television quiz shows prior to 1960 in which some contestants were secretly given assistance in answering questions. The hearing examiner stated that Enright and Barry
“have engaged in activities relating to television quiz programs which are censurable and [which] * * * reflect adversely upon their character qualifications to be a licensee of a radio station. However * * * such activities do not constitute an absolute disqualification. * *
The examiner found, as mitigating factors, that WGMA had provided “outstanding service,” and that Enright and Barry had violated no law or express Commission policy when they conducted the deceptive programs, though Congress has since amended the Communications Act to forbid such practices.[1] The examiner further stated:
“[S] imple justice requires that Barry and Enright’s conduct be considered in the light of the then-existing circumstances. Certainly the networks which broadcast these then highly rated programs had both network and licensee responsibility, since the programs in question were broadcast over their own stations, as well as over those of their affiliates.
“From the evidence, it appears that, at least, the higher echelons of the networks were not aware of the use of such controls. It is, however, equally evident that there had been public exposés which would appear likely to alert persons with a desire to know the facts * * * and to cause real investigations to be made * * *. [A]s was pointed out to the vice president and general attorney of NBC by at least two members of the congressional committee [which investigated these practices in 1960], it was singular indeed that no suspicion had been aroused * *
On the basis of these findings, the examiner recommended license renewaL On April 15, 1964, the Commission reversed the examiner, because Enright and Barry “lack the requisite character qualification to be licensees” on the ground that their “prolonged deception practiced upon the television viewing public * * * is so patently and flagrantly contrary to the public interest as to warrant, without more, the denial of an application for renewal * * The Commission also found that Enright and Barry had attempted “to discourage and to frustrate” initial investigations by a New York City grand jury and by network officials.
Appellant petitioned the Commission to reconsider its decision and to consolidate oral argument with pending applications for renewal of operating licenses by the National Broadcasting Company, the network which carried, and for a time owned, the quiz shows produced by En-right and Barry. Alternatively appellant asked the Commission to vacate its decision and withhold further decisions until it had decided the NBC case.
It appears that before the Commission’s initial decision in the present case, the hearing examiner in the NBC case[*732] rendered his opinion, stating in pertinent part:
“NBC contends that it was duped, and that it acted promptly to protect the public interest as soon as it determined what was going on. * * * The manner in which NBC reacted when the revelations inescapably broke upon it shows how clearly it was recognized inside the company that the trickery of its quiz shows was on the wrong side of the line separating downright dishonesty from the permissible make-believe of show business. The record urges the judgment that so long as there was no danger of disclosure to threaten audience acceptance of the shows, NBC turned its back on the evidence that the quiz programs might be counterfeit, and acted finally only when it was compelled by the growing tide of public dissatisfaction and by the threat posed in the aroused interest of various public agencies. Clearly, any disposition to frame conduct not according to ordinary morality and public requirements but in response to business necessities, and which shuns misconduct only because of the risks in discovery, is a substantial discredit.”[2]
The examiner concluded, however, that this discredit was counterbalanced by “the record of the network” in broadcasting, and that its role in the deceptive quiz shows thus did not disqualify it from holding broadcast licenses. On July 24, 1964, while the NBC proceedings were still pending, the Commission denied appellant’s request for reconsideration in conjunction with the NBC applications on the ground that “no useful purpose would be served.” One week later, on July 30, 1964, the Commission granted several license renewals to NBC without any mention of the network’s role in the deceptive quiz shows.[3]
We think the Commission’s refusal at least to explain its différent treatment of appellant and NBC was error. Both were connected with the deceptive practices and their renewal applications were considered by the Commission at virtually the same time. Yet one was held disqualified and the other was not.[4] Moreover, while in other cases the Commission found that criminal violations of antitrust laws were not sufficient character disqualifications to bar license renewals,[5] in the present case it found noncriminal conduct sufficient. The Commission stated, “Obviously, misconduct of the nature here involved in the broadcast field is necessarily in a somewhat different category [from criminal antitrust violations] and, on the facts of this case, of a most serious consequence.” Without intimating any opinion as to whether any of the misconduct discussed here is “in a somewhat different category” from appellant’s, we think the differences are not so “obvious” as to remove the need for[*733] explanation. And whether there are differences may be a question of decisional importance.[6]
Moreover, “the Commission has not explained its decision ‘with the simplicity and clearness through which a halting impression ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we are left to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflicting inferences. * * * We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.’ ” Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 654, 74 S.Ct. 826, 832, 98 L.Ed. 1015 (1954). We therefore remand this case for further proceedings.[7] The Commission should reconsider appellant’s application in accordance with the purposes of this remand. Whatever action the Commission takes on remand, it must explain its reasons and do more than enumerate factual differences, if any, between appellant and the other cases; it must explain the. relevance of those differences to the purposes of the Federal Communications Act.
So ordered.
Section 509, Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. V, 1964).
In re Applications of Nat’l Broadcasting Co., Docket Nos. 13085, 14091-92, 14054-56, initial decision of Hearing Examiner, released Nov. 20, 1963.
Following oral argument before this court, counsel for the Oommission submitted a memorandum stating that “no formal findings as to the network’s lack of knowledge or participation in the shows had been publicly made” by the Oommission.
Any inconsistency here may not be explained as a ehange in policy or correction of a previously erroneous ruling since the cases were decided contemporaneously. Compare Federal Communications Comm’n v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223, 67 S.Ct. 213, 91 L.Ed. 204 (1946); Leedom v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Wkrs., 107 U.S.App.D.C. 357, 278 F.2d 237 (1960); Shawmut Ass’n v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 146 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1945); Feinstein & Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963); Lanolin Plus Cosmetics v. Marzall, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 349, 196 F.2d 591 (1952).
General Electric Company, 2 Pike & Fischer R.R.2d 1038 (1964); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 22 Pike & Fischer R.R. 1023 (1962).
Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964); Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964).
See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 243 F.2d 26 (1957), where the case was remanded to the Commission because of its apparent failure to apply consistent standards in a comparative hearing for a broadcast license. See also Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, supra; Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 321 F.2d 359 (1963).
Concurrence
I concur in remanding for explanation of the difference of treatment of appellant and NBC, and reconsideration, with respect to the participation of each in the television quiz shows. The violation of antitrust laws by certain licensees not involved in this case and appellant’s con-duet are, however, so unrelated that I would require no further explanation from the Commission in this matter.