Khorshad v. Khorshad, 121 A.D.3d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). · Go Syfert
Khorshad v. Khorshad, 121 A.D.3d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Goldstein v. Goldstein (nyappdiv, 2018-11-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goldstein v. Goldstein
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
"In interpreting a marital contract, a court should construe it in such a way as to give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized" ( Khorshad v Khorshad , 121 AD3d 857, 858 [internal quotation marks omitted]; accord Matter of McCarthy v McCarthy , 129 AD3d at 971 ; see Matter of McMahon-Rohan v Rohan , 113 AD3d 771, 771 ; Matter of Moss v Moss , 91 AD3d at 784 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of O'Connor-Gang v. Munoz
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The terms of a stipulation of settlement that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce operate as contractual obligations binding on the parties (see Matter of Gravlin v Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 5 [2002]; Khorshad v Khorshad, 121 AD3d 857, 858 [2014]; Martin v Martin, 80 AD3d 579 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Calandra v. Macaione
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The mother’s contention that the parties contracted in the stipulation of settlement to apply the lesser standard of a “change in circumstances” to the father’s income over $105,000 is not supported by the language of the subject provision (see Khorshad v Khorshad, 121 AD3d 857, 858 [2014]; Kosnac v Kosnac, 60 AD3d 636, 637 [2009]), and the mother’s remaining contentions are without merit.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of McCarthy v. McCarthy (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
“A separation agreement or stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract, the terms of which are binding on the parties” (Matter of Moss v Moss, 91 AD3d 783, 783 [2012]; see Matter of Gravlin v Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 5 [2002]; Khorshad v Khorshad, 121 AD3d 857, 858 [2014]).
discussed Cited "see" Ambrose v. Ambrose
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
“The terms of a stipulation of settlement that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce operate as contractual obligations binding on the parties” (Martin v Martin, 80 AD3d 579, 580 [2011]; see Khorshad v Khorshad, 121 AD3d 857, 858 [2014]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hamid Khorshad, Appellant,
v.
Vida Khorshad, Respondent
2013-05346.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 15, 2014.
121 A.D.3d 857
Skelos, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Maltese.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

[*858] In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered November 13, 2012, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marón, J.), dated April 30, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion, in effect, to enforce certain provisions of the parties’ stipulation of settlement dated March 13, 2012, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, so as to direct the plaintiffs attorney to pay from an escrow account the sum of $75,400 for the defendant’s capital gains tax obligations with respect to the sale of the former marital residence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“The terms of a stipulation of settlement that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce operate as contractual obligations binding on the parties” (Martin v Martin, 80 AD3d 579, 580 [2011]; see Ambrose v Ambrose, 93 AD3d 744, 745 [2012]; Matter of Moss v Moss, 91 AD3d 783, 783 [2012]). “In interpreting a marital contract, a court should construe it in such a way as to ‘give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized’ ” (Matter of Moss v Moss, 91 AD3d at 784, quoting Hyland v Hyland, 63 AD3d 1106, 1107 [2009]). “Where such an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the parties’ intent must be construed from the four corners of the agreement, and not from extrinsic evidence” (Herzfeld v Herzfeld, 50 AD3d 851, 851-852 [2008]; see Matter of Meccico v Meccico, 76 NY2d 822, 824 [1990]; Ambrose v Ambrose, 93 AD3d at 745; Clark v Clark, 33 AD3d 836, 837 [2006]).

Here, the parties’ stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, calls for certain funds from the net proceeds of the sale of the former marital residence to be set aside and held in escrow “for the payment of capital gains tax in conjunction with the sale of the marital residence.” As the Supreme Court properly concluded, this provision requires the plaintiff and his counsel to release funds from escrow in order to reimburse the defendant for the sums she expended toward her 2011 capital gains tax obligations. The plaintiffs argument to the contrary is not supported by the language of the stipulation of settlement.

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.

Skelos, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.