Brown v. State, 197 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). · Go Syfert
Search
Brown v. State, 197 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …youth and its attendant characteristics at p. 572 ⚠ not in text
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: TYRONE GLADON v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2017-08-16) · Strongest negative: People v. Cervantes (calctapp, 2017-04-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" People v. Cervantes
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: but see · confidence high
(Conn. 2015) 115 A.3d 1031 , 1035, 1044–1045 & fn. 15 [50 years without possibility of parole was a de facto LWOP for purposes of applying Miller‘s sentencing requirements]; but see, Williams v. State (Fla. App. 2016) 197 So.3d 569, 572 [50-year sentence not de facto LWOP]; State v. Zuber (N.J.
discussed Cited "but see" People v. Cervantes
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: but see · confidence high
(State v. Ragland (Iowa 2013) 836 N.W.2d 107, 109-110, 120-122 [60 years unconstitutional]; Peterson v. State (Fla.Ct.App. 2016) 193 So.3d 1034 , 1038-1039 & fn. 8 [56-year sentence with opportunity for release at age 74 was unconstitutional]; Bear Cloud v. State (Wyo. 2014) 2014 WY 113 [ 334 P.3d 132, 142 ] [“ ‘[t]he prospect of [only] geriatric release’ ” is the functional equivalent of life without parole]; State v. *617 Null (Iowa 2013) 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Null) [52.5 years is de facto life sentence even though evidence “does not clearly establish that [the defendant’s] prison t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TYRONE GLADON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Because Graham applies retroactively, “Henry’s application of Graham to lengthy term of years sentences should also be given retroactive application,” Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Waiters v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Moreover, Waiters’ forty-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence without parole, see, e.g., Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that a fifty-year sentence is not the equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole), qualifying him for relief under Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla.2016) (reversing Land-rum’s nonmandatory life-without-parole sentence for second-degree murder imposed without individualized consideration of Landrum’s “youth and its attendant characteristics” that is required under Miller).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that Williams’ “fifty-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of Graham”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citation omitted); see also Collins v. State, 189 So.3d at 343 (holding that the aggregate sentence of 52-to-55 years for a 16 year-old does “not amount to a defacto life sentence”).
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jamie L. Tyson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Fla. 1st DCA 2015), on reh’g (Nov. 9, 2015), review granted, SC15-2079, 2015 WL 7720518 (Fla. Nov. 19, 2015); see also Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 26, 2016) (“The postconviction court correctly denied [defendant’s] claim. [Defendant] would be entitled to be resen-tenced only if his sentence violated Graham.” (citation omitted)). *1089 In Peterson , our court determined that the defendant’s 56-year sentence could not stand under Graham and its progeny.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert BROWN, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Florida, Appellee
3D13-2288.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Mar 25, 2015.
197 So. 3d 569
2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 4199
2015 WL 1319511
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Shepherd, Emas, Scales.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
SHEPHERD, C.J.

Robert Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, asserting as error the State’s cross-examination of Brown at trial and later closing argument, questioning why he waited until trial — four years after the date of the crime — to divulge the name of the alleged actual , owner of the contraband. Because Brown invoked his.right to remain silqnt, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, [1] when he was arrested at the scene of the crime and never waived that right during the ensuing four years, we find, as the State has admirably conceded, that the prosecution’s questioning and argument were in error arid shifted the burden of proof to Brown to prove his innocence: See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 317 (Fla.1990) (“Our cases have made clear that courts must prohibit all evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence.”); see also, U.S. Corist. amend. V (“No Person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’); Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness • against oneself.”). We note that in this regard, we have considered the State’s harmless error argument and are unable to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

Reverséd and remanded for a new trial.