Gulf Ins. Co. v. Ronald Tilley, Carol Jo Tilley, Marcella Smith (A Minor), Patricia A. Smith, 393 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1968). · Go Syfert
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Gulf Ins. Co. v. Ronald Tilley, Carol Jo Tilley, Marcella Smith (A Minor), Patricia A. Smith, 393 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1968). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
74 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 35 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (iowa, 1988-10-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
Iowa · 1988 · confidence medium
In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, 280 F.Supp. 60, 64-65 (N.D.Ind.1967), aff'd per curiam, 393 F.2d 119, 120 (7th Cir.1968), a child was burned by an overturned coffee pot while in the care of a babysitter.
discussed Cited "see" Myrtil v. Hartford Fire Insurance
E.D. Pa. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, 280 F.Supp. 60, 65 (N.D.Ind.1967), aff’d, 393 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1968); Stanley v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 361 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. 1978) (“The provision does not lend itself to clarity, resulting in a split of opinion over whether it is ambiguous with the consensus that it is poorly worded.”).
cited Cited "see" MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nye
Mo. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, 280 F.Supp. 60 (D.C.Ind.1967), aff’d, 393 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1968); Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Askerud, 254 Minn. 156 , 94 N.W.2d 534 (1959).
cited Cited "see" Martinelli v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven
Mo. Ct. App. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, D.C.N.D.Ind., 280 F.Supp. 60 , affd., 7 Cir., 393 F.2d 119 ; State Farm Fire & Cas.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ronald TILLEY, Carol Jo Tilley, Marcella Smith (A Minor), Patricia A. Smith, Defendants-Appellees
16419.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Mar 5, 1968.
393 F.2d 119
Milford M. Miller, Jr., Fort Wayne, Ind., Hugh E. Reynolds, Jr., Indianapolis. Ind., for appellant., Carl G. Winter, Indianapolis, Ind., William S. Glickfield, Marion, Ind., for ap-pellee.
Schnackenberg, Kiley, Cummings.
Cited by 58 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Milford M. Miller, Jr., Fort Wayne, Ind., Hugh E. Reynolds, Jr., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.

Carl G. Winter, Indianapolis, Ind., William S. Glickfield, Marion, Ind., for appellee.

Before SCHNACKENBERG, KILEY and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff insurer, a Texas corporation, filed a diversity action seeking a declaratory judgment that the homeowner’s policy it issued to Mr. and Mrs. Ronald Tilley, Indiana citizens, did not apply to a certain accident. On October 9, 1964, Mrs. Patricia Smith Wood employed Mrs. Tilley to be a baby-sitter for her two and one-half year old daughter, Marcella Smith. Mrs. Wood left her child at the Tilley residence about 8:00 a. m. Two hours later, Mrs. Tilley decided to prepare breakfast for herself and a guest. Mrs. Tilley plugged an electric percolator into a wall outlet and placed it on a 4-foot high counter between the eating area and the kitchen of her home. Marcella Smith was sitting at a child’s table on the kitchen side of the counter and, while Mrs. Tilley was making pancakes, pulled the percolator cord, causing the hot coffee to spill and burn the child severely. Subsequently Marcella Smith filed a $71,900 damage suit against Mr. and Mrs. Tilley in the Circuit Court of Grant County, Indiana, where it is apparently still pending.

The insurance policy excluded coverage for any business pursuits of the insured “except * * * activities * * * which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits * * In a well-reasoned opinion, the District Court assumed that Mrs. Tilley’s baby-sitting for compensation was a business pursuit within the policy exclusion. However, the Court held that the preparation of hot coffee was “incident to non-business pursuits” within the exception to the exclusion, observing that otherwise the excepting clause would be meaningless. On the basis of the District Court’s opinion (280 F.Supp. 60), we agree that there was no exclusion from coverage under this policy.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Concurrence

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge

(concurring).

In the last full paragraph of the above opinion, it seems to me that the district court’s reasoning would be more clearly set forth by noting that that court held that, giving meaning both to the exclusion and the exception, the preparation of hot coffee was incident to non-business pursuits and thus within the exception, viz., “business pursuit”, excluded by the policy.