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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, 2012–2021 ·
…it cannot be said that incompetent representation has occurred merely because other lawyers, judging from hindsight, could have made a better choice of tactics.
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Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971
1998
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Charles W. Garton v. Harold R. Swenson
circumstances which demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer's deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lemaricus Davidson v. State of Tennessee
(2×)
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9 (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cortney R. Logan v. State of Tennessee
(2×)
In its written order denying post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel’s “decision not to move for a change of venue was a strategic choice and there is no proof or argument that there would be a more neutral venue for the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer.” Citing Robinson v. U.S., 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), the post-conviction court stated that it would “not second-guess a logical strategic decision simply because the petitioner was ultimately convicted.” Petitioner argues that the post- conviction court “misapplied the law t…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Richard Lloyd Odom v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9 (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Fields v. State of Tennessee
When the judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)). (1) Introduction of the Transparencies.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
William Darryn Busby v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)). -14- (1) Failure to prepare and present reasonable defense.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jerry Ray Davidson v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9 (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8 th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher A. Davis v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to 41 be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9 (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8 th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Steven Ray Thacker v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dennis Wade Suttles v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Calvin Owens v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255,1256 (8th Cir. 1971)). -8- I.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillip Lowell Bledsoe v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Timothy DeWayne Gardner v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” State v. Hellard, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mario Antoine Leggs v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel." 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James Allen Bowers v. State of Tennessee
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel." 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Taylor v. Myers
The Eighth Circuit in Robinson v. United States, stated in pertinent part, “Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the fray so as to case doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used.” 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1971). *874 Accordingly, relief based upon ineffective assistance of trial counsel is denied.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Boyd Huls v. A.L. Lockhart
We note that when defense counsel’s strategy “turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, [in hindsight,] this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1971) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Kerley
Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir.1971); Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn.1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Westbrook v. Zant
See, Com v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 561 (11th Cir.1983); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1255-56 (8th Cir. 1971).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hellard v. State
When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel.” Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Parker v. Parratt
There must be such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant. 448 F.2d at 1256 (footnote and citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Willis Parker v. Robert F. Parratt, Warden, Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, Armstead Pierce v. Robert F. Parratt, Warden, Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex
There must be such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney's legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant. 448 F.2d at 1256 (footnote and citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donald Garfield Cox v. Donald Wyrick, Warden
(2×)
Since the Oregon statute did not provide for reciprocal discovery, it was error for the court below to enforce it against petitioner, and his conviction must be reversed. 5 As we said in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted): Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the fray so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leonard E. Smith v. United States
Plant v. Wyrick, 636 F.2d 188 , (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 , 98 S.Ct. 145 , 54 L.Ed.2d 109 ; Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 , 95 S.Ct. 1404 , 43 L.Ed.2d 659 (1975); see Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James David Blue Thunder, (Two Cases)
(2×)
As we stated in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1978): 22 Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the fray so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used . . .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Denver Witham v. James Mabry, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction
Cf. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Orr v. Schaeffer
Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971); see Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220, 1223 (1st Cir. 1974). 20 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Leonard McCracken
See Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971). 2 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roy C. Reynolds v. James Mabry, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction
As we said in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971): Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the fray so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grant v. United States
See e. g., United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1977); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 -1166 (9th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442 , 445 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 945 , 91 S.Ct. 961 , 28 L.Ed.2d 228 (1971); Henderson v. Cardwell, 426 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1970); Morgan v. United States, 295 F.Supp. 967, 972 (D.Conn.1968).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rede Thomas Bad Cob
(2×)
However, this attack runs directly into the precept stated in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), and expressly reaffirmed in McQueen, 5 supra, 498 F.2d at 216, that in choosing trial tactics “the exercise of a defense attorney’s professional judgment should not be second-guessed by hindsight. . . .” A wrong or poorly advised decision by a defense attorney is not alone enough to support a subsequent claim of ineffective counsel.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aikens v. State
As stated in Anderson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Mo. 1972), [quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)]: “. . . ‘In order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity on this ground, the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of this ethical duty to his client.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Joseph Ward Easter
(2×)
We said in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971): 10 In order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity on this ground (ineffective assistance of counsel), the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer's deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charles N. Johnson v. United States
In so doing, the court properly applied the standard set out in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), and found *646 that counsel fully performed his duty to serve his client effectively. 9 While our prior cases such as McQueen v. Swenson, supra,; Garton v. Swenson, supra, and Robinson v. United States, supra, speak of denial of effective assistance of counsel or ineffective representation, and similar phrases, it appears to us that characterizing counsel’s conduct on the basis of effectiveness may suggest a standard not supported by constitutional principles.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jeannette Elizabeth Hager
(2×)
However, this attack runs directly into the precept stated in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), and expressly reaffirmed in McQueen, supra, 498 F.2d at 216 , that in choosing trial tactics “the exercise of a defense attorney’s professional judgment should not be second-guessed by hindsight . . . .” A wrong or poorly advised decision by a defense attorney is not alone enough to support a subsequent claim of ineffective counsel.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Roger Lee McQueen v. Harold R. Swenson, Warden
And, of course, the duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research. [487 F.2d at 1204 (footnotes omitted).] In deciding the instant case, the district court relied upon the sound precept enunciated in Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), that the exercise of a defense attorney’s professional judgment should not be second-guessed by hindsight in a proceeding such as the present one. 357 F.Supp. at 563 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garton v. Swenson
Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), for example, states that before a violation of a particular defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may be found: “the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of this ethical duty to his client.” See also Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1972), which quotes Robinson’s conclusion that the facts must demonstrate “such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant.” *1362 And some Eighth Circuit eases app…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Peterson v. State of Missouri
In Robinson v. United States, supra 448 F.2d at 1256, the court stated: In order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity on this ground, the circum *1384 stances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Redus v. Swenson
There must be "such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney's legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant." Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Manuel Joseph Valenzuela
(2×)
However, as we have often noted, a “wrong or poorly advised decision by a defense attorney is not alone enough to support a subsequent claim of ineffective counsel.” United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1974); accord, Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Edward Lewis ROBINSON, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
71-1094.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 7, 1971.
Robert G. Duncan, Kansas City, Mo., on brief for appellant., Bert C. Hurn, U. S. Atty., and Vernon A. Poschel, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., on brief for appellee.
Vogel, Gibson, Lay.
Cited by 72 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals denial of his § 2255 petition. He sought post-conviction relief in the district court on the ground that his conviction for concealing a sto[*1256] len vehicle under 18 U.S.C. § 2313 was caused by the denial of effective assistance of counsel. His original conviction was affirmed by this court. 419 F.2d 1109 (8 Cir. 1969). Petitioner’s claim is premised on the ground that his counsel wrongfully recommended that he not take the stand to testify on his own behalf and that further his counsel refused to cause compulsory process to issue at his trial for two absent witnesses. After holding a hearing the district court found that counsel’s representation was effective and that the defendant himself had voluntarily declined to testify at trial. The record further demonstrates that the petitioner’s trial counsel, an experienced lawyer in handling criminal cases, intei'viewed one of the witnesses who stated he could not help petitioner and otherwise did not want to testify. [1] Neither counsel nor the defendant knew how to locate the other witness. We affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.
Hindsight can always be utilized by those not in the fray so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a lawyer has used. Trial counsel’s strategy will vary even among the most skilled lawyers. When that judgment exercised turns out to be wrong or even poorly advised, this fact alone cannot support a belated claim of ineffective counsel. Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129, 145 (8 Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1019, 86 S.Ct. 1966, 16 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1966); Taylor v. United States, 332 F.2d 918, 922 (8 Cir. 1964); Kilgore v. United States, 323 F.2d 369, 372-373 (8 Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 681, 11 L.Ed.2d 617 (1964); Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791, 795 (8 Cir. 1962). In order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity on this ground, the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of this ethical duty to his client. There must be such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant. [2] Cf. Williams v. United States, 402 F.2d 548, 552 (8 Cir. 1968); Dillane v. United States, 121 U.S.App. D.C. 354, 350 F.2d 732 (D.C.Cir. 1965); Lyles v. United States, 346 F.2d 789 (5 Cir. 1965), cert. denied 385 U.S. 952, 87 S.Ct. 331, 17 L.Ed.2d 229 (1966); Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67 (4 Cir. 1964); Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F.Supp. 201, 234 (D.Neb.1957). The factual circumstances existing here fall short of raising such a claim. Cf. United States v. Cotton, 446 F.2d 865 (8 Cir. 1971).
Judgment affirmed.
1
. The trial court significantly found that petitioner retained his trial counsel to prosecute his appeal.
2
. Although waiver was not the basis of the court’s decision below, apropos to the facts here is the Supreme Court’s observation in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-452, 85 S.Ct. 564, 569, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965):
“If [a strategic reason] motivated the action of petitioner’s counsel, and their plans backfired, counsel’s deliberate choice of the strategy would amount to a waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the state courts or here. Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (C.A.5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.”