Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., Inc., 455 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., Inc., 455 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we agree that recovery by kaiser is precluded as a matter of law because there is . . . no contention that the interference with kaiser's contract rights was intentional.”
43 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re: Deepwater Horizon (ca5, 2015-05-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In re: Deepwater Horizon (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we agree that recovery by kaiser is precluded as a matter of law because there is . . . no contention that the interference with kaiser's contract rights was intentional.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Veracruz v. BP, P.L.C. (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir.1972) (“We agree that recovery by Kaiser is precluded as a matter of law because there is ... no contention that the interference with Kaiser’s contract rights was intentional.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plains Pipeline, L.P. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
E.D. La. · 2014 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972) (denying recovery where owner of production plant suffered losses from interruption of gas services due to damage to another owner’s pipeline); Louisville & Nashville R.R.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nautilus Marine, Inc. v. James Niemela John O'Hara Ocean Beauty Seafoods, Inc., a Washington Corporation, in Personam M/v Norquest
9th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir.1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. the M/V Marathonian
S.D.N.Y. · 1975 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5 Cir. 1972) (per curiam) ; J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARSHLAND DREDGING COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellee
71-3042.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mar 2, 1972.
455 F.2d 957
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10971
F. W. Middleton, Jr., Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff-appellant., James H. Daigle, New Orleans, La., E. Leland Richardson, Baton Rouge, La., George B. Matthews, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.
Bell, Dyer, Clark.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Claiming diminishment of its gas supply caused by Marshland’s fracture of the- underwater line of its supplier, Sugar Bowl Gas Company, Kaiser sued Marshland for consequential damages. From an adverse summary judgment for Marshland, Kaiser appeals. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. A barge owned by Marshland Dredging, while engaged in cleaning an outfall canal entering the Mississippi under a contract with Humble Oil, dropped a heavy anchor which punctured a high pressure gas pipeline owned and operated by Sugar Bowl Gas Company. This puncture caused immediate interruption of gas fuel service to Kaiser’s production plant located a short distance north of the point where the pipeline was damaged, resulting in shutdown expenses and production losses of $170,229, for which Kaiser seeks recovery. The gas fuel was being supplied to Kaiser under contract by Sugar Bowl Gas.

In granting summary judgment, the trial judge relied primarily on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 1927, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290, that “as a general rule, * * * a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other unknown to the doer of the wrong.” 275 U.S. at 309, 48 S.Ct. at 135.

We agree that recovery by Kaiser is precluded as a matter of law because there is (1) no contention that the interference with Kaiser’s contract rights was intentional; (2) no evidence that Marshland had knowledge of the existence of the contract between Kaiser and Sugar Bowl Gas, and (3) no showing of facts, by affidavit or otherwise, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial, of anything more than merely the negligent interference with contract rights. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

Affirmed.