Julio Gonzales v. Dr. George Beto, Dir., Texas Dep't of Corr., 460 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
Search
Julio Gonzales v. Dr. George Beto, Dir., Texas Dep't of Corr., 460 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Marc Veasey v. Greg Abbott (ca5, 2016-07-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marc Veasey v. Greg Abbott (2×)
5th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Int'l Refinery, Inc., 676 F.3d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a per se approach in favor of a “totality of the circumstances approach for deciding whether third-party payment of a retainer creates a disqualifying interest” in a bankruptcy case); United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (employing a multi-factor test to determine whether consent to search was voluntary); Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 2004) (employing a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine whether workers were volunteers for the purposes of the Fair Labor St…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Julio GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Dr. George BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee
72-1126.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
May 18, 1972.
460 F.2d 314
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9474
Roy E. Greenwood, Staff Counsel, Tex. Dept, of Corrections, Harry H. Walsh, III, Staff Counsel, Huntsville, Tex., for petitioner-appellant., Howard M. Fender, Asst. Atty. Gen. State of Texas, Austin, Tex., Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen. of Texas, Nola White, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Alfred Walker, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Rob-er C. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Gewin, Ainsworth, Simpson.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a Texas State prisoner, incarcerated for theft, appeals from a denial by the District Court of habeas relief. He contends that the warrantless search of an impounded automobile (in which he had been riding as a passenger when arrested) was illegal, and that a lineup procedure at which he was identified without benefit of counsel was so fundamentally prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process.

We have examined the record and the District Court’s findings and conclusions, and we are convinced that relief was properly denied.

The search of the vehicle was based on probable cause, independent of any incident to arrest, and under circumstances approved in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The lineup, having occurred prior to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), must be judged by the totality of surrounding circumstances to determine whether it was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification” as to constitute lack of due process. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). We have applied these standards and find no circumstances whatsoever which were conducive to the denial of any of appellant’s constitutional rights. We find no error by the District Court.

Affirmed.