At page 615 cited at this page2 citing cases
- Bradley v. Carydale Enter., 707 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Va. 1989).publishedCo., 530 F.2d 539, 541 (4th Cir.1975) (Section 1981 suit); Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615, 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 , 93 S.Ct. 128 , 34 L.Ed.2d 130 (1972) (Section 1982 suit); Harris v. Obenshain, 452 F.Supp. 1172, 1176-7…
- W.M. Scheerer v. Rose State Coll. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, Donald Burris, & Evan Kemp, 950 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1991).publishedJuly 2, 1991) (post- Wilson and Goodman decision holding that § 1982 is sufficiently analogous to § 1981 and § 1983 to warrant use of the same limitations period); see also Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615, 615 (4th Cir.) (pre-Wilson decisio…
Other citing cases
- Griffin v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Va. 1989).published
- Metzger v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 834 (Tax Ct. 1987).published
- McCausland v. Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1981).published
- Bright Mccausland v. Mason Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 649 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1981).published
- Otis H. Reed, Jr. v. Terrell Don Hutto, Comm'r of Corr., State of Arkansas, A. L. Lockhart, Superintendent, Etc., 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973).published
- Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983).published
v.
Lee A. GIFFORD and Charles R. Samuels, Appellees
Jesse L. Allen and Constance G. Allen appeal from an order of the district court which held that their complaint charging racial discrimination in the sale of real estate in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was barred by Virginia’s one-year statute of limitations. The complaint, which seeks compensatory and punitive damages, alleges that the Allens suffered humiliation, emotional stress, and anxiety when the defendants initially refused to sell them a house. Later the Al-lens succeeded in purchasing a home in the subdivision the defendants were developing.
While this appeal was pending, we held, in Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir., 1972), that the state’s two-year statute applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for personal injuries. Both § 1982 and § 1983 were enacted to redress the infringement of civil rights. Both allow the recovery of damages for personal wrongs. We conclude, therefore, that the reasons stated in Almond for applying Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations to actions under § 1983 make the same limitation period appropriate for personal injury suits based on § 1982.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and this ease is remanded for further proceedings. Each party shall bear his own costs.