United States v. Lloyd A. Landry & Eric B. Levin, 463 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
United States v. Lloyd A. Landry & Eric B. Levin, 463 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Gary William Minore, AKA Skip, United States of America v. Arthur Torsone, United States of America v. Prommateta Chinawat (ca9, 2002-06-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gary William Minore, AKA Skip, United States of America v. Arthur Torsone, United States of America v. Prommateta Chinawat
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Longoria, 113 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559-60 (9th Cir.1992); Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960, 965-66 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Landry, 463 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir.1972); 5 Criminal Procedure § 21.4(c) (“ ‘An explanation of the elements of the charge helps to assure that the defendant fully appreciates the nature of the offense to which the plea is tendered.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Peter Erlenborn
9th Cir. · 1973 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Landry, 9 Cir., 1972, 463 F.2d 253 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lloyd A. LANDRY and Eric B. Levin, Defendants-Appellants
71-2583.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jun 13, 1972.
463 F.2d 253
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9055
Morris Lavine (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellants., Irving Prager, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Eric A. Nobles, Robert L. Meyer, Asst. U. S. Attys., William D. Keller, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Merrill, Goodwin, Lindberg.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Lloyd Landry and Eric B. Levin were indicted, with five others, in a conspiracy to deal in counterfeit United States currency. 18 U.S.C. § 473. Landry and Levin cooperated with the investigation, and pleaded guilty to one count of the ten-count indictment. In due course, they were sentenced to six months' confinement and 30 months’ probation. The remaining counts were dismissed. After being sentenced, both defendants[*254] sought to change their pleas. The district court denied the relief under Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.

The defendants now appeal, with new counsel, and assert that their guilty pleas were taken in proceedings which did not satisfy Fed.R.Crim.P. 11.

We have examined the record, and agree that the district judge receiving the guilty pleas did not, in the case of the defendant Landry, make the comprehensive record of the factual basis for the plea required by Rule 11 and by McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), citing with approval Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).

The defendant Landry did confer at length with retained counsel before and during the proceedings in which he pleaded guilty, but he never told the district judge that he understood the charge. He was equivocal about the degree of his participation in the conspiracy, and his equivocation caused the judge to recess the proceedings. After further consultation with counsel, Landry announced that he wished to persist in his guilty plea, but, again, he did not acknowledge, and the record does not show, that he understood the elements of the crime.

There is some circumstantial evidence that Levin and Landry may have thought they would receive probation because of their service as informers. The motion to change the plea was a reaction to a sentence of confinement (brief as it was in light of the maximum penalty of five years on each count).

On oral argument, Levin abandoned his appeal. Landry obviously did not abandon the appeal; and while the withdrawal of his plea at this time is difficult to rationalize on a practical basis, we believe the law regarding Rule 11 to be so clear that reversal is unavoidable.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions to permit Landry to change his plea.