United States v. Fred Douglas Coston, 469 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Fred Douglas Coston, 469 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Brady (cod, 1989-04-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Brady
D. Colo. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Davis v. Erdmann, 607 F.2d 917, 919 (10th Cir.1979) (implicitly assuming that a combination knife/pistol that could fire a .22 short cartridge was within the definition of any other weapon); United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 , 26 & n. 3 (2d Cir.) (a “pen gun,” which it described as a device made from the triggering mechanism of a flare gun attached to a machined barrel, was “any other weapon”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 , 98 S.Ct. 71 , 54 L.Ed.2d 82 (1977); United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir.1975) (affirming a conviction based on possession of an unregis…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Medeiros (2×)
Haw. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Muliufi, supra . [10] In United States v. Coston, 469 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.1972), the court assumed that a flare gun was a weapon and the only question was then whether it was a firearm. [11] We realize that our holding raises questions with respect to whether the other provisions of HRS, Chapter 134, relating to registration (134-2), permits to acquire (134-3), place to keep firearms (134-6), possession by a felon (134-7), permits to carry (134-9), licenses to sell and manufacture firearms (134-31), and carrying deadly weapons (134-51) apply generally to flare guns.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Sampson
Mass. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Coston, 469 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding within the § 5845 definition of Blair flare gun which the defendant had loaded with a shotgun shell and which was shown by test-firing to be capable of being used as a shotgun).9 10 *758 That the Legislature intended to put flare devices on a different footing from weapons and other destructive instrumentalities is evident from the fact that such devices are exempted from the requirement that the possessor of firearms obtain a firearm identification card, c. 140, § 129C (a) (exempting “[a]ny device used exclusively …
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Fred Douglas COSTON, Appellant
72-1853.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Dec 6, 1972.
469 F.2d 1153
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6405
George Minor, Jr., Portsmouth, Va. (court-appointed counsel, on brief), for appellant., Brian P. Gettings, U. S. Atty. for Eastern District of Virginia, and Roger, T. Williams, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief, for appellee.
Butzner, Russell, Field.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Fred Douglas Coston appeals from his conviction, after a plea of guilty, of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U. S.C. § 5861. Coston contends that the weapon he possessed, a Blair Flare gun which he had loaded with a shotgun shell, was not a “firearm” within the meaning of the Act. The weapon, which had a length of 5% inches and a smooth bore, proved capable of being used as a shotgun when test-fired. These physical characteristics and firing capability made the weapon a firearm within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845. Cf. United States v. Shafer, 445 F.2d 579, 583 (7th[*1154] Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986, 92 S.Ct. 448, 30 L.Ed.2d 370 (1971); United States v. Williams, 427 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909, 91 S.Ct. 154, 27 L.Ed.2d 149 (1970).

Affirmed.