United States v. Louis Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Louis Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dearstyne v. Mazzuca (nynd, 2011-03-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dearstyne v. Mazzuca
N.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 338 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that the third Barker factor “weighted] heavily” against petitioners where they “waited roughly 22 months before advancing their speedy trial claim,” which “hardly render[ed] plausible their contention that an expeditious resolution of their cases was a matter of pressing constitutional importance for them”); United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.1980) (finding that “third [Barker ] factor weigh[ed] against [petitioners who] waited un…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Flowers v. Warden, Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cyphers, 556 F.2d at 636 (no constitutional speedy-trial violation even though defendant’s incarceration while awaiting trial in New York prevented a timely consideration of his parole in Ohio and prohibited him from receiving a federal sentence concurrent with his Ohio sentence); McQuillan, 525 F.2d at 818 (no speedy-trial violation even though delay cost defendant his job, and some of his witnesses became unavailable); Lasker, 481 F.2d at 237 (prejudice was “insubstantial” even though defendant suffered damage to his reputation, witnesses’ memories dulled, and two characte…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gabriel Infanti and Nathan Kurtz
2d Cir. · 1973 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Fasanaro, supra, 471 F.2d at 718.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mallet v. Miller
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
Furthermore, the reason for the delay — inability to locate the chief prosecution witness — is mentioned in Barker as one which justifies some delay. 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; see also United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Henry Rayborn v. Charles Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, and Robert Abrams, New York State Attorney General
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Cf. Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir.1982); see also United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir.1973) (per curiam) (defendant’s failure to assert his right in a timely fashion “left [the court] with the impression that he ... never wanted a speedy trial at all,” which weighed in favor of not finding a deprivation of the right).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Tommy Roberts (2×)
2d Cir. · 1975 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (over four years); United States v. Saglimbene, 471 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 , 93 S.Ct. 2146 , 36 L.Ed.2d 686 (1973) (six years).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States Ex Rel. James A. Walker v. Robert J. Henderson, Superintendent of Auburn Correctional Facility,respondent-Appellee
2d Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 847-848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 , 92 S.Ct. 2489 , 33 L.Ed.2d 333 (1972).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Louis FASANARO, Defendant-Appellant
165, Docket 71-2077.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 2, 1973.
471 F.2d 717
1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12367
Abraham Solomon, New York City, for defendant-appellant., Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S. Atty. for Southern District of New York, Carter LaPrade and Rudolph W. Giuliani, Asst. U. S. Attys., for appellee.
Feinberg, Timbers, Thomsen.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

On February 17, 1972, 456 F.2d 1336, we affirmed without opinion the judgment of conviction entered against appellant in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Inzer B. Wyatt, J., for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 659 and 2. On June 26, 1972, the Supreme Court, 408 U.S. 916, 92 S.Ct. 2505, 33 L.Ed.2d 329 granted Fasanaro’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), decided four days before. We have carefully considered the four factors enumerated by the Court in Barker, in light of which a defendant’s claim that his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was denied is to be evaluated. After reviewing the facts of this case, we again conclude that no denial of that right appears on this record. Accordingly, we again affirm the judgment.

The four factors identified in Barker are “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’’ 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Applying these factors here, we note that the delay between indictment and trial —over four years between April 1967 and August 1971 — -was clearly substantial. On the other hand, the reason for the delay — inability to locate the chief prosecution witness — is mentioned in Barker as one which justifies some delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. Moreover, Fasanaro failed to assert his claimed right until one[*718] month after trial was finally scheduled, although represented by counsel throughout. We are thus left with the impression that he, like Willie Mae Barker, never wanted a speedy trial at all since he might reasonably have hoped that the principal government witness would never be found. Finally, we are unpersuaded by any claim of prejudice. While Fasanaro’s counsel stated at the sentencing before Judge Wyatt that one possible defense witness had died during the delay, the assertion was not substantiated ; no colorable claim of prejudice had been made prior to that time, nor does any appear in appellant’s brief filed with us following Supreme Court remand.

Affirmed.