Margaret Jenkins v. U. S. Post Off., 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
Margaret Jenkins v. U. S. Post Off., 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Michael Booher v. United States Postal Service (ca6, 1988-04-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Michael Booher v. United States Postal Service
6th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1982); Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 , 94 S.Ct. 57 , 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bartholomew v. United States
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
He has no right to a pre-termination hearing, Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 , 94 S.Ct. 57 , 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973), nor does he have a right to appeal the discharge to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bartholomew v. United States
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
He has no right to a pre-termination hearing, Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 , 94 S.Ct. 57 , 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973), nor does he have a right to appeal the discharge to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Department of Water & Power
Cal. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
"Nearly any reason assigned for dismissal is likely to be to some extent a negative reflection on an individual's ability, temperament, or character. ( Jenkins v. U.S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Department of Water & Power
Cal. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
(Jenkins v. U.S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Lehman
E.D.N.Y · 1982 · confidence medium
See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 80-81 , 94 S.Ct. 937, 948-49 , 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1979); Jaeger v. Freeman, 410 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1973); Heaphy v. United States Treasury Dept., 354 F.Supp. 396, 399-401 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 347 F.Supp. 1158, 1161 (S.D.N.Y.1972) ("Certainly Congress intended that Federal employers should have an unfettered right to terminate probationary employees.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Lehman
E.D.N.Y · 1982 · confidence medium
See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 80-81 , 94 S.Ct. 937, 948-49 , 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1978); Jaeger v. Freeman, 410 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1973); Heaphy v. United States Treasury Dept., 354 F.Supp. 396, 399-401 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 347 F.Supp. 1158, 1161 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (“Certainly Congress intended that Federal employers should have an unfettered right to terminate probationary employees.
cited Cited as authority (rule) McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
E.D. Pa. · 1977 · confidence medium
Jenkins v. U.S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Larry v. Lawler
N.D. Ill. · 1976 · confidence medium
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 , 94 S.Ct. 57 , 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stetson v. Board of Selectmen of Carlisle
Mass. · 1976 · confidence medium
While dismissal for “any reason other than reduction in force is likely to be to some extent a reflection on . . . ability, temperament, or character” (Medoff v. Freeman, 362 F.2d 472, 476 [1st Cir. 1966]), “not every dismissal attains constitutional proportions.” Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mary C. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District, a Political Subdivision
9th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Jenkins v. U. S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see" Glenn Harrington v. United States of America, Stephen R. Walsh, Jr.
1st Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jenkins v. U. S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 414 U.S. 866 , 94 S.Ct. 57 , 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Fuller v. Johnson
W.D. Wash. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, e.g., Abdallah v. Napolitano, 909 F.Supp.2d 196, 210 (W.D.N.Y.2012) (citing cases); see also Jenkins v. U.S. Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Margaret JENKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U. S. POST OFFICE Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
72-2287.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 15, 1973.
475 F.2d 1256
Peter Greenfield (argued), Legal Services Center, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant., Joseph B. Scott, Atty. (argued), Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Harlington Wood, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Stan Pitkin, U. S. Atty., Ernest Scott, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for defendants-appellees.
Koelsch, Wright, Belloni.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published
BELLONI, District Judge:

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the United States.

Margaret Jenkins (plaintiff) was employed as a postal trainee by the United States Post Office. Her appointment[*1257] was “career conditional” with a one year probationary period. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in the course of the probationary period because of her “failure to meet minimum standard requirements.” Plaintiff was informed of her discharge by letter which additionally advised her that “[t]here is no allowable appeal from this decision through the Post Office Department procedures.”

Plaintiff maintains that she was entitled to a pre-dismissal hearing. Conceding that the right to a hearing is not authorized by any statute or regulation, plaintiff contends that such a hearing is required by the Fifth Amendment, and that her termination from government employment without a hearing constituted a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law.

We find plaintiff’s arguments unconvincing and affirm the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff suggests that the Constitution requires a hearing to protect an individual’s liberty any time a government employee is discharged under circumstances which reflect unfavorably upon his character. This proposition is overly broad. “[A]ny reason [assigned for the dismissal] other than reduction in force is likely to be to some extent a reflection on a probationer’s ability, temperament, or character.” Medoff v. Freeman, 362 F.2d 472, 476 (1st Cir. (1966). Nonetheless, not every dismissal attains constitutional proportions. “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). However, a posting procedure similar to that which concerned the Court in Constantineau is not at issue here. Plaintiff’s reliance on Constantineau is inappropriate.

Plaintiff did not have a property interest in her continued employment. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The Court, in Roth, further observed that “[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Roth at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. Plaintiff was a probationary employee and as such had no right to continued employment. Plaintiff’s status did not give rise to a property interest entitling her to a predismissal hearing.

Affirmed.