United States v. Herman Louis Williams, 485 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Herman Louis Williams, 485 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1976 · …require that the act be given the 'narrowest meaning.' it is sufficient if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of congress. at p. 1384 ⚠ not in text
16 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Herbert Theron Dunn (ca11, 1987-04-03)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Herbert Theron Dunn (3×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
See United States v. Garcia-Vazquez, 777 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir.1973), ce rt. denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jose Garcia Vazquez (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 837-38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 , 104 S.Ct. 245 , 78 L.Ed.2d 234 (1983); United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974); see also United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, *496 629 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Paul Udofot (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
In United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974), the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument identical to that urged by appellant, stating: The language of Section 922(e) is manifestly clear in its requirement that firearms and ammunition be brought to the carrier’s attention, either by written notice in the case of a shipper or by a delivery into the carrier’s custody of the firearm itself in the case of a passenger.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Channel
D. Maryland · 1976 · confidence medium
But that canon “is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose,” * * * and does not “require that the act be given the ‘narrowest meaning.’ It is sufficient if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress.” * * * [Citations omitted.] Judge Field, relying upon Cook, observed in United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1384 (4th Cir. 1973): While it is true that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, statutes are not to be construed …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Handler
D. Maryland · 1974 · confidence medium
But that canon “is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose,” * * * and does not “require that the act be given the ‘narrowest meaning.’ It is sufficient if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress.” * * * [Citations omitted.] Citing and relying upon Cook , Judge Field, in United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1384 (4th Cir. 1973), observed: While it is true that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, statutes are not to …
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Patrick G. Henry
9th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974) and United States v. Burton, 351 F.Supp. 1372 (W.D.Mo.1972), aff’d, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835 , 94 S.Ct. 178 , 38 L.Ed.2d 70 (1973), both so holding.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Krug
6th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Courts have held that the “purpose is to effect delivery of the firearm in a manner that makes the carrier aware that a firearm is being transported,” United States v. Dunn, 813 F.2d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir.1987), and that to satisfy this exception “a passenger must give the carrier at least actual notice that the item to be transported is a firearm or ammunition,” United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 838 (8th Cir.1983); see also United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383,1385 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974) (holding that to satisfy the passe…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. David Hartzog
4th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir.1973) (“[T]he entire statutory scheme is aimed at restricting the unchecked movement of firearms and ammunition which undermines legitimate efforts to impose reasonable restrictions upon their possession and use.”), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 , 94 S.Ct. 1947 , 40 L.Ed.2d 293 (1974).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Herman Louis WILLIAMS, Appellant
73-1471.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Oct 8, 1973.
485 F.2d 1383
1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 7622
Richard J. Stahl, Court-appointed counsel, Richmond, Va. (Horwitz, Baer & Neblett, Inc., Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellant., Raymond A. Carpenter, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Brian P. Gettings, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.
Haynsworth, Field, Widener.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
FIELD, Circuit Judge:

This case involves the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), a section of the Gun Control Act of 1968, regulating the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of firearms and ammunition by common or contract carrier. Section 922(e) makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors, any package or other container in which there is any firearm or ammunition without written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally possesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or contract carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign commerce may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such common or contract carrier for the duration of the trip without violating any of the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added).

In November, 1971, Herman Louis Williams boarded an Altair Air Lines flight from Baltimore, Maryland, to Richmond, Virginia. Before boarding the plane, Williams handed his luggage to the pilot who placed it in the nose cone of the plane where it remained throughout the flight. Williams did not inform the pilot orally or in writing that a firearm was in the luggage. Williams was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) and was found guilty by the district judge sitting without a jury.

Before the district court and this court Williams has maintained that he qualifies under the exception clause of Section 922(e) which we have emphasized above. It is undisputed that Williams was a passenger who legally owned or possessed the firearm in question which was transported in interstate commerce aboard a common carrier. At issue is whether Williams’ transfer of the luggage to the plane’s pilot without informing him of its contents satisfied the requirement that the passenger “deliver said firearm * * * into the custody of the pilot.” Williams argues that a relinquishment of control is all that the statute requires of a passenger and in support of his argument notes the absence in the exception clause of an express notice requirement such as that imposed on certain shippers.

While it is true that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, statutes are not to be construed in a manner which would defeat their clear purpose. United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262, 86 S.Ct. 1412, 16 L.Ed.2d 516 (1966); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 and 26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948); Stock v. Department of the Air Force, 186 F.2d 968, 972 (4 Cir. 1950). The language of Section 922(e) is manifestly clear in its requirement that firearms and ammunition be brought to the carrier’s attention, either by written notice in the case of a shipper or by a delivery into the carrier’s custody of the firearm itself in the case of a passenger. Carrying Williams’ argument to the absurd extreme, a dealer, barred from shipping a single firearm in interstate commerce aboard a common carrier without giving the carrier written notice,[*1385] could ship any quantity of firearms and ammunition in sealed containers and evade the.requirement of written notice by the simple expedient of flying as a passenger and carrying the containers as luggage. Such surreptitious traffic in firearms and ammunition was the precise menace at which the Gun Control Act of 1968 was directed. As the court in United States v. Burton, 351 F.Supp. 1372 (W.D.Mo.1972), noted, the entire statutory scheme is aimed at restricting the unchecked movement of firearms and ammunition which undermines legitimate efforts to impose reasonable restrictions upon their possession and use.

The legislative history accompanying Section 922(e) [reported as 922(d)] reveals that the notice requirements were designed “to make more effective the succeeding subsection [enacted as 922(f); reported as 922(e)] which prohibits a carrier from transporting or delivering a firearm in violation of the chapter.” 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, p. 4420 (90th Cong., 2d Sess.1968). Plainly, if a carrier is not put on notice of a firearm’s presence it cannot discharge its legal obligation to insure that the transportation is lawful. The absence of an explicit requirement of notice in the passenger exception was obviously predicated on the common sense belief that delivery of firearms and ammunition into a common carrier’s custody would be done in a manner which would make the carrier aware of that fact.

If the Congressional purpose in enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968 is to be realized, “custody” must be construed to mean a transfer of control in a manner which gives the carrier actual notice of the presence of a firearm. Any other construction would be sophistic and effectively defeat that purpose.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.