Juanita Williams v. Police Officer Gould & City of Los Angeles, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Juanita Williams v. Police Officer Gould & City of Los Angeles, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Jerry R. Blake (ca9, 1980-11-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jerry R. Blake
9th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Apolinar Navarette, Jr., AKA Paul Medel Navarette v. Jiro J. Enomoto (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
In Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973), we said that “[gjood faith is a defense to liability for damages in a suit under section 1983 — at least if, and to the extent that, it would be a defense ‘[ujnder the prevailing view in this country’ in common-law actions based on the parallel tort [citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)].” And in Wood v. Strickland, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that § 1983 should be construed to accord school board members a qualified good faith immunity from damages under that section where �…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Huotari v. Vanderport
D. Minnesota · 1974 · confidence medium
In such circumstances, “either view as to its ultimate resolution might be entertained reasonably and in good faith.” Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548-549 (9th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fisher v. Volz
3rd Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
See also our opinion in Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); for a stricter test, see Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973) (police must prove reasonable belief that the suspect was on the premises). 28 In any event, since the jury awarded punitive damages as against Curtis, it must have found either malice and wantonness, or gross and culpable negligence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fisher v. Volz
3rd Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
See also our opinion in Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); for a stricter test, see Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973) (police must prove reasonable belief that the suspect was on the premises). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Boscarino v. Nelson
E.D. Wis. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Juanita WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Police Officer GOULD and City of Los Angeles, Defendants-Appellants
71-1077.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 11, 1973.
486 F.2d 547
Burk M. Wiedner, Deputy City Atty. (appeared), Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., George J. Franscell, Asst. City Atty., Thomas J. Feeley, Dennis M. O’Rourke, Deputy City Attys., Los An-geles, Cal., for defendants-appellants., David A. Binder (appeared), Boyd S. Lemon, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Browning, Goodwin, Jameson, Per Curiam.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Fifth Circuit (1)
PER CURIAM:

Juanita Williams sued a Los Angeles police officer, Ronald Gould, for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an unconstitutional invasion of her apartment. Officer Gould defended on the ground that he had entered the apartment in the good-faith execution of his duties as a police officer to arrest a felon reasonably believed to be within. The trial court directed a verdict against Officer Gould. The court reasoned as follows: (1) If the entry violated Miss Williams’ constitutional rights, good faith was not a defense under this court’s ruling in Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); and (2) the entry did violate Miss Williams’ constitutional rights because Officer Gould should have secured a warrant before entering.

Good faith is a defense to liability for damages in a suit under section 1983 — at least if, and to the extent that, it would be a defense “[u]nder the prevailing view in this country” in common-law actions based on the parallel tort. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1973); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1968); Notaras v. Ramon, 383 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1968); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 788-791 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1973). [1] If Cohen v. Norris were to the contrary, its authority could not have survived Pierson v. Ray; but, in any event, it is not. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Pierson v. Ray, a holding that specific intent is not an essential element of a cause of action under section 1983 does not negate the availability of a “good faith” defense, 386 U.S. at 556-557, 87 S.Ct. 1213.

In common-law actions for warrantless entry to effect an arrest, the prevailing tort law view in this country recognizes as a defense a good faith and reasonable belief that there is a felon on the premises. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 204 (1965); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 1.19, at 54-56 (1956). Such a defense is therefore available in the corresponding damage action under section 1983. Rodriquez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 1973).

We comment on the merits of the defense in only one respect. Because the defense rests on good faith and reasonable belief, Officer Gould need not, in order to establish the defense, prevail on the legal position that a warrant is not required to enter a home to arrest a felon. Whether a warrant is required in such a situation is an open constitutional issue. It divides the Supreme Court. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 476-482, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1972). Either view as to its ultimate resolution might be entertained reasonably and in good faith. Moreover, warrantless entry of a dwelling by a police officer to effect an arrest is apparently authorized under certain circumstances by a California statute (Cal.Penal Code § 844), upon which Officer Gould may well have re[*549] lied reasonably and in good faith. See Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

1

. The trial court’s premise that if plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated, the “good faith” defense is not available deprives this defense of any significance, since if plaintiff’s constitutional rights have not been violated, she has no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.