Charles A. Hickmann & Phyllis C. Hickmann v. Gregory Wujick, as Assessor of the Town of Huntington, 488 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
Charles A. Hickmann & Phyllis C. Hickmann v. Gregory Wujick, as Assessor of the Town of Huntington, 488 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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38 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hall v. Nassau County (nyed, 2023-03-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Nassau County
E.D.N.Y · 2023 · confidence medium
Of particular relevance here, the Second Circuit has long recognized that “New York provides several remedies which afford [plaintiffs] an opportunity to raise all constitutional objections to the real property taxes imposed.” LILCO, 889 F.2d at 431 ;5 see also Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973) (New York remedies for taxpayers “are adequate” because plaintiffs “may seek judicial review of their assessment . . . and adverse determinations may be appealed”); Piedmont Gardens, LLC v. LeBlanc, 733 F. App’x 576 , 578–79 (dismissing tax challenge on comity 5 In Lon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Speer v. New London
D. Conn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [,] or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.” (citations omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. Deal
D. Conn. · 2020 · confidence medium
First, although the Plaintiff invokes the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, “[b]asing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights . . . or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.” Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Andrews County Appraisal District
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
This argument fails because “[b]asing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 [ (a) ](3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.” Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline
D. Kan. · 2004 · confidence medium
The court ruled that the TIA’s bar on subject matter jurisdiction extended to civil rights actions, stating: “Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.” Brooks, 801 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. Alameda Board of Supervisors
N.D. Cal. · 1990 · confidence medium
Hickman v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973); see Hawaiian Telephone, 691 F.2d at 910 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven
E.D.N.Y · 1989 · confidence medium
Accord Tully, 429 U.S. at 75 , 97 S.Ct. at 223 ; Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973) (per curiam); 423 South Salina Street, 566 F.Supp. at 492 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. Nance
10th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
The Second Circuit aptly explained: “Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.” Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973); see also Kimmey v. H.A.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. Nance
10th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Sec. 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341." Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973); see also Kimmey v. H.A.
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Conway
D. Vt. · 1981 · confidence medium
Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First United Methodist Church v. City of Syracuse
N.D.N.Y. · 1980 · confidence medium
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 470 , 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1639 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976); Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler
7th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Moreover, Wells did not in any way alter the Second Circuit's position that "invocation of the Civil Rights Act does not suffice to create an exemption from 28 U.S.C. § 1341 ," Id. at 76 ; Hickman v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973); American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler
7th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Moreover, Wells did not in any way alter the Second Circuit’s position that “invocation of the Civil Rights Act does not suffice to create an exemption from 28 U.S.C. § 1341 ,” Id. at 76 ; Hickman v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973); American Commuters Ass’n v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffin, Inc. v. Tully
D. Vt. · 1976 · confidence medium
Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973); Ammex-Champlain Corp. v. Gallman, supra. Nevertheless there appears to be a contradiction between the plain language of section 1140 and the few cases we have found which cloaks this issue in some uncertainty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerome J. Wells v. James E. Malloy, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Vermont
2d Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
We have thus held, both before Mitchum, American Commuters Ass’n, Inc. v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2 Cir. 1969), and thereafter, Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2 Cir. 1973), that invocation of the Civil Rights Act does not suffice to create an exemption from 28 U.S.C. § 1341 .
cited Cited "see" Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods, Ltd.
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973). 189 .
cited Cited "see" Finizie v. City of Bridgeport
D. Conn. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1973); Group Assisting Sewer Proposal-Ansonia v. City of Ansonia, 448 F.Supp. 45 (D.Conn.1978).
cited Cited "see" Linderkamp v. Bismarck School District No. 1
N.D. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir.1973). 5 .
cited Cited "see" Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Hickmann v. Wujick (2d Cir. 1973) 488 F.2d 875 , aff’g, D.C., 333 F.Supp. 1221 , and American Commuters Association v. Levitt (2d Cir. 1969) 405 F.2d 1148 , aff’g, D.C., 279 F.Supp. 40 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bonin v. Gannon
M.D. Penn. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Aluminum Co. of America v. Department of Treasury of Michigan, 522 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles A. HICKMANN and Phyllis C. Hickmann, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Gregory WUJICK, as Assessor of the Town of Huntington, DefendantAppellee
203, Docket 73-1666.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Dec 7, 1973.
488 F.2d 875
Charles A. Hickmann, Huntington, N. Y., for plaintiffs-appellants., Frank J. Mack, First Deputy Town Atty. (Frank J. Mack, Huntington, N. Y., and Herbert M. Levy, New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appel-lee.
Feinberg, Gurfein, Per Curiam, Waterman.
Cited by 33 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs commenced this civil action in the United States District Court for[*876] the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, seeking a declaratory judgment, damages and injunc-tive relief to redress claimed deprivation, under color of New York State law, of rights secured by the United States Constitution, more particularly their prior right as parents to control the education of their children. The sole defendant named in plaintiffs’ complaint is the Assessor of the Town of Huntington, Suffolk County, New York, where plaintiffs reside and pay real property taxes on the basis of an assessment roll prepared by defendant as required by State law.

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from “denying [them] a $200.00 tax credit against the school property taxes they will be required to pay for the 1971-72 tax year . . . .” They claim, in substance, that this tax relief is needed to enable them to pay the tuition charged by the non-public school their children attend.

Judge Neaher dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Federal District Coui't lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the assessment, levy or collection of taxes imposed under State law. We affirm.

28 U.S.C. § 1341 provides that: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.”

We concluded in American Commuters Association v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148, 1151 (2 Cir. 1969), that “when there are adequate state remedies available, Section 1341 means what it so plainly says and that federal jurisdiction is still precluded by it.” Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S. C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341. Levitt, supra; see also Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033, 87 S.Ct. 1484, 18 L.Ed.2d 596 (1967). Plaintiffs’ argument that they are not seeking to claim illegality or that the assessment was illegal is no more than a play on words. Nor is their argument that they have no plain, speedy and efficient remedy in the New York Courts more convincing.

As Judge Neaher observed, the Real Property Law, McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 50-a, of the State of New York subjects all real property in the State to taxation by counties, cities, towns, villages or school districts for municipal or school district purposes. (N.Y. Real Property Tax Law § 300 (McKinney 1972)). The Suffolk County Tax Act, enacted by the State Legislature, permits the taxing of real property in Suffolk County in accordance with the needs of its several town governments, villages and separate school districts.

The remedies afforded for review of real property assessments are adequate. Plaintiffs may seek judicial review of their assessment under Section 700 of the Real Property Tax Law, and adverse determinations may be appealed, § 724. That the remedy is expeditious is shown by Section 700(3) which grants to such proceedings and appeals a preference over all other civil actions and proceedings in all courts. The Rules of Practice, Supreme Court, Suffolk County permit the taxpayer to move for judgment on the pleadings (N.Y. Real Property Tax Law § 720(1), (McKinney 1972); or to move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212.

Moreover, the taxpayer may bring a declaratory judgment action where the taxing statute is said to be unconstitutional. Richfield Oil Corp. v. City of Syracuse, 287 N.Y. 234, 239, 39 N.E.2d 219 (1942).

The complaint was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Affirmed.