Bacon v. Nygard, 140 A.D.3d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). · Go Syfert
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Bacon v. Nygard, 140 A.D.3d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. YMCA of the USA (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fields v. General Conference of the United Methodist Church (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Both causes of action are based on the same factual allegations that appellants employed his boxing instructor, knew or should have known that the boxing instructor had a propensity to commit sexual abuse, and failed to protect plaintiff from foreseeable harms by properly supervising the boxing instructor led to plaintiff's injuries ( see Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Denson v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
New York courts routinely dismiss such derivative claims where, as here, they "fall within the ambit of other traditional tort liability, namely, [a] cause of action sounding in defamation" (Fleischer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD3d 536 ,538 [dismissing "cause[] of action alleging ... intentional infliction of emotional distress against each of the defendants ... as duplicative"]; see also Matthaus v Hadjedj, 148 AD3d 425 , 425 [l51 Dept 2017] ["Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as duplicative of her de…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MRE Tech. Solutions LLC v. Smiths Detection, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · confidence medium
Equitable estoppel is an extraordinary remedy, which applies where a party is prevented from filing an action within the applicable statute of limitation due to his or her reasonable reliance on deception, fraud or misrepresentations by the other ( see Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maak v. Medina Professional Firefighters Assn., IAFF Local 2161
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for prima facie tort because it is based on the same conduct as both the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and a previously dismissed cause of action for defamation, and it is thus duplicative of those causes of action ( see Ripka v County of Madison , 162 AD3d 1371 , 1373 [3d Dept 2018]; Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; see generally Freihofer v Hearst Corp. , 65 NY2d 135 , 142-143 [1985]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Educ. Loan Trust IV, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, plaintiff was aware of the facts before the statute of limitations expired ( see Pahlad v Brustman , 8 NY3d 901, 902 [2007]; Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Abello v. NYP Holdings, Inc.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2026 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, which are premised on the same facts as the defamation claims, are dismissed as duplicative (see Matthaus v Hadjedj, 148 AD3d 425 [lstDept2017]; see also Bacon v Nygard, 140 AD3d 577,578 [1st Dept 2016] citing Fleischer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD3d 536 , 538-539 [1st Dept 2013], Iv. denied21 NY3d 858 [2013]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Doe v. Xi Fang Temple
E.D.N.Y · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Under New York law, a “claim for IIED may not be sustainable where the conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 159 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); see also Bacon v. Nygard, 140 A.D.3d 577, 578 (1st Dep’t 2016) (IIED claim dismissed as duplicative of defamation claim).8 Here, Mr. Du’s claim is premised solely on plaintiff’s false report of sexual assault to police and prosecutors, which led to the initiation of his prosecution and “forced [Mr.] D[u] to engage in the humiliating exp…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. Riverside Church in the City of N.Y.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Louis Bacon, Appellant,
v.
Peter Nygard Et Al., Respondents
1535 150400/15.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 23, 2016.
140 A.D.3d 577
Sweeny, Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Webber.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered on or about July 31, 2015, which dismissed the defamation claims based on 105 of 135 allegedly defamatory statements as time-barred, the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort as duplicative and/or[*578] time-barred, and the aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims to the extent the intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort claims were dismissed, unanimously affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff failed to establish that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense to his time-barred defamation claims. He contends that defendants’ fraud and misrepresentations prevented him from discovering defendants’ identity — not that he “was lulled into inaction by defendant [s] in order to allow the statute of limitations to lapse” (East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, 218 AD2d 628, 628 [1st Dept 1995]). Further, plaintiff does not allege a fiduciary relationship between himself and defendants (id. at 629).

In any event, plaintiff’s allegations that he acted diligently in bringing this action are utterly refuted by the two open letters he published {see Lezama v Cedano, 119 AD3d 479, 480 [1st Dept 2014]). The letters demonstrate that plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to bring an action for more than a year before he commenced this action (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 450 [1978]).

The intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort claims are duplicative since the underlying allegations fall “within the ambit of” the defamation causes of action (see Fleischer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD3d 536, 538-539 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]). The non-time-barred “hate rally” allegations were intended to show that plaintiff was defamed, not that he suffered emotional distress. The continuing tort doctrine is not applicable since there was not a “final actionable event” that occurred within the statutory limitations period (see Shannon v MTA Metro-N. R.R., 269 AD2d 218, 219 [1st Dept 2000]). The non-time-barred, non-defamation allegations that were dismissed cannot form a basis for invoking the continuing tort doctrine.

Concur — Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Webber, JJ.