defamation claim in New York

2024An essential element of a defamation claim is that the statement was published to a third party (see Stepanov, 120 AD3d at 34 ).

2024To prevail in a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) a false statement that is (2) published to a third party (3) without privilege or authorization and that (4) causes harm, unless the statement is one of the types of publications actionable regardless of harm” (Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 120 AD3d 28, 34 [1st Dept 2014]).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2024Karl's cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539; Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2019Since truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim, dismissal of the complaint was warranted ( Dillon v City of New York , 261 AD2d 34, 38 [1st Dept 1999]; see Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co. , 120 AD3d 28, 34 [1st Dept 2014]).

2019With respect to the defamation claim, plaintiff failed to plead it with the required particularity (CPLR 3016[a]; Dillon v City of New York , 261 AD2d 34, 38 [1st Dept 1999]).

2024Karl's cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539; Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2024Reeves' cause of action for prima facie tort was also duplicative of the defamation claim ( see Matthaus v Hadjedj , 148 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2017]; Fleischer , 104 AD3d at 538-539). [*14]The prima facie tort claim, insofar as asserted by Consolidated, fails because the basis of the tort, the alleged defamatory statements made about its CEO, were not "of and concerning" Consolidated ( Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v CBS News Inc. , 28 NY3d 82, 86-87 [2016]; see also Cohn v National Broadcasting Co. , 67 AD2d 140, 146 [1st Dept 1979], affd 50 NY2d 885 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1022 [1980]).

2025As plaintiffs assert, slander per se excuses the requirement of special damages otherwise required for a defamation claim and includes both those statements that charge a plaintiff with a "serious crime" and those that "tend to injure" a plaintiff in their trade, business or profession ( Liberman v Gelstein , 80 NY2d 429, 435 [1992]; see Higgins v Goyer , 162 AD3d 1191 , 1193 [3d Dept 2018]; Martin v Hayes , 105 AD3d 1291, 1292 [3d Dept 2013]; see generally Geraci v Probst , 15 NY3d 336, 344 [2010]).

2015Petitioner also has inadequately asserted the damage element of a defamation claim, inasmuch as it has not alleged facts that would indicate injury to its business reputation from the postings (see id. at 39 ; see also Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 436 [1992]).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2024The statute provides that "[a] civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published." Defendants' article provided a substantially accurate reporting of Reeves' arrests for domestic violence and related criminal proceedings, and the defamation action brought by Reeves against Michelle and others, during the divorce and custody proceedings ( see Alf v Buff

2024The statute provides that "[a] civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published." Defendants' article provided a substantially accurate reporting of Reeves' arrests for domestic violence and related criminal proceedings, and the defamation action brought by Reeves against Michelle and others, during the divorce and custody proceedings ( see Alf v Buff

2012Similarly, the communications were subject to a qualified privilege, which is a defense to a defamation claim, as the communications were made to persons who had some common interest in the subject matter (Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 751 [1996]).

2011However, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the defamation claim based on the qualified privilege protecting communications between employees on matters of common interest (see Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 751 [1996]; Murganti v Weber, 248 AD2d 208, 209 [1998]).

2010“Since falsity is a requirement of a defamation claim and only factual assertions are capable of being proven false, defamation actions can only be premised on assertions of fact, not opinion” (Hassig v FitzRandolph, 8 AD3d 930, 931 [2004]; see Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d 46, 51 [1995]; Versaci v Richie, 30 AD3d 648, 649 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 710 [2006]).

2007However, it should be remembered that not only is truth a complete defense to a defamation claim (see Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d 46 [1995]), but a qualified privilege offers strong protection as well.

2018The statement that an employee of Main Street made to a third party, to wit, that he would have to wear a rubber suit to go into plaintiff's apartment, is not subject to a defamation claim, since the statement was a hyperbolic expression of opinion—a qualified privilege—which is not actionable ( see Mann v Abel , 10 NY3d 271 , 276 [2008]; Stillman v Ford , 22 NY2d 48, 53 [1968]).

2012The defamation claim and those claims related to it (second and sixth causes of action) were also properly dismissed since the alleged defamatory statement contained nonactionable opinion and/or loose, hyperbolic language (Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d 271, 276 [2008], cert denied 555 US 1170 [2009]).

2016Contrary to plaintiff’s further contention, the first counterclaim also adequately states that plaintiff acted with actual malice, which is a required element for a defamation claim brought by a public official (see Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 17 [1983], cert denied 464 US 831 [1983]; see generally Freeman v Johnston, 84 NY2d 52, 56 [1994], cert denied 513 US 1016 [1994]).

2014On a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, the court must decide whether the statements, considered in the context of the entire publication, are “reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation,” such that the issue is worthy of submission to a jury (Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 12 [1983], cert denied 464 US 831 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2024To satisfy the falsity element of a defamation claim, a party must allege that the complained of statement is substantially false ( Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]).

2024To satisfy the falsity element of a defamation claim, a party must allege that the complained of statement is substantially false ( Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]).

2012An essential element of a defamation claim is that the alleged defamatory statement was “ ‘published without privilege or authorization’ ” (Epifani v Johnson, 65 AD3d 224, 233 [2009], quoting Salvatore v Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 563 [2007]).

2012An essential element of a defamation claim is that the alleged defamatory statement was “ ‘published without privilege or authorization’ ” (Epifani v Johnson, 65 AD3d 224, 233 [2009], quoting Salvatore v Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 563 [2007]).

2011(See generally Immuno AG., 77 NY2d at 244 .) Rather, plaintiff rests her defamation cause of action on the claim that Seinfeld defamed her by conveying the “unmistakable message” to television viewers “that Lapine had fabricated opportunistic allegations of plagiarism against his wife.” (Plaintiffs mem of law in opposition at 1, 6.) Assessment of this defamation claim requires consideration of both the context in which the statements were made and their content.

2005On appeal, defendants contend, inter alia, that the truth of Ms. Puccio’s statement that plaintiff had been previously accused of corporal punishment is undisputed, that the “plaintiff has the burden of showing the falsity of factual assertions” (Immuno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235, 245 [1991]), that truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim (see Dillon v City of New York, 261 AD2d 34 [1999]), and that Ms. Puccio’s failure to explain to the mother that the previous allegations of corporal punishment had been expunged did not convey any false defamatory impressions.

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026While the complaint adequately alleged the unauthorized, knowing or reckless publishing of a false statement ( see Frechtman v Gutterman , 115 AD3d 102 , 104 [1st Dept 2014]), the statement, viewed in its totality, was not defamatory ( see Liberman v Gelstein , 80 NY2d 429, 435 [1992]; Geraci v Probst , 15 NY3d 336, 344 [2010]; see also Franklin v Daily Holdings, Inc. , 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015]).

2025As plaintiffs assert, slander per se excuses the requirement of special damages otherwise required for a defamation claim and includes both those statements that charge a plaintiff with a "serious crime" and those that "tend to injure" a plaintiff in their trade, business or profession ( Liberman v Gelstein , 80 NY2d 429, 435 [1992]; see Higgins v Goyer , 162 AD3d 1191 , 1193 [3d Dept 2018]; Martin v Hayes , 105 AD3d 1291, 1292 [3d Dept 2013]; see generally Geraci v Probst , 15 NY3d 336, 344 [2010]).

2024Defendants' characterization of plaintiff's conduct in pursuing the litigation against them constituted advocacy in the course of judicial proceedings and, as such, the challenged statements were privileged ( see Rondeau v Houston , 118 AD3d 638 , 639 [1st Dept 2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 999 [2014], citing Pomerance v McTiernan , 51 AD3d 526, 528 [1st Dept 2008]).

2024Defendants' characterization of plaintiff's conduct in pursuing the litigation against them constituted advocacy in the course of judicial proceedings and, as such, the challenged statements were privileged ( see Rondeau v Houston , 118 AD3d 638 , 639 [1st Dept 2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 999 [2014], citing Pomerance v McTiernan , 51 AD3d 526, 528 [1st Dept 2008]).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2004Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 731 [1968]; Sweeney v Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y., 84 NY2d 786 [1995]). 2 The defense claims that its work is exempt from a defamation claim because its words are an expression of opinion protected by the First Amendment.

2004Amant v Thompson , 390 US 727, 731 [1968]; Sweeney v Prisoners' Legal Servs. of N.Y. , 84 NY2d 786 [1995]). [FN2]{** 4 Misc 3d at 977 } [*3] The defense claims that its work is exempt from a defamation claim because its words are an expression of opinion protected by the First Amendment.

2026While the complaint adequately alleged the unauthorized, knowing or reckless publishing of a false statement ( see Frechtman v Gutterman , 115 AD3d 102 , 104 [1st Dept 2014]), the statement, viewed in its totality, was not defamatory ( see Liberman v Gelstein , 80 NY2d 429, 435 [1992]; Geraci v Probst , 15 NY3d 336, 344 [2010]; see also Franklin v Daily Holdings, Inc. , 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015]).

2024Basis for the Defamation Claims Ordinarily, "[t]he elements [of a defamation claim] are a false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se" (Frechtman v Gutterman, 115 AD3d 102, 104 [1st Dept 2014]).