iied claim in New York

2024The first element — extreme and outrageous conduct — is the most demanding element to meet ( see Chanko , 27 NY3d at 57 ; Howell , 81 NY2d at 122 ).

2024The first element — extreme and outrageous conduct — is the most demanding element to meet ( see Chanko , 27 NY3d at 57 ; Howell , 81 NY2d at 122 ).

2026Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 256 AD2d 269, 270 (1st Dept 1998) (dismissing IIED claim as duplicative of claim for sexual harassment because it is a nontraditional remedy and "is a theory of recovery that is to be invoked only as a last resort"); Davis v YMCA <?!

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2025Discussion CPLR 3211 (a) (7) provides that a motion to dismiss a cause of action shall be granted if "the pleading fails to state a cause of action." In New York, to succeed on an IIED claim, a plaintiff must meet their prima facie burden by establishing four elements of IIED ( see Howell v New York Post Co., Inc. , 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]): (i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.

2025Discussion CPLR 3211 (a) (7) provides that a motion to dismiss a cause of action shall be granted if "the pleading fails to state a cause of action." In New York, to succeed on an IIED claim, a plaintiff must meet their prima facie burden by establishing four elements of IIED ( see Howell v New York Post Co., Inc. , 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]): (i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.

2026We find that Supreme Court erred in denying defendant Long's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, as defendant established that plaintiff's allegations do not "fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

2024Because defendant's CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion challenges the facial sufficiency of the pleading of the IIED claim, we determine only whether the facts alleged, viewed through the lens formed by the Leon principles, state that claim ( see Leon , 84 NY2d at 88 ; see also Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc ., 20 NY3d 342, 351 [2013]).

2025Plaintiff breached its contractual duties throughout the lease term of February 2020 until February 2021, forcing Defendants to live thousands of miles from friends, family and work." (NYSCEF No. 64 at ¶ 29.) To the extent this counterclaim sounds in intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants have not sufficiently alleged, or provided evidence, that plaintiff's conduct was extreme and outrageous of the sort required to make out an IIED claim. ( See Walentas v Johnes , 257 AD2d 352, 353 [1st Dept 1999] [discussing requirements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis

2025Plaintiff breached its contractual duties throughout the lease term of February 2020 until February 2021, forcing Defendants to live thousands of miles from friends, family and work." (NYSCEF No. 64 at ¶ 29.) To the extent this counterclaim sounds in intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants have not sufficiently alleged, or provided evidence, that plaintiff's conduct was extreme and outrageous of the sort required to make out an IIED claim. ( See Walentas v Johnes , 257 AD2d 352, 353 [1st Dept 1999] [discussing requirements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis

2025A reasonable jury could view the evidence that plaintiff's employer regularly screamed at, berated, and physically assaulted her as "both (1) a deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment and intimidation and (2) an abuse of power" ( Scollar v City of New York , 160 AD3d 140 , 146 [1st Dept 2018]; see also Vasarhelyi v New School for Social Research , 230 AD2d 658, 661-662 [1st Dept 1996]).

2025A reasonable jury could view the evidence that plaintiff's employer regularly screamed at, berated, and physically assaulted her as "both (1) a deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment and intimidation and (2) an abuse of power" ( Scollar v City of New York , 160 AD3d 140, 146 [1st Dept 2018]; see also Vasarhelyi v New School for Social Research , 230 AD2d 658, 661-662 [1st Dept 1996]).

2025Sept. 15, 2023) (denying a student a scholarship and financial aid “is not an act ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree’” to state a claim for IIED); Dillon v. City of N.Y., 261 A.D.2d 34, 41 (1st Dept. 1999) (disclosing plaintiff’s termination and making disparaging remarks, including a vulgar epithet, did not meet the IIED standard).

2025Sept. 15, 2023) (denying a student a scholarship and financial aid “is not an act ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree’” to state a claim for IIED); Dillon v. City of N.Y., 261 A.D.2d 34, 41 (1st Dept. 1999) (disclosing plaintiff’s termination and making disparaging remarks, including a vulgar epithet, did not meet the IIED standard).

2025This is a difficult threshold to meet, as the conduct of a defendant must be "a longstanding campaign of deliberate, systematic, and malicious harassment" ( see Seltzer v Bayer , 272 AD2d 263, 264-65 [1st Dept 2000]).

2025This is a difficult threshold to meet, as the conduct of a defendant must be "a longstanding campaign of deliberate, systematic, and malicious harassment" ( see Seltzer v Bayer , 272 AD2d 263, 264-65 [1st Dept 2000]).

2024Plaintiff [*3]points to recent Second Department decisions reinstating IIED claims in actions brought under the revival provisions of the CVA ( see Kaul v Brooklyn Friends Sch. , 220 AD3d 936 , 939 [2d Dept 2023]; Novak v Sisters of the Heart of Mary , 210 AD3d 1104, 1106 [2d Dept 2022]; Eskridge v Diocese of Brooklyn , 210 AD3d 1056, 1058 [2d Dept 2022]).

2024Plaintiff [*3]points to recent Second Department decisions reinstating IIED claims in actions brought under the revival provisions of the CVA ( see Kaul v Brooklyn Friends Sch. , 220 AD3d 936 , 939 [2d Dept 2023]; Novak v Sisters of the Heart of Mary , 210 AD3d 1104, 1106 [2d Dept 2022]; Eskridge v Diocese of Brooklyn , 210 AD3d 1056, 1058 [2d Dept 2022]).

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024Corp. v Columbia Univ., 4 AD3d 49, 56 [1st Dept 2004].) Movants contend only that defendants have not met the extreme-and-outrageous-conduct element of an IIED claim.

2024Corp. v Columbia Univ., 4 AD3d 49, 56 [1st Dept 2004].) Movants contend only that defendants have not met the extreme-and-outrageous-conduct element of an IIED claim.

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024"Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish [his or her] allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co ., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024Supreme Court's dismissal of the IIED claim for the reason provided by the court is understandable: we have on occasion stated that no IIED claim lies when the offensive conduct is embraced by a traditional tort (see McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury , 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 94 NY2d 753 [1999]; see also Bacon v Nygard , 140 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2016]; Conde v Yeshiva Univ. , 16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]; Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art , 214 AD2d 250, 263 [1st Dept 1995]).

2024Because defendant's CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion challenges the facial sufficiency of the pleading of the IIED claim, we determine only whether the facts alleged, viewed through the lens formed by the Leon principles, state that claim ( see Leon , 84 NY2d at 88 ; see also Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc ., 20 NY3d 342, 351 [2013]).

2024After acknowledging that a claim for IIED is cognizable in New York and concluding that the offensive conduct alleged by the plaintiff (the defendant's commencement of an unfounded defamation action against the plaintiff to malign, harass and intimidate the plaintiff), the Court stated: " it may be questioned whether the doctrine of liability for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress should be applicable where the conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability" ( Fischer , 43 NY2d at 557-558 [emphasis added]).

2024After acknowledging that a claim for IIED is cognizable in New York and concluding that the offensive conduct alleged by the plaintiff (the defendant's commencement of an unfounded defamation action against the plaintiff to malign, harass and intimidate the plaintiff), the Court stated: " it may be questioned whether the doctrine of liability for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress should be applicable where the conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability" ( Fischer , 43 NY2d at 557-558 [emphasis added]).

2024For instance, in Murphy , the Court of Appeals held that [*6]the plaintiff, whose employment had been terminated by the defendant, could not subvert the traditional at-will contract rule (and the accompanying consequence that New York does not recognize a tort for wrongful discharge), by casting his cause of action in terms of IIED ( 58 NY2d at 297, 303 ).

2024For instance, in Murphy , the Court of Appeals held that [*6]the plaintiff, whose employment had been terminated by the defendant, could not subvert the traditional at-will contract rule (and the accompanying consequence that New York does not recognize a tort for wrongful discharge), by casting his cause of action in terms of IIED ( 58 NY2d at 297, 303 ).