J. T. Roach v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367 (8th Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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J. T. Roach v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367 (8th Cir. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Richmond v. Duke (ared, 1995-12-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richmond v. Duke
E.D. Ark. · 1995 · confidence medium
And, when one factors in the fact that one who is paroled in Arkansas remains under the State’s supervision, see Roach v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir.1974), and hence remains “in custody” for purposes of § 2254, Piercy v. Black, 801 F.2d 1075 , 1077 n. 2 (8th *632 Cir.1986), it seems somewhat strained to argue that a prisoner’s challenge to his loss of “good-time” credits can be viewed, in any meaningful way, to be an attack upon the fact or duration of his “custody” sufficient to sustain a cause of action under § 2254. 14 The Court is aware, howe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clawitter v. Lockhart
Ark. · 1985 · confidence medium
As the court said in Roach v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974): . . . parole is a supervised release from incarceration prior to the termination of sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tomich v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole
W.D. Mo. · 1984 · confidence medium
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, supra; Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir.1974), and Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 280-281 (5th Cir.1973), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Braxton v. Josey
D. Maryland · 1983 · confidence medium
Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir.1974); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D.Ill.1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rufus Lee Averhart v. Albert Tutsie, Parole Board Chairman
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D.Ill.1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carroll Lee Wyatt v. United States Parole Commission
9th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Roach v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Salisbury, 422 F.2d 1326, 1327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 , 91 S.Ct. 73 , 27 L.Ed.2d 69 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nunley v. U. S. Board of Paroles
W.D. Okla. · 1977 · confidence medium
In Roach v. Board of Pardons & Parole, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (CA8 1974) a prison inmate argued that to base denial of parole on his prior criminal record was to impose additional punishment for his prior offense(s) in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy and the court in rebutting his argument stated: “[Pjarole is a supervised release from incarceration prior to the termination of sentence.
discussed Cited "see" James Martin Garner v. Kay Howell, Records Supervisor Arkansas Department of Correction Larry Norris, Warden, Arkansas Department of Correction
8th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Roach v. Arkansas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir.1974) (per curiam) (denial of parole does not increase sentence but merely perpetuates the status quo, i.e., continued incarceration during the term of sentence); see also, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2808 (recodified at Ark.
discussed Cited "see" John Priore v. W. Raymond Nelson, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, and Cecil McCall Chairman, U. S. Parole Commission
2d Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Roach v. Board of Pardons, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974); Nunley v. U. S. Board of Paroles, 439 F.Supp. 887 (W.D.Okl.1977); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F.Supp. 652, 661-62 (D.Mass.1975); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D.Ill.1973).
discussed Cited "see" Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission
M.D. Penn. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, State of Arkansas, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974) (“. . [P]arole is a supervised release from incarceration prior to the termination of sentence. . . .
cited Cited "see" State v. Ouimette
R.I. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Roach v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 503 F.2d 1367 (8th Cir. 1974).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
J. T. ROACH, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, STATE OF ARKANSAS, Et Al., Appellees
74-1329.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 16, 1974.
503 F.2d 1367
1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6490
J. T. Roach, pro se., Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., and James W. Atkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellees.
Vogel, Ross, Webster.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

On April 15, 1974, appellant sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from denial of parole by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. On the same day, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the petition as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Appeal was taken by appellant from such dismissal.

The record indicates that appellant was denied parole because of the nature and seriousness of the offense for which he was incarcerated, and because of his prior criminal record. Appellant contends that consideration by the parole board of his prior criminal record in determining his eligibility for parole was a violation of his constitutional rights.

Appellant argues that he has been deprived of liberty without due process of law based upon the following rationale:

(1) Denial of parole is an increase in the length of a prison sentence;

(2) An increase in sentence may be imposed only by a court of competent jurisdiction ;

[*1368] (3) Therefore, parole may be denied only by a court of competent jurisdiction.

In other words, denial of parole by an agency other than a court is a denial of due process of law. U.S.Const, amend. XIV.

Also, appellant argues that to base denial of parole on prior criminal record is to impose additional punishment for his prior offense(s) in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. U.S.Const, amend. V.

Appellant’s conclusions in each instance are based upon the erroneous premise that denial of parole is an increase in the sentence. In fact, parole is a supervised release from incarceration prior to the termination of sentence. Conversely, 'the denial of parole has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, i. e., continued incarceration during the term of sentence. Therefore, such denial does not give rise to multiple punishment for the same offense. United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Barc, 141 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct. 1262, 88 L.Ed. 1581; Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (D.C.Ill.1973).

A parole board is an independent statutory agency delegated broad discretionary powers in parole eligibility determinations. In making such determinations, the parole board may properly consider the length and seriousness of an inmate’s prior criminal record.

Prior criminal convictions are one of many factors a parole board should consider in its review to determine whether a prospective parolee will remain at liberty without violating the law, and whether such release will be compatible with the welfare of society. See Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 280-281 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809, 94 S.Ct. 79, 38 L.Ed.2d 44; Riley v. Perini, 422 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Salisbury, 422 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1970).

We find no error in the conclusion of the District Court. Accordingly, this case is affirmed.