John B. Kotmair, Jr., Dba (Sole Owner of Free State Home Builders, Inc.) v. D. Gray, 505 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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John B. Kotmair, Jr., Dba (Sole Owner of Free State Home Builders, Inc.) v. D. Gray, 505 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tobey v. Napolitano (vaed, 2011-08-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tobey v. Napolitano
E.D. Va. · 2011 · confidence medium
Olson v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811, 821 (8th Cir.1987); see also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 , 93 S.Ct. 602, 606 , 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973) (“[Actions of the Federal Government and its officers are at least facially exempt from [§ 1983’s] proscriptions.”); Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir.1974) (finding that IRS agents were not subject to suit under § 1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sharkey v. Airco, Inc.
E.D. Pa. · 1981 · confidence medium
Walh v. Rexnord, 624 F.2d 1169, 1181 (3rd Cir. 1980); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 945 (3rd Cir. 1976); Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir. 1974). 5 .
discussed Cited "see" Prince v. The Harbor Bank of Maryland
D. Maryland · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that “the bank employees acted as private citizens” and were not “subject to suit under” § 1983); Hughes v. M&T Bank, Civ.
discussed Cited "see" McKenzie-El v. Internal Revenue Service
D. Maryland · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that IRS employees cannot be sued under § 1983); see also Polsky v. United States, 844 F.3d 170, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2016) (same); Yalkut v. Gemignani, 873 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
discussed Cited "see" Michael Duane, Smith v. Millie R. Kitchen, Randy Komisarek, and Keith Woods
10th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir.1974) (per curiam) (holding that section 1983 does not reach conduct by bank employees complying with an IRS levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331 ); see also Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir.1997) (awarding attorney’s fees to defendant and characterizing plaintiffs claim under section 1983 as “unreasonable” and “meritless” when defendants’ underlying conduct arose under color of federal law).
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. Kitchen
10th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (holding that section 1983 does not reach conduct by bank employees complying with an IRS levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331 ); see also Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1997) (awarding attorney’s fees to defendant and characterizing plaintiff’s claim under section 1983 as “unreasonable” and “meritless” when defendants’ underlying conduct arose under color of federal law).
discussed Cited "see" Michael Duane, Smith v. Millie R. Kitchen, Randy Komisarek, and Keith Woods
10th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 746 (4th Cir.1974) (per curiam) (holding that section 1983 does not reach conduct by bank employees complying with an IRS levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331 ); see also Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir.1997) (imposing sanctions on plaintiff for bringing a claim under section 1983 when defendants' underlying conduct arose under color of federal law).
cited Cited "see" Plowman v. United States Department of the Army
E.D. Va. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See *632 Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744, 745 (4th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited "see" DiEdwardo v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF BATH
E.D. Pa. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sebel v. Lytton Savings and Loan Association, et al., 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9343 (S.D.Cal.1965) and Kotmair v. Gray, et al., 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9492 (D.Md.1974), affirmed, 505 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1974).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John B. KOTMAIR, Jr., Dba (Sole Owner of Free State Home Builders, Inc.), Appellant,
v.
D. GRAY Et Al., Appellees
74-1716.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Nov 8, 1974.
505 F.2d 744
John B. Kotmair, Jr., on brief for appellant., George Beall, U. S. Atty., Donald H. Feige, Asst. U. S. Atty., M. King Hill, Jr., and Michael A. Pretl, Baltimore, Md., on brief for appellees.
Craven, Butzner, Russell.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

John B. Kotmair filed a pro se complaint against D. Gray and Gale Youn-kins, officers of the Internal Revenue Service, and certain employees of the Carroll County Bank and Trust Co. charging them with violating a number of his constitutional rights while acting under color of state law (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985) and seeking $20,000 general and $60,000 punitive damages against each defendant. This action arose when Free State Home Builders, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by Kot-mair, incurred a penalty of $26.88 for late payment of $806.46 Federal Employment Taxes. Kotmair received a notice of the deficiency on February 19, 1973, and two letters entitled “Final Notice Before Seizure” on May 3 and August 8, 1973. These notices explained that if[*746] the amount due was not paid within 10 days, Free State’s assets could be levied upon without further notice. Appellant explained to the IRS agents and the bank in which Free State had an account that if they levied upon or permitted levy upon Free State’s account, he would bring legal action against them. The account was levied upon; the amount levied was transferred from the bank to the government; and this suit was brought. The district court, on a motion by the defendants, granted summary judgment, and we affirm.

In his complaint, appellant attacks the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 6331, which authorized collection of overdue taxes by levy and seizure. However, a determination of that statute’s constitutionality is not necessary to a decision of the instant appeal. We need note only that the defendants, in seizing and paying the penalty, acted within their official scope of duty and in good faith reliance upon the law, see Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973), and therefore are not subject to suit for their actions. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959). In any event, there was no action under color of state law. Rather, the IRS agents acted under federal law, and the bank employees acted as private citizens obeying the federal law. Thus, none of the defendants would be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even had their actions not been protected.

Although appellant contends that there are important issues of fact to be decided, summary judgment is appropriate where, as is the ease in the instant action, one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ. P., Rule 56; for it is clear that even were appellant to prove all of the facts which he has alleged, he would not be entitled to judgment in this case.

Accordingly, we dispense with oral argument and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Affirmed.