United States v. Gary Lee Mack, 509 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Gary Lee Mack, 509 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Barbara Walberg v. United States (ca2, 1985-06-05)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barbara Walberg v. United States
2d Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
The language of §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 960(b)(1) thus squarely contradicts Walberg’s contention, for each stated that the special parole term shall be a minimum of a certain number of “years in addition to [the] term of imprisonment.” Accord United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615, 616 (9th *146 Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 , 95 S.Ct. 1578 , 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975).
discussed Cited "see" Fassette v. United States
C.D. Cal. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See the precise holdings of our Circuit on that point in United States v. Mack, 494 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 916 , 95 S.Ct. 1578 , 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975).
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Gary Lee MACK, Appellant
20-15662.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Apr 14, 1975.
509 F.2d 615
John Cleary (argued), of Federal Defenders, Inc., San Diego, Cal., for appellant., Jeff Arbetman, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for appellee.
Chambers, Goodwin, East.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Gary Lee Mack urges that the imposition of a three-year prison term and a two-year special parole term pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 in a corrective sentence following a successful appeal to this court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On the prior appeal we stated that imposition of an identical sentence did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Mack, 494 F.2d 1204, 1206-1208 (9th Cir. 1974). Mack contends that this statement must be deemed dictum since we went on to hold that a valid sentence had not been imposed.

Mack argues that, because the sentencing judge had pronounced only a three-year sentence in the first, defective sentence, this three-year term became the upper limit for all punishment, including any mandatory parole period necessary to make the sentence legal. In other words, he argues that the sentencing court was bound by double-jeop[*616] ardy principles to carve the mandatory special parole term out of the three years first pronounced. In the first appeal we found nothing in the cases cited by appellant to require such a result, and he has offered no new support for his argument. It is clear that Congress, in enacting the mandatory special parole term, did not intend that it be carved out of the custodial portion of a sentence arrived at by the sentencing court in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. The statute says that the parole term must be added to the term of imprisonment.

Affirmed.