Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,022 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jack W. Savage, & Nat'l Commodity Rsch. & Statistical Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
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Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,022 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jack W. Savage, & Nat'l Commodity Rsch. & Statistical Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 1980 · 3 courts · …would require sec to answer at the outset of its investigation the possibly doubtful questions of fact and law that the investigation is designed and authorized to illuminate. ✓
29 citation events across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corporation (cadc, 1993-10-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#12 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) cited 1× in this case · 52 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corporation
D.C. Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882; SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir.1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Dow Chemical Company, Intervening v. Dr. James R. Allen and John Van Miller, and James P. Wachtendonk, Intervening (2×)
7th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
C. v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975), or protective orders forbidding outside disclosure of the information, see Lonning, supra, 539 F.2d at 211 , and cases cited therein.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. Milton Shaffner (3×)
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (CA7 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Interstate Commerce Commission v. James R. Gould, Doing Business as Brokers for Agricultural Cooperativeassociations (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 , 63 S.Ct. 339 , 87 L.Ed. 424 (1943). 480 F.2d at 1052-53 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied); 9 accord, SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,957 United States of America v. Luigi M. Di Fonzo
7th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributing Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 , 94 S.Ct. 1410 , 39 L.Ed.2d 469 (1974); SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tivian Laboratories, Inc.
1st Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 180 U.S.App.D.C. at 410 , 555 F.2d at 882 ; SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1975); Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 ; see In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 459 F.Supp. 1338, 1340 (E.D.Pa.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company. Federal Trade Commission v. The Superior Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Exxon Corporation, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Shell Oil Company, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company of California, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Mobil Oil Corporation, a Corporation (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.C. Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held in SEC v. Savage that the Commission was not required to establish its jurisdiction by demonstrating that a company's commodities future contracts were "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Act before the subpoena would be enforced. 513 F.2d 188, 189 (1975).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held in SEC v. Savage that the Commission was not required to establish its jurisdiction by demonstrating that a company’s commodities future contracts were “securities” within the meaning of the Securities Act before the subpoena would be enforced. 513 F.2d 188, 189 (1975).
cited Cited "see" United States International Trade Commission v. E. & J. Gallo Winery
D.D.C. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir.1975) (per curiam). 1 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Federal Trade Commission v. Rockefeller
2d Cir. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e. g., SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federal Trade Commission v. David Rockefeller
2d Cir. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, E. g., SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1975). 43 Appellants also argue that if they must comply with the subpoenas, they are entitled to reimbursement of their costs of compliance from the government.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Jack W. SAVAGE, and National Commodity Research & Statistical Service, Inc., Respondents-Appellants
74-1290.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Mar 17, 1975.
513 F.2d 188
David F. Silverzweig, Harry G. Fins, Chicago, 111., for respondents-appellants., Lawrence E. Nerheim, Gen. Counsel, Walter P. North, Associate Gen. Counsel, SEC, Washington, D. C., John I. Mayer, SEC, Chicago, 111., for petitioner-appel-lee.
Hastie, Pell, Per Curiam, Tone.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

This appeal has been taken from an order of the district court that directed National Commodity Research and Statistical Service (hereinafter, “NAT-COM”) and its president, Jack Savage, to comply in all respects with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter, “SEC”). The subpoena required Savage to appear personally and listed by category and called for the production of a great quantity of business records of NATCOM.

The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act authorize administrative investigations of suspected violations, of those statutes. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) and § 78u(a) & (b). The latter section, paralleling the former, provides: “The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to[*189] determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder . . .And, in so doing, “the Commission ... is empowered to subpena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any . records which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry”.

In November, 1973, pursuant to the above cited statutory authority, SEC had undertaken a formal private investigation to determine whether NATCOM’s acts or practices in connection with “commodity futures contracts” that it offered or sold to its customers involved violations of the registration requirements and the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The challenged subpoena issued in furtherance of. that investigation.

From the beginning the essential contention of the appellants has been that SEC must establish its “jurisdiction” by showing that appellants’ commodity futures contracts are “securities” within the meaning of the Securities Act before they can be compelled to obey the subpoena. However, the very purpose of the present investigation is to examine the appellants’ course of business in detail and with particularity, a procedure which, in the above quoted language of the statute, “the Commission in its discretion . . . deems necessary” to determine whether the present law is applicable to and is being violated by appellants’ transactions. Thus, the appellants would require SEC to answer at the outset of its investigation the possibly doubtful questions of fact and law that the investigation is designed and authorized to illuminate.

The courts should not frustrate the Commission’s performance of its legislatively assigned and specified responsibility by imposing any such requirement. In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 1946, 327 U.S. 186, 216, 66 S.Ct. 494, 509, 90 L.Ed. 614, an analogous situation led the Supreme Court to observe that the administrative agency’s “investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury’s, or the court’s in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations”. Accordingly, the Court said that such an inquiry must not be “limited ... by ... forecasts of the probable result of the investigation”. To the same effect, see United States v. Powell, 1964, 379 U.S. 48, 57, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401.

In two recent cases the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has refused to impose upon SEC just such a burden in justification of an investigative subpoena as appellants would have us impose here. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., 1973, 480 F.2d 1047, cert. denied 415 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 1410, 39 L.Ed.2d 469; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 1970, 422 F.2d 1371. In our view those cases were correctly decided.

Separately, appellants complain that the subpoena’s demand for records is so comprehensive that it’s enforcement could seriously and unreasonably disrupt NATCOM’s business. Certainly a mass removal of business records currently in use could have that effect. However, counsel for SEC has assured this court that some records can adequately be examined without removal from NAT-COM’s place of business and that any removal of others will be organized and scheduled in cooperation with NATCOM to minimize disruption of business.

We have no reason to doubt the good faith of those assurances. However, if particular demands for production or removal of records should threaten unwarranted disruption of NATCOM’s business, appellants shall be free to ask the district court for appropriate protective restrictions. Securities and Exchange[*190] Commission v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., supra, at 1381.

We find no merit in any other contention advanced by appellants but not discussed in this opinion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.