Fed. Com. & Navigation Co., Ltd. v. The M/v Marathonian, Her Engines, Etc. & Europa Shipping Corp., 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Fed. Com. & Navigation Co., Ltd. v. The M/v Marathonian, Her Engines, Etc. & Europa Shipping Corp., 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …if free to do so, we might question whether at least the damage to the principal time charterer is not so reasonably to be expected as to justify recovery. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1983 · …the robins rule appears to be based on a contract theory, denying relief to one injured by negligent interference with contract ✓
38 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: ADMIntermare v. Kamca Trading SA (nysd, 2022-03-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ADMIntermare v. Kamca Trading SA
S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Co., Ltd. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 907 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming judgment on the pleadings that dismissed claims brought by time charterer pursuant to the Robins Dry Dock); see also VL8 Pool, Inc., 2021 WL 1152936 , at *4–5 (dismissing negligence and product liability claims of time charterer based on damage to vessel pursuant to Robins Dry Dock).
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Petroleum & Transport, Inc. v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2012 · confidence medium
Commerce & Navigation Co., 528 F.2d at 908 (noting arguments for and against bright-line rule as to time charterers); Allders, 1995 WL 251571 , at *1 (collecting post-Kinsman II cases); Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Complaint of Moran Enterprises Corp.
E.D.N.Y · 1999 · confidence medium
Id. at 908.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marr Enterprises, Inc., and Ben Paz v. Lewis Refrigeration Co. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1977 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co., Ltd. v. The M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976); White and Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code, 334-35 (1972). *959 The decision of the district court is affirmed. 1 .
cited Cited "see" American Petroleum & Transport, Inc. v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1975).
discussed Cited "see" G & G Steel, Inc. v. Sea Wolf Marine Transportation, LLC
2d Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co., Ltd. v. M/V MARATHONIAN, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1975); Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869, 871-72 (2d Cir.1946) (L.Hand, J.); Conti Corsi Schiffahrts-GMBH & Co. KG NR. 2 v. M/V “PINAR KAPTANOGLU”, 414 F.Supp.2d 443, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (discussing “bright line rule” established by consistent application of Robins Dry Dock).
discussed Cited "see" Plaza Marine, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
In Robins, the Supreme Court held that, absent a showing of injury to person or property, pure economic loss arising from a maritime tort is not recoverable, even if such losses were a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. 275 U.S. at 308-09 , 48 S.Ct. at 135 ; see Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976).
cited Cited "see" Holt Hauling & Warehousing Systems, Inc. v. M/V Ming Joy
E.D. Pa. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam); Petition of Kinsman Transit, 388 F.2d 821, 823-24 (2d Cir.1968).
discussed Cited "see" State of Louisiana v. Testbank
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, S.D.N.Y.1975, 392 F.Supp. 908 , aff'd, 2 Cir.1975, 528 F.2d 907 (per curiam), cert. denied, 1976, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 .
discussed Cited "see" Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, S.D.N.Y. 1975, 392 F.Supp. 908 , aff'd, 2 Cir.1975, 528 F.2d 907 (per curiam), cert. denied, 1976, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 .
discussed Cited "see" Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls
2d Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. The M/V Marathonian, 392 F.Supp. 908 , 909 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Falls Riverway Realty, Inc., and Forest City Development Corp. v. The City of Niagara Falls, New York and Niagara Falls Urban Renewal Agency, and Third-Party v. Samuel Pierce, as Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Joseph Monticciolo, as Regional Administrator, Region II of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Richard W. Lippold as Buffalo Area Manager, Buffalo Area Office, Region Ii, of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Third-Party
2d Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. The M/V Marathonian, 392 F.Supp. 908 , 909 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976).
cited Cited "see" Getty Refining and Marketing Co. v. M/T FADI B
E.D. Pa. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F.Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 907 (1975).
discussed Cited "see" New York State United Teachers v. Thompson
N.D.N.Y. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F.Supp. 908 , 909 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d per curiam, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 , 96 S.Ct. 2176 , 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976); 5 Wright & Miller, Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
FEDERAL COMMERCE & NAVIGATION COMPANY, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
the M/V MARATHONIAN, Her Engines, Etc. and Europa Shipping Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
198, Docket 75-7274.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 19, 1976.
528 F.2d 907
Nicholas J. Healy, New York City (Healy & Baillie, Edward J. Miller, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant., Kenneth H. Volk, New York City (Burlingham, Underwood & Lord, Michael C. Bynane, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Kaufman, Smith, Feinberg.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Federal Commerce & Navigation Company, Ltd., time charterer of the M/V ROLWI, sued in the district court for the Southern District of New York for damages of some $700,000 sustained while the ROLWI was laid up as a result of damage sustained in a collision with the M/V MARATHONIAN, owned and operated by defendant Europa Shipping Corporation.

The district court, John M. Cannella, Judge, in a considered and thorough opinion reluctantly dismissed the action as not sustainable in the light of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290 (1927), which denied relief for damages sustained by a time charterer. 392 F.Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y.1975). We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant contends that Robins is unsound, has been eroded and should not be followed, and in the alternative that intentional wrongdoing on the part of defendant takes the case out of the rule of Robins based on negligent interference with contract.

The short answer to the second claim is that excessive speed in foggy conditions falls short of intentional damage.

[*908] The first claim is somewhat more substantial, for the basis for denial of relief to the time charterer in Robins has come under strong scholarly criticism. See F. James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 43, 55-57 (1972); [1] 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 6.10 at 501 — 05 (1956); see also W. L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 129, at 939, 940 (4th ed. 1971).

We are unable, however, to discern any indication that the Supreme Court has moved away from the Robins rule. The only case since Robins cited to us, Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394, 55 S.Ct. 467, 79 L.Ed. 942 (1935), explicitly distinguished Robins, and the admiralty texts recognize the continued force of the rule. See, e. g., Poor, Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading 25 (5th ed. 1968); Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading 49 (18th ed. 1974).

The Robins rule appears to be based on a contract theory, denying relief to one injured by negligent interference with contract, although an effort is also made by appellee to justify the rule on the basis of remoteness of injury. If free to do so, we might question whether at least the damage to the principal time charterer is not so reasonably to be expected as to justify recovery. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 823—24 (2d Cir. 1968). But there are arguments to the contrary, such as the difficulty in drawing the line in a field where successive subcharters are not uncommon and rapid and wide fluctuations of rates of charter hire not unknown.

In any case, “the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for pronouncement of the doom.” Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970). [2] The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Take . . . the case of a ship’s charterer who loses its use, and even may have to pay hire, during the time when the ship is laid up for repairs necessitated by defendant’s negligence. If there were no charter, the owner who lost the vessel’s use could recover for that loss measured by its reasonable value. If the defendant were liable to the charterer instead, it would not be a wide and open-ended liability, but a finite one that the tortfeasor or his liability insurer would expect to pay under frequently occurring circumstances. There seems to be no valid reason why defendant should escape this ordinary item of damage just because the loss in this case happened to be suffered by one who had no proprietary interest in the ship.

25 Vand.L.Rev. at 56.

2

. See also Judge Learned Hand dissenting in Spector Motor Service Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1943, 1944), vacated and remanded, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944):

Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant