Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1985 · …prove victorious, the path would be clear for refunds of improper rent increases. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2002–2014 · …requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial, at p. 181 ✓
81 citation events (50 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Haffey (kyed, 2022-03-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Haffey
E.D. Ky. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it is settled law that the filing of a petition to review an order of a bankruptcy judge does not stay the effect or operation of the order unless a supersedeas bond is filed or the order itself provides for a stay.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lower Susquehanna Riverkeeper Association v. Joe Darrah, Inc., d/b/a J&K Salvage, et al.
M.D. Penn. · 2026 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Picard v. Phoenix Administrators, LLC
M.D. Penn. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Picard v. Phoenix Administrators, LLC
M.D. Penn. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PENNMARK COVENTRY HOLDINGS, LLC v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.
E.D. Pa. · 2025 · confidence medium
Additionally, “[t]he requisite feared injury or harm must . . . not merely [be] serious or substantial, and it must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)) (cleaned up).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HICE v. EQT COPORATION
W.D. Pa. · 2025 · confidence medium
An important distinction to note is that an immediate, irreparable injury is not the same as a “serious or substantial” injury; rather, for an injury to be irreparable, it “must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerneth v. East Union Township
M.D. Penn. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston
M.D. Penn. · 2024 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ATS TREE SERVICES, LLC v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
E.D. Pa. · 2024 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable–not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) EXPERIOR GLOBAL WAREHOUSING, LLC v. BTC III HAMILTON DC LLC
D.N.J. · 2024 · confidence medium
In the Third Circuit, “the requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial.” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SIGNANT HEALTH HOLDING CORP. v. DEBONIS
E.D. Pa. · 2024 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable–not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) BROWN v. FALVEY
D.N.J. · 2024 · confidence medium
The feared injury “must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial.” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ROYER v. DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
E.D. Pa. · 2023 · confidence medium
Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he injury must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” (quoting Gause v. Perkins, 56 N.C. 177, 179 (1857))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DOE v. ROWAN UNIVERSITY
D.N.J. · 2023 · confidence medium
It is not enough for the harm to be “serious or substantial, .... [I]t must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” ECRI v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. State College Area School District
M.D. Penn. · 2022 · confidence medium
Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 77 Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977). 78 See Doc. 4 at pp. 19-20; Doc. 13 at p. 18 (bottom). 79 See Doc. 4 at pp. 19-20 (citing Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 291 (D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Rivello
M.D. Penn. · 2022 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) - 3 - (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Little
M.D. Penn. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (8d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Neff v. Commissioners of Schuylkill County Halcovage, Bender & Hess
M.D. Penn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – nor merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramirez v. United States
M.D. Penn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freedland v. Mattingly
M.D. Penn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gomez v. Cullen
M.D. Penn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CLP ASSOCIATES, LLC v. SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
W.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). “[W]here a possible injury can be measured by a specific number of dollars and consequently has a dollar value, it cannot be said to be irreparable.” Miller v. Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freedland v. Mattingly
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosa-Diaz v. Rivello
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DOE v. United States
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GRAHAM v. CONNORS
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Wetzel
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GRAHAM v. CONNORS
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arnold v. Smith
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Wetzel
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’” See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ASI Business Solutions, Inc. v. Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc.
E.D. Pa. · 2017 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’ ” Id. (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brian ex rel. A.B. v. Line Mountain School District
M.D. Penn. · 2014 · confidence medium
The “requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial,” and “must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
E.D. Pa. · 2012 · confidence medium
Rather, the harm must be “of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (quoting Glaseo, 558 F.2d at 181).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley School District
W.D. Pa. · 2010 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury must be irreparable — not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that money cannot atone for it.’ ” Id. (citing Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dietz v. Baker
D. Del. · 2007 · confidence medium
The “requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial.” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977). “[T]he injury must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money alone cannot atone for it.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. City of Pittsburgh
3rd Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In addition, the purported injury “must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zokaites v. Land-Cellular Corp.
W.D. Pa. · 2006 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury must be irreparable — not merely serious or substantial,’ and it must be of a peculiar nature, so that money cannot atone for it.” Id. (citing Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sprint Communications Company L.P. v. Cat Communications International, Inc
3rd Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
The injunction bond should maintain the limit on the applicant’s liability and allow the applicant to “know[] just what [its] exposure is when the bond is set by the district court.” Id. (quotations omitted). 6 III. “[T]he law has entrusted the power to ... dissolve [a preliminary] injunction to the discretion of the trial court in the first instance, and not to the appellate court....” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 180 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sprint Comm Co v. Cat Comm Intl Inc
3rd Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
The injunction bond should maintain the limit on the applicant’s liability and allow the applicant to “know[ ] just what [its] exposure is when the bond is set by the district court.” Id. (quotations omitted).6 III. “[T]he law has entrusted the power to . . . dissolve [a preliminary] injunction to the discretion of the trial court in the first instance, and not to the appellate court . . . .” Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 180 (3d Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chestnut Real Estate Partnership v. Huber
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Rather, “irreparable injury is suffered whenever monetary damages are difficult to ascertain or are otherwise inadequate.” Maryland-Nat’l, 282 Md. at 615 , 386 A.2d at 1234 (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)); see also Dudley v. Hurst, 67 Md. 44, 52 , 8 A. 901, 904 (1887) (“An injury may be said to be irreparable when it cannot be measured by any known pecuniary standard.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Angstadt Ex Rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West School
M.D. Penn. · 2002 · confidence medium
The “requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial,” and “must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.” Glaseo v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chamberlain
M.D. Penn. · 2001 · confidence medium
Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 179 (3d Cir.1977); Orson, Inc. vs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) El Bey v. Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc.
Md. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rather, “irreparable injury is suffered whenever monetary damages are difficult to ascertain or are otherwise inadequate.” Maryland-Nat’l, 282 Md. at 615 , 386 A.2d at 1234 (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)); see also Dudley v. Hurst, 67 Md. 44, 52 , 8 A. 901, 904 (1887) (“An injury may be said to be irreparable when it cannot be measured by any known pecuniary standard.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Township of South Fayette v. Allegheny County Housing Authority
W.D. Pa. · 1998 · confidence medium
“The ‘requisite feared injury must be irreparable — not merely serious or substantial,’ and it “must be of a peculiar nature, so that money cannot atone for it.” Id. (emphasis supplied) (citing Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E.B. v. Poritz
D.N.J. · 1996 · confidence medium
The harm “ ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’ ” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson Ex Rel. Jackson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
E.D. Pa. · 1994 · confidence medium
While the harm plaintiff faced may have been serious or substantial, it was not "irreparable.” See Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir.1976). 7 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. New Jersey
D.N.J. · 1985 · confidence medium
Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 180 (3d Cir.1977); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, supra, 670 F.2d at 443 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) EEOC v. State of NJ
D.N.J. · 1985 · confidence medium
Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 180 (3d Cir. 1977); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, supra, 670 F.2d at 443 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mississippi Power & Light Co. & Mississippi Public Service Commission v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
For example, in Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179 (3d Cir.1977), it was held that tenants of a large subsidized housing project were not entitled to a preliminary injunction against increased rents because "the claimed injury was financial, a loss of money, a loss capable of recoupment," and should the tenants eventually "prove victorious, the path would be clear for refunds of improper rent increases." Id. at 182 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 180 (3rd Cir. 1977). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Glasco, Barbara, Wendy Jackman, Doleta Gentry, Della Washington and the Hill Manor Tenants Association, an Unincorporated Association, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated
v.
Hills, Carla, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, H. R. Crawford, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Assistant Secretary for Housing Management in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Newark Community Housing Corporation, a Corporation of the State of New Jersey and Booker Realty Management Corporation, a Corporation of the State of New Jersey. City of Newark, Intervenor
76-1991.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Jun 27, 1977.
558 F.2d 179
1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12688
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: E.D. Kentucky (1)

558 F.2d 179

GLASCO, Barbara, Wendy Jackman, Doleta Gentry, Della
Washington and the Hill Manor Tenants Association, an
Unincorporated Association, Individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated, Appellants,
v.
HILLS, Carla, Individually and in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, H. R. Crawford, Individually and in his
official capacity as Assistant Secretary for Housing
Management in the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Newark Community Housing Corporation, a
corporation of the State of New Jersey and Booker Realty
Management Corporation, a corporation of the State of New Jersey.
City of Newark, Intervenor.

No. 76-1991.

United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.

Argued May 6, 1977.
Decided June 27, 1977.

Bernard K. Freamon, Newark, N. J., for appellants; Bernard K. Freamon, Newark, N. J., Clintona Hare, on the brief.

Irving Jaffe, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald R. Glancz, Barrie L. Goldstein, Attys., Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellees.

Before ALDISERT and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and FOGEL, District Judge.[*]

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

[*~179]1

In A. O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 1976), we summarized those considerations followed by an appellate court in reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary injunctions. We emphasized that the law has entrusted the power to grant or dissolve an injunction to the discretion of the trial court in the first instance, and not to the appellate court, and that unless the trial court misuses that discretion, commits an obvious error in applying the law, or makes a serious mistake in considering the proof, the appellate court must take the judgment of the trial court as presumptively correct. "This limited review is necessitated because the grant or denial . . . is almost always on an abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate balancing of the probabilities of ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief." United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 431 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1970).

2

The narrow question for decision in this appeal from a denial of a request for a preliminary injunction is whether we should reverse the district court judgment on the basis of the record before the trial court at the time it denied the request. We have repeatedly said that an appellate court, exercising its limited review of the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief, asks these questions: (a) Did the movant make a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits? (b) Did the movant show that, without such relief, it would be irreparably injured? (c) Would the grant of a preliminary injunction substantially have harmed other parties interested in the proceedings? (d) Where lies the public interest? See cases cited in A. O. Smith Corp., supra, 530 F.2d at 525.

I.

3

The appellants are tenants of Hill Manor Apartments, a 21-story, 426-unit apartment complex located in Newark, New Jersey, and built in 1970 with a mortgage insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715l (d)(3). They seek to prevent rent increases requested by the owner and approved by HUD. The ultimate question to be decided by the district court at final hearing is whether a HUD regulation exempting landlords from local rent control ordinances in certain situations, 24 C.F.R. 403.1 et seq., preempts a Newark ordinance providing that no owner may impose a rent increase in excess of 5 percent without applying to, and gaining the approval of, the Newark Rent Control Board.

4

On November 27, 1974, the owner of Hill Manor Apartments served the tenants with a notice of a 27 percent rent increase approved by HUD. This was the first increase sought since the project was constructed. The attempted increase was challenged first in the New Jersey Superior Court, which ordered a hearing before the Newark Rent Control Board. The Board subsequently approved an 11 percent increase but the owner refused to accede to the lower rate.

5

The present action was filed on June 10, 1975, challenging the actions of the owner and HUD. The tenants moved for a preliminary injunction against the rent increase. On February 24, 1976, their motion was denied, without prejudice, and they were granted leave to file a supplemental complaint. In denying the motion, the district court reasoned: "What has been presented is sufficient to indicate that the likelihood of plaintiffs' eventual success is remote, so that one of the essential showings to the grant of a preliminary injunction is lacking." The tenants then filed a supplemental complaint embracing events that had occurred since the suit began, including a second HUD-approved rent increase and the issuance of HUD regulations, 24 C.F.R. 403.1 et seq., which purport to preempt local rent control in subsidized HUD projects. The tenants moved for a preliminary injunction restraining HUD from enforcing its new preemption regulations. On April 29, 1976, their motion was denied, the district court stating:

6

The denial of the preliminary injunction at the hearing of February 24, 1976 was arrived at on grounds that do not depend on the validity of these regulations. Consequently, the present motion is merely a formal challenge to the regulations now that they have been explicitly attacked by the added material in the supplemental complaint. Their "enforcement" is not a rational subject for restraint by injunction.

7

The present motion, in substance, is no more than an attempt to seek reargument or reconsideration of the previous denial, formally embodied in a separate order dated February 26, 1976. As such, it is far beyond the 14 day period fixed by Local Rule 12-I for that purpose, and it is accordingly, denied.

[*~180]8

Both parties to this appeal are anxious that we resolve the ultimate legal issue posed by the tension between the HUD regulations and the Newark Rent Control Ordinance. We decline the invitation and affirm the action of the district court. An independent review of the record, as it existed at the time the injunction was denied, has persuaded us that the tenants did not meet the burden of establishing irreparable injury.

II.

9

We have previously emphasized "the elementary principle that a preliminary injunction shall not issue except upon a showing of irreparable injury." National Land & Investment Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 97 (3d Cir. 1970). We have said that the requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable not merely serious or substantial. " 'The word means that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned for. . . . Grass that is cut down cannot be made to grow again; but the injury can be adequately atoned for in money. The result of the cases fixes this to be the rule: the injury must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it. . . . ' Gause v. Perkins, 3 Jones Eq. 177, 69 Am.Dec. 728 (1857). 'Irreparable injury is suffered where monetary damages are difficult to ascertain or are inadequate.' Danielson v. Local 275, Laborers Union, 479 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1973)." A. O. Smith, supra, 530 F.2d at 525.

10

We are not insensitive to the claims of appellants, and we recognize the desirability of achieving a prompt resolution of the ultimate legal issue of preemption. An appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction, however, is hardly the procedural vehicle for the resolution of a sensitive issue of federal-state relations. The record at this stage is necessarily truncated. Moreover, the only proper inquiry on the question of preemption at this time is whether the movants have made a strong showing at the preliminary hearing that they are likely to prevail on the merits at the final hearing. Thus, even if we were to grapple with the merits at this stage, we could only decide, at most, whether or not the tenants have made a strong showing that they would ultimately prevail in a future decision.

11

It is a matter of no little distress that the original complaint in this matter, filed June 10, 1975, has not been moved for final disposition in the district court. The record discloses no request by plaintiffs for summary judgment or final hearing. Although there has been skirmish after skirmish in the battle for preliminary injunctions, there has been no effort in the trial court to sharpen and ripen the proceedings for final decision. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 21, 1976, from "the Order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey docketed February 24, 1976 and April 29, 1976, denying Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of 24 C.F.R. 403.5 and 24 C.F.R. 403.6, and prohibiting imposition of rent increases pending final resolution of this matter." But, since May, 1976, appellants have allowed a year to pass in the district court without attempting to achieve or accelerate "the final resolution of this matter" there.

12

It was a necessary prerequisite for a preliminary injunction that the tenants show irreparable injury. No probative evidence supporting this sine qua non was adduced before the district court prior to the orders of February and April, 1976, the subject matter of this appeal. At best, the claimed injury was financial, a loss of money, a loss capable of recoupment in a proper action at law.

13

The tenants' action was not merely an academic exercise to test whether federal power could preempt local rent control; rather, it was an attempt to strike down a federal regulation that facially permitted a higher rent increase than one permitted by the Newark authorities. The tenants had a clear-cut financial interest. Should they prove victorious, the path would be clear for refunds of improper rent increases.[1] But the record before the district court fails to show proof of irreparable injury. Because of this failure of proof, we will sustain the action of the district court, albeit for a reason other than that given by the district court. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 841 n.21 (3d Cir. 1976).

[*~181]14

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

*

Honorable Herbert A. Fogel, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation

1

Nor do appellants receive comfort from Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Volks City, Inc., 348 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1965), which they suggest poses a scope of review at variance with A. O. Smith Corp., supra. Volkswagenwerk simply quoted the rule of Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815, 49 S.Ct. 256, 73 L.Ed. 972 (1929), stating that "the injunction usually will be granted" when the questions presented are "grave, and the injury to the moving party will be certain and irreparable."