Miyoko Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Miyoko Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Mengert v. United States (ca10, 2024-10-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mengert v. United States (2×)
10th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
See also Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding federal parole officers are not “investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” under 28 U.S.C. 20 Appellate Case: 23-5100 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2024 Page: 21 § 2680(h)); EEOC v. First Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1980) (same for agents of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (same for security guards at an Air Force base exchange); cf. Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938, 945-46 (7th Ci…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Radiya Buchanan v. William Barr
D.C. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Moore, 213 F.3d at 710 (prose- cutors not covered); Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (parole officers not covered); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (some security employees not cov- ered); see also Pellegrino v. TSA, 937 F.3d 164, 170-81 (3d Cir. 2019) (allowing claim against TSA employees to proceed, but artic- ulating a convoluted test). 4 That may mean that we should never extend Bivens. “[C]reating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor” that re- quires “evaluat[ing] a range of policy considerations.” Id. at 1802 (c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frey v. David
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Wilson, 959 F.2d at 15 (federal parole officers not subject to proviso); EEOC v. First Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (same for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agent); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same for security guard at military exchange).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Webb-Beigel v. United States
D. Ariz. · 2019 · confidence medium
Cir. 2000) (postal inspectors empowered to make arrests); Wilson v. 26 United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (parole officers not investigative or law enforcement officers because not empowered to arrest); EEOC v. First Nat’l Bank 27 of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agent lacked authority to search, seize, or arrest); Solomon v. United States, 28 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (security guard at military exchange not empowered to search, seize, or arrest). 1 whether a search is justified, not whether…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nadine Pellegrino v. TSA (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (parole officers); EEOC v. First National Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agent); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (security guard at military exchange).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. SEC. Admin. (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
The Court then permitted the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims to proceed against the United States. 10 United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weinraub v. United States
E.D.N.C. · 2012 · confidence medium
Coulter, 2008 WL 4416454 , at *8 (quoting Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977) (concluding that security employees of a military exchange were not “investigative or law enforcement officers” within the meaning of § 2680(h)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro v. United States
5th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
When no mandate exists, however, the passed the 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claim Act to provide compensation [for the victims].” Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977). 8 No. 07-40416 governmental action is considered discretionary and the first prong is satisfied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro v. United States (2×)
5th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
This court has previously addressed the congressional intent of § 2680(h): "Congress, in response to 'no knock’ raids conducted by federal narcotic agents on the wrong dwell ings, passed the 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claim Act to provide compensation [for the victims].” Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McElroy v. United States
W.D. Tex. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals assessed the congressional intent of 2680(h) as follows: “Congress, in response to ‘no knock’ raids conducted by federal narcotic agents on the wrong dwellings, passed the 1974 amendment to the Federal Torts Claims Act to provide compensation [for persons *593 victimized by intentional torts].” Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosamarica B. Hobdy v. United States
10th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 309-10 (5th Cir.1977) (false arrest and false imprisonment); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 182, 184 (D.D.C.1983) (abuse of process), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1151 (D.C.Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 1991 · confidence medium
Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 , 101 S.Ct. 1361 , 67 L.Ed.2d 342 (1981) (E.E.O.C. agents’ authority to have access to evidence does not give rise to liability); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977) (military exchange security guards are not law enforcement officers); Aronson v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 178, 180 (D.Pa.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir.1984) (government attorneys are not law enforcement officers); Art Metal-U.S.A. v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 182, 184 (D.D.C.1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1151 (1985) (inspector ge…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Pooler v. United States of America. Ronnie Bradley v. United States (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183 , 195 n. 3 (8th Cir.1979), and Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977), read the proviso as inapplicable to United States attorneys and to security personnel in military exchanges because these federal officers are not empowered to execute searches, seizures, and arrests for violations of federal law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeLong v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Alaska · 1984 · confidence medium
Resolution of this conflict depends therefore upon whether the marine guards are empowered by law “to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” See Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rubin
D. Colo. · 1983 · confidence medium
Conversely, in Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir.1977), the court was unable to identify any such language authorizing security employees at a military exchange to make arrests or conduct searches.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Braugh v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust
Tex. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977); see e. g.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Pansoy
usafctmilrev · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977).
cited Cited "see" Bertman Ames and Gloria Ames v. United States
8th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hernandez v. United States
D. Colo. · 2014 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Solomon, 559 F.2d at 310 (holding that security employees of military exchange were not investigative or law enforcement officers as defined under 2680(h)) and Wilson, 959 F.2d at 15 (holding that parole officers do not fit within the 2680(h) exception because they do not have the power to make arrests and can only perform searches or seize evidence with the parolee’s consent) with Eyo v. United States, No. 06-6185, 2007 WL 4277511 , at *4-5 (D.N.J.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Valn v. United States
D. Del. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 , reh’g. en banc denied, 564 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1977) (security employees of a military exchange were not “investigative or law enforcement officers” within meaning of the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity for actions based on false arrest and false imprisonment). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Miyoko SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
77-1703.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Sep 16, 1977.
559 F.2d 309
1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11551
Sam Gross, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant., Jamie Boyd, U. S. Atty., Jeremiah Handy, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Coleman, Morgan, Per Curiam, Tjoflat.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff brought suit under § 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp.1976), alleging that security guards employed by a military base exchange had falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned her. On a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, the District Court dismissed the suit. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity since under § 2680(h) the United States has waived its sovereign immunity only as to certain intentional, tortuous acts of an investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States and security personnel of an Air Force exchange are not investigative or law enforcement officers within the meaning of § 2680(h). We affirm.

The suit arose out of the following facts. On September 3, 1974, plaintiff was shopping at Lackland Air Force Base Exchange. As plaintiff was leaving the store, she was stopped by two exchange security employees who apparently believed she had been shoplifting. Plaintiff returned with them to the store office. When the contents of plaintiff’s purse were examined, no shoplifted items were found.

The sole question for this Court’s consideration is whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity defense to plaintiff’s complaint. Prior to March 16, 1974, sovereign immunity was a complete bar to actions based on false arrest and false imprisonment. In 1974, the federal government, through the amending of § 2680, submitted itself to liability where certain of its agents committed certain intentional torts. Section 2680 was amended as follows:

[*310] The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.

The issue then becomes one of statutory construction, specifically whether security personnel of the Air Force exchange are “investigative or law enforcement officers” within the meaning of § 2680(h) as amended.

In interpreting statutes, a court’s function “is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress”. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1939). The wording of the statute and the legislative history evidence congressional intent. See C. Sands, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction § 45.13 (4th ed. 1973). A review of the legislative history reveals that Congress, in response to “no-knock” raids conducted by federal narcotic agents on the wrong dwellings, passed the 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide compensation for such victims. S.Rep.No. 588, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2789, 2790-91. Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity for the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment only in limited circumstances. The federal government deprived itself “of the defense of sovereign immunity in cases in which Federal law enforcement agents [or investigative officers], acting within the scope of their employment, or under color of Federal law, commit [committed] . . . false imprisonment, false arrest . . . .” Id. at 2791. “Investigative or law enforcement officer” is statutorily defined as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law”. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976). Therefore, security employees of a military exchange would be “investigative or law enforcement officers” within the meaning of § 2680(h) only if the security personnel were (1) empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law or (2) acting within the scope of their employment in conducting searches, seizures, and arrests for violation of federal laws. The security employees are not so empowered by law. Nor would such actions be within the scope of their employment.

In view of the statute’s language and legislative history, we conclude that security employees of a military exchange are not investigative or law enforcement officers within the meaning of § 2680(h). We hold that the plaintiff’s claim is completely barred by sovereign immunity.

AFFIRMED.