Doyle A. Jones v. The Honorable Terry L. Shell, United States Dist. Judge for the E. Dist. of Arkansas, 572 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Doyle A. Jones v. The Honorable Terry L. Shell, United States Dist. Judge for the E. Dist. of Arkansas, 572 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2010 · 2 courts · …the writ of habeas corpus, challenging detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time. at p. 1280 ≈ altered
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 1983–2013 · 2 courts · …the writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time. at p. 1280 ✓
52 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re Elliot (virginislands, 2010-09-24) · Strongest negative: Goldberg v. Tracy (nyed, 2008-01-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Goldberg v. Tracy
E.D.N.Y · 2008 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time....
discussed Cited "but see" United States Ex Rel. Savino v. Flood
E.D.N.Y · 1979 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278 , 1280 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978) (failure to appeal denial of State post-conviction relief not conclusive of failure to exhaust, “unless he has knowingly and deliberately waived the appeal.”).
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In re Elliot (2×)
virginislands · 2010 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the writ of habeas corpus, challenging detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Noble Lee Simpson v. Carlos Ortiz, Warden Fci, Bastrop, U.S. Parole Comm. (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
5th Cir. · 1993 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
busy court dockets cannot justify a 14-month delay in processing this claim from the date of remand.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Simpson v. Ortiz (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1993 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
busy court dockets cannot justify a 14- month delay in processing this claim from the date of remand.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) (DP) Letner v. Davis
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
(See Doc. 64-1 at 5-6; cf. Jones v. 23 Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (exhaustion doctrine is one of comity and where the 24 petitioner’s claim has been deliberately delayed by the state, a federal court should not become 25 catalyst for further delay by insisting upon exhaustion); Mucie v. Missouri State Dept. of Corrections, 26 543 F.2d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1976) (exhaustion excused where state has been unnecessarily and 27 intentionally dilatory by failing to respond to the state petition for over a year); U.S. ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Landon Thomas v.
3rd Cir. · 2021 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
We held that “although this delay is of concern, it does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due process.” Id.; see also Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 , 954 n.12 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that district court delay must be “extraordinary” to warrant mandamus relief); cf. Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that 14-months delay in ruling on a habeas petition, for no reason other than docket congestion, was unreasonable).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zepeda v. United States
D. Ariz. · 2019 · confidence medium
“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging 20 illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if ... trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” A long stay also threatens to create the 21 perception that courts are more concerned with efficient trial management than with the vindication of constitutional rights. 22 Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. 23 Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978)). 24 In Yong, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court had abused its discretion in 25 staying habeas proceedings pending a decision in a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clyde Baer, III v.
3rd Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maria Carrascosa v.
3rd Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (Court’s congested docket did not justify fourteen-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (District Court’s fourteen-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McPeters v. United States
C.D. Cal. · 2016 · confidence medium
Wash. July 19, 2016) (quoting Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Savage v. United States
C.D. Cal. · 2016 · confidence medium
Wash. July 19, 2016) (quoting Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gary L. Codner v.
3rd Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
In Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990), for example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s congested docket did not justify a 14-month delay in adjudicating his habeas corpus petition, and in Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating a petition following a remand denied the petitioner due process.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Burrell, Jr. v.
3rd Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990) (Court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (District Court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerome Blyden v.
3rd Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990) (Court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (District Court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nezzy Adderly
3rd Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), and a 14-month delay usually presents a due process issue, see Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process), where jurisdiction is lacking in the…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Adderly
3rd Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir.1996), and a 14-month delay usually presents a due process issue, see Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990) (court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating ha-beas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (district court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process), where jurisdiction is lacking in the f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quintana v. Bravo (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.M. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978). 112 N.M. at 628 , 818 P.2d at 406 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Burgess
3rd Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 89 (3d Cir.1992). 1 Some delays may be so prejudicial that they warrant mandamus relief, see Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Kitano
3rd Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
While some delays may be so prejudicial that they warrant mandamus relief, see Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir.1996); Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978), we do not find the five-month delay at issue here to be so prejudicial that an issuance of the writ is warranted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoeun Yong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,opinion
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if ... trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roman E. Warner v. Al C. Parke, Superintendent
7th Cir. · 1996 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that seven month delay attributable to overworked state attorney general and recalcitrant court reporter did not suffice to violate due process and to merit default judgment, and distinguishing Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1279-80 (8th Cir.1978), in which court ordered State to show cause why merits should not be reviewed in light of failure to raise exhaustion until after seven months of inexcusable delay). 7 A recent amendment to the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(3) (1996), states that a court may not deem a …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico Department of Corrections Derald Kerby, Warden, Central New Mexico Correctional Facility
10th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
"Plainly, 'the writ of habeas corpus, challenging detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.’ ” Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Caristo v. Sullivan (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.M. · 1991 · confidence medium
“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Rogers (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978). 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires a hearing on a show cause order issued pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus within five days after the return is filed unless additional time is allowed for good cause, and it then requires that the court “summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” See McClellan v. Young, 421 F.2d at 691 (section 2243 imposes specific duty on court to summarily hear and dispose of habeas petitions); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d at 1280 (habeas corpus procedure should no…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Rogers (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978). 9 28 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Billy Ray Hale v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Hale cites Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 , 83 S.Ct. 822, 828 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.)), in which the Court states that the writ of habeas corpus must be construed to afford “a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” He also relies heavily on this Court’s statement in Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978), that the writ “is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” Hale’s reliance on Jones , however, is overstated…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bermudez v. Reid (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1983 · confidence medium
Put simply, “The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time.” Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank J. Ruiz v. Elmer O. Cady
7th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In those situations, the petitioner’s due process rights would be denied, and “[t]he writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, . . . reduced to a sham if the trial courts [did] not act within a reasonable time . . . especially . . . upon remand of a pending petition from [the appeals court].” Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul Seemiller v. Circuit Court Clerk of St. Charles County, Prosecuting Attorney of St. Charles County, and Honorable Judge Dalton, Circuit Court
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See generally Thompson v. White, 591 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978); Mucie v. Missouri State Department of Corredions, 543 F.2d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1976); and Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835 , 838-39 n.4 (8th Cir. 1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruiz v. Cady
E.D. Wis. · 1981 · confidence medium
In Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978), in a second appeal brought after a previous remand, the court of appeals commented as follows on the district judge’s failure to act expeditiously pursuant to the court’s mandate on remand: “We find a flagrant violation of our mandate of January 13, 1977, by the district court in failing to act within a reasonable time upon this court’s order of remand.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seemiller v. Circuit Court Clerk of St. Charles County
E.D. Mo. · 1980 · confidence medium
See generally Thompson v. White, 591 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978); Mucie v. Missouri State Department of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1976); and Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835 , 838-39 n.4 (8th Cir. 1967).
cited Cited "see" Faul v. Lejeune
D. Minnesota · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" In re Habeas Corpus Cases
E.D.N.Y · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir.1978) (“The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time____Busy court dockets cannot justify a 14-month delay in processing this claim from the date of remand____ We find this delay has denied petitioner constitutional due process.”) Congress could clarify the state of the law by revising section 2243 to acknowledge the need to allow district court’s discretion in managing their section 2254 (and section 2255) habeas caseloads under Title 28 of the…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Doyle A. JONES, Petitioner,
v.
the Honorable Terry L. SHELL, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Respondent
78-1242.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Apr 6, 1978.
572 F.2d 1278
1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11832
Doyle Anthony Jones, pro se., Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee., ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Lay, Per Curiam, Ross.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Fifth Circuit (2)
PER CURIAM.

This matter comes before us on the filing in this court of two petitions for writs of mandamus directing the district court to rule on a petition for habeas corpus entitled Jones v. Mabry, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction, No. PB-C-76-242 (E.D.Ark., filed March 16, 1976). In view of the fact that the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on March 7, 1978, the first petition for mandamus, filed on January 22, 1978, is dismissed as moot. Petitioner filed a second petition for mandamus on March 16, 1978, setting forth the long procedural history of his case and requesting this court to reopen the case; we treat this petition as a notice of appeal in petitioner’s habeas corpus case, No. PB-C-76-242, and as an application for a certificate of probable cause. We grant the certificate of probable cause and require the State of Arkansas to show cause why summary reversal should not be granted petitioner on this appeal.

Petitioner originally sought a writ of habeas corpus in March of 1976. The cause was transferred from Judge Eisele to Judge Shell. [1] Without requiring responsive pleading from the State, Judge Shell denied the writ on September 23, 1976. On appeal to this court the State of Arkansas confessed error in that the district court did not pass on petitioner’s claim that he “had no knowledge of the crime he had committed which resulted in his conviction and sentence to the Arkansas Department of Correction and that his parole was revoked without a hearing.” We remanded the cause for responsive pleading and further review by the district curt. Jones v. Mabry, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).

For some unknown reason the district court delayed entering an order requiring the State to respond to these charges until May 12, 1977, some four months later. At this time the State was given 20 days to respond to the charges. In August of 1977, after petitioner filed a motion for default judgment, the State finally filed a “motion to dismiss” asserting that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies because he had not appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court from a denial of post-conviction relief by the state trial court. Judge Shell once again failed to act. After peti[*1280] tioner filed a petition for mandamus in this court in January 1978, Judge Shell, in response, then entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss on March 7, 1978.

We find a flagrant violation of our mandate of January 13, 1977, by the district court in failing to act within a reasonable time upon this court’s order of remand. The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time. [2] This is especially true upon remand of a pending petition from this court. In this case the entire proceeding should have been handled within 30 to 60 days of our order. Busy court dockets cannot justify a 14-month delay in processing this claim from the date of remand. Petitioner has been seeking relief since March of 1976. We find this delay has denied petitioner constitutional due process.

A good deal of the blame lies with the State of Arkansas. After conceding error before this court in January 1977, the State waited seven months before responding and then, without filing a responsive pleading, the State set up the defense of failure to exhaust state remedies. We find the State lacking in good faith in asserting this pleading without at least alternatively complying with this court’s order and the district court’s direction to respond to the petitioner’s allegations. The exhaustion doctrine is one of comity and where petitioner’s claim has been deliberately delayed by the State the federal district court should not become a catalyst for further delay by insisting upon exhaustion. Cf. Mude v. Missouri State Department of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976). Whether the exhaustion defense is a valid one here is beside the point. [3] Habeas corpus procedure should not be so dilatory or technical as to deny a petitioner a hearing and ruling on the merits of his claim within a reasonable time.

Under the circumstances, the State is given 15 days in which to respond in this court as to:

(a) petitioner’s allegations that he has no knowledge of the crime he had committed which resulted in his conviction and sentence to the Arkansas Department of Correction; and

(b) petitioner’s allegations that his parole was revoked without a hearing.

The State is further ordered to show cause why summary reversal and remand to the district court for an immediate review of petitioner’s claim should not be granted.

Further order of this court shall issue upon receiving the State’s response.

1

. In view of the transfer, the motion to substitute Judge Shell for Judge Eisele as respondent in the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.

2

. The writ must be construed to afford “a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400, [83 S.Ct. 822, 828, 9 L.Ed.2d 837] (1963).

3

. The ground asserted by the State and adopted by the trial court is incorrect. The fact that petitioner did not appeal the denial of post-conviction relief is not conclusive of his failure to exhaust state remedies unless he has knowingly and deliberately waived the appeal. See Cain v. Missouri, 518 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1975).