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Doctrinal family: Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperli… ↗
Quoted verbatim 2×
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cited 6× by 6 distinct cases, 2021–2024 ·
…although one might read the flsa, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the 'opt-in' provision of 16(b) of the act, 29 u.s.c. 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.
at p. 336
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2020–2023 ·
…although one might read the flsa, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the 'opt-in' provision of 16(b) of the act, 29 u.s.c. 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate cas…
at p. 336
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 1981–2014 · 2 courts ·
…comports with the broad remedial purpose of the act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits.
at p. 336
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Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979
2002
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Nashaily Ortiz, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al. v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al.
although one might read the flsa, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the 'opt-in' provision of section 216(b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Lopez v. St Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center
although one might read the flsa, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the 'opt-in' provision of section 216(b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dana Yoon, on behalf of herself and a class and collective of similarly situated individuals v. Honey 490 Inc., et al.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provision of the [FLSA]”); Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. at 261 n.15.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniel West, Romaine Clarke, Ryon Morgan, and Saadala Aboulessan, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. LaserShip, Inc. et al.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt- in’ provision of [Section] 16(b) of the [FLSA], 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) Although orders authorizing notice are sometimes referred to as orders “certifying” a collective action, the FLSA does not contain a certification mechanism.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Abbott v. Comme Des Garcons, Ltd.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt- in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Orbetta v. Dairyland USA Corporation
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
West v. Lasership, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).8 Although orders authorizing notice are sometimes referred to as orders “certifying” a collective action, FLSA does not contain a certification mechanism.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lorenzo v. Dee Mark Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Recio v. D'Almonte Enterprises Parking Garage, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson-Cradle v. KPS Affiliates Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).3 Although orders authorizing notice are sometimes referred to as orders “certifying” a collective action, the FLSA does not contain a certification mechanism.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodney v. Casella Waste Systems, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (interpreting § 216 “as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice’).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Zambrano v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Duran v. R&L Interior Renovations and Construction, Corp.
Photographic Lab’ys, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Zambrano v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martinez v. JLM Decorating, Inc.
Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Curry v. P&G Auditors and Consultants, LLC
Photographic Lab’ys, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pena v. SP Plus Corporation
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pena v. SP Plus Corporation
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lawrence v. NYC Medical Practice, P.C.
Photographic Lab’ys., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Perez v. Escobar Construction, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act . . . to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate 6 On May 4, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ letter-motion requesting to file a sur-reply.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Taveras v. PSD Freeport Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 3356-36 (2d Cir. 1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wood v. Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Contrera v. Langer
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission,, as not providing for notice, ... it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case,”); Orders authorizing notice are sometimes referred to as orders “certifying” a collective action, even though the FLSA does not contain a certification mechanism.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Warman v. American National Standards Institute
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Schaefer v. M & T Bank Corp.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam)) (alterations in Amendola)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Guzman v. Three Amigos SJL Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, ... it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of s 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. s 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations • omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garcia v. Spectrum of Creations Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (“Although one might- read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, ... it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of s 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc.
Photographic Labs., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (permitting notice to broad class despite absence of statutory language because such a ruling “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits.”) In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have demonstrated diligence and that good cause exists to extend the deadline to amend the pleadings.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
White v. 14051 Manchester Inc.
However, for a collective action to be efficient, there must be “the same factual and legal issues.” Johnson, 561 F.Supp.2d at 587 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 , 110 S.Ct. 482 , 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989); Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.2003); Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Labs., 600 F.2d 335, 335 (2d Cir.1979)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Romero v. La Revise Associates L.L.C.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, ... it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of s 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. s 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 , 99 S.Ct. 2162 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kalloo v. Unlimited Mechanical Co. of NY, Inc.
Hoffmanm-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172-73 , 110 S.Ct. 482 ; Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Calderon v. King Umberto, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335 (2d Cir.1978)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Karic v. Major Automotive Companies, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335-36 (2d Cir.1978) (holding that a district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provision of the [FLSA]”); Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F.Supp. at 261 & n. 15.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cunningham v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
See Myers, 624 F.3d at 554-55 ; Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1979); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 , 110 S.Ct. 482 , 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (recognizing discretion of the district court to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which incorporates 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Guillen v. Marshalls of MA, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 , 99 S.Ct. 2162 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979) (“Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, ... it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of s. 16(b) of the Act, *475 29 U.S.C. s. 216 (b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Aros v. United Rentals, Inc.
Photographic Labs., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Alonso v. UNCLE JACK'S STEAKHOUSE, INC.
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ruggles v. Wellpoint, Inc.
Such recognition “comports with the broad remedial purpose of [FLSA] ... as well as in avoiding multiplicity of suits.” Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc.
See Eoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173 , 110 S.Ct. 482 ; Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.2003); Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Labs., 600 F.2d 335, 335 (2d Cir.1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bowens v. Atlantic Maintenance Corp.
Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provisions of the [FLSA]”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Doucoure v. Matlyn Food, Inc.
Photographic Lab., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fasanelli v. Heartland Brewery, Inc.
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc.
See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 , 110 S.Ct. 482 , 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (examining the propriety of court-supervised notice under § 216(b) in the context of a collective action brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which expressly incorporates by reference the remedies and enforcement provisions of FLSA § 216(b)); Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (court-authorized notice in an appropriate case “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the [FLSA], ... as well as with the interest of …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc.
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp.
Photographic Lab., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 , 99 S.Ct. 2162 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Roberta BRAUNSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EASTERN PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORIES, INC. and Heart of America Portraits, Inc., Defendants-Appellants
v.
EASTERN PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORIES, INC. and Heart of America Portraits, Inc., Defendants-Appellants
411, Docket 78-7464.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 14, 1979.
600 F.2d 335
Shaun S. Sullivan, New Haven, Conn. (William J. Doyle, Marshall B. Babson, and Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for defendants-appellants., A. Reynolds Gordon, Bridgeport, Conn., for plaintiff-appellee.
Waterman, Timbers, Van Graafeiland.
Cited by 123 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM:
We affirmed by our order entered November 17, 1978 the order of the district court from which an appeal was taken and which appeal was expedited by a prior order of our Court entered September 21, 1978. In light of the petition for rehearing by defendants-appellants addressed to the panel that heard this appeal on the merits and in accordance with our practice in appropriate cases of publishing previously unpublished decisions or orders of this Court, Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373 (2 Cir. 1977) (per curiam), we now publish the following opinion in the instant case which in substance is our order entered November 17, 1978.
The essential issue raised on this appeal is whether a district court has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the “opt-in” provision of the Fair Labor Stan[*336] dards Act dealing with actions for nonpayment of statutorily required minimum wages and overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
We believe that Judge Daly took the proper course in authorizing notice to other potential plaintiffs in this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although one might read the Act, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the “opt-in” provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case. Cantu v. Owatonna Canning Co., Docket No. 3-76-Civ. 374 (D.Minn. April 12, 1978); Lantz v. B-1202 Corp., 429 F.Supp. 421 (E.D.Mich.1977); Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, Inc., Docket No. C73-41 (N.D.Ohio 1973). Contra, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9 Cir. 1977). Although we agree with Judge Choy’s view in Kinney that due process does not require notice, we do not agree with his conclusion that there is no power in the district court to order it in a proper case.
In our view, this holding comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits. In short, we believe that the recent trend in the law, see, e.g., Bates & O’Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1976), strips Judge Wyzanski’s rationale of a decade and a half ago in Cherner v. Transitron Electronics Corp., 201 F.Supp. 934 (D.Mass.1962), of much of its force — a rationale which in any event is not controlling on this Court.
Aside from publishing our opinion above, the petition for rehearing is in all respects denied.