United States v. James Elwood Miller, 603 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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United States v. James Elwood Miller, 603 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Scott Brian Janoe (ca10, 1984-02-21)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Scott Brian Janoe
10th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
We agree with the Ninth Circuit, which said in the similar context of failure to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of defendant’s statements, that “neglecting a statutory requirement should diminish our enthusiasm to invoke the harmless error doctrine.” United States v. Miller, 603 F.2d 109, 110 (9th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,484 John F. Maher v. Zapata Corporation v. William Maldonado, Objector-Appellant
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
As the court stated in Goldman : “Instead of choosing the course of securing the greatest possible money judgment from the [individual defendants], the parties and the court chose the course of terminating litigation and taking steps to assure that such conduct as had been disclosed could not occur in the future.” 603 F.2d at 109.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James Elwood MILLER, Defendant-Appellant
78-2735.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 29, 1979.
603 F.2d 109
1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 12193
Eugene R. Bracamonte, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz. (argued), for plaintiff-appellee., Stanton Bloom (argued), Tucson, Ariz., for defendant-appellant.
Ely, Sneed, Takasugi.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 83%
Citer courts: Court of Chancery of Delaware (1)
SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of numerous counts arising from his purchase and sale of firearms. Specifically, he was convicted of one count of selling firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1), ten counts charging him as a felon receiver of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1), and five counts of making false statements on firearm forms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).

Appellant appeals on numerous grounds, all of which, save one, we shall not discuss. The one we do consider is that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of appellant’s statements made to government agents subsequent to his arrest as is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The United States admits that the failure was error. It insists, however, that it was harmless.

The issue is a close one, but, on balance, we believe the error was not harmless. There was considerable dispute about whether the statements were voluntary and, while we are not prepared to conclude as a matter of law that they were not, we think the dispute underscores the necessity of the statutorily required instruction. Moreover, we believe that neglecting a statutory requirement should diminish our enthusiasm to invoke the harmless error doctrine. No exception reading “except when voluntariness appears beyond a reasonable doubt” appears in the statute’s command that the jury be instructed “to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances . .”

Finally, our reluctance to invoke the harmless error doctrine is reinforced by the existence of serious questions with respect to whether the government has pyramided its charges making possible the very heavy sentence imposed on the appellant. In striking the balance that the scales of justice require, it is not improper to place thereon serious but unresolved issues raised by the appellant.

Therefore, we reverse appellant’s convictions with respect to all counts.

REVERSED.