Thomas Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co. & Ford Motor Credit Co., 614 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Thomas Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co. & Ford Motor Credit Co., 614 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Cavanaugh Motors, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation, Walt Martin Motors, Inc., John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Bank of America, a Corporation, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation, Bank of America, a Corporation, John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation (ca9, 1982-03-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Cavanaugh Motors, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation, Walt Martin Motors, Inc., John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Bank of America, a Corporation, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation, Bank of America, a Corporation, John Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, a Partnership, and Bank of America, a Corporation, Sherry Hughes v. Walt Martin Motors, Inc., and Bank of America, a Corporation
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Id.; accord, Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1980); Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co., 614 F.2d 1085, 1086 (6th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors
9th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Id.; accord, Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1980); Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co., 614 F.2d 1085, 1086 (6th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance
SCOTUS · 1981 · confidence medium
Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F. 2d 423, 426 (CA7 1980); Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co., 614 F. 2d 1085, 1086 (CA6 1979); Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 588 F. 2d 753, 756-757 (CA9 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 444 U. S. 555 (1980).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas AUGUSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARSHALL MOTOR COMPANY and Ford Motor Credit Company, Defendants-Appellees
77-3550.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Dec 26, 1979.
614 F.2d 1085
John E. Duda, William M. Wohl, Duda, Elk & Wohl, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff - appellant., Andrew J. McLandrich, James P. Conroy, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, Ohio, for Marshall Motor Co., William D. Ginn, David J. Naftzinger,Thompson, Hiñe & Flory, Cleveland, Ohio, for Ford Motor Credit Co.
Lively, Keith, Brown.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

ORDER

Appellant, Augusta, purchased a Ford automobile from a Ford Dealer, appellee Marshall Motor Co. Augusta desired financing of the purchase, which Marshall arranged through appellee Ford Motor Credit Co. Augusta executed an “instalment contract” which was forthwith assigned by Marshall to Ford Credit, and Augusta was shortly thereafter supplied with a payment coupon book by Ford Credit.

Augusta then sued Marshall and Ford Credit, contending that under the Truth-In-Lending Act and Regulation Z issued by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Act, Marshall and Ford Credit were required to reveal at the time of the purchase that Ford Credit was a creditor of Augusta and that this was not done. Ford Credit and Marshall contended that Ford Credit, as an assignee of the instalment contract, was not a “creditor” of Augusta within the meaning of the Regulation and that, in any event, Augusta received notice that Ford Credit was a creditor by the very terms of the[*1086] instalment contract and also by the payment coupon book sent to him by Ford Credit.

Augusta, Ford Credit and Marshall moved for summary judgment, and District Judge Krupansky granted summary judgment in favor of Ford Credit and Marshall and against Augusta. 453 F.Supp. 912. Judge Krupansky did not determine whether Ford Credit, as an assignee, was a “creditor” within the meaning of the Regulation, but he did determine that Augusta received notice that Ford Credit was a creditor by the terms of the instalment contract and also the payment coupon book.

We need not decide whether Ford Credit was, as an assignee, a “creditor” within the meaning of the Regulation and need not decide whether the payment coupon book gave timely notice, if such was required. We determine that Judge Krupansky was correct in holding that the instalment contract itself gave adequate notice of Ford Credit’s involvement in the transaction. This issue involving this very contract form was before the court in Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 586 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1978), and the court held that the contract gave such notice, pointing out that Ford Credit was shown as assignee on the contract át a point close to two separate places that the purchaser must sign the contract. The court also determined that the fact that Ford Credit is not described as a “creditor" and instead is shown as the assignee does not vitiate the notice to the purchaser. We also point out that at the top of the contract form are the words “Ford Motor Credit Company,” which although torn off after the contract is executed, were there when Augusta signed it.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.