Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (1980). · Go Syfert
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
153 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Smith v. County of Wayne (mied, 2023-12-19) · Strongest negative: Hauptmann v. Wilentz (njd, 1983-08-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Hauptmann v. Wilentz (3×) also: Cited "see"
D.N.J. · 1983 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Lee v. Williams, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit on claim that he supervised police officers who “planted” a pistol in plaintiff’s possession), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Smith v. County of Wayne
E.D. Mich. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the complaint in the instant case alleges prosecutorial misconduct, including falsification of evidence, and the coercion of perjured testimony from a number of witnesses.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Smith v. County of Wayne
E.D. Mich. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the complaint in the instant case alleges prosecutorial misconduct, including falsification of evidence, and the coercion of perjured testimony from a number of witnesses.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Schloss v. Bouse (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
2d Cir. · 1989 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a prosecutor might not enjoy absolute immunity from suit by a witness who was allegedly threatened and imprisoned to obtain his perjured testimony
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Schloss v. Bouse (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
2d Cir. · 1989 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a prosecutor might not enjoy absolute immunity from suit by a witness who was allegedly threatened and imprisoned to obtain his perjured testimony
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pearson v. City Of New York (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
Absolute immunity extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses.” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Fallon
N.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Immunity even extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses,” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)), “the knowing use of perjured 9 testimony,” “the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34, the “making [of] false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings,” Burns, 500 U.S. at 490 (collecting cases), and “conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial,” Dory, 25 F.3d at 83 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sarit Shmueli v. The City Of New York
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 501-02 (2d Cir.2004) (" Bernard "); Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 659-60 (2d Cir.1995) (" Hill "); cf. Manafo v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 285 F.3d 201, 210-11 (2d Cir.2002) (same with respect to a defense of qualified immunity). 20 Further, although absolute immunity is an affirmative defense whose availability depends on the nature of the function being performed by the defendant official who is alleged to have engaged in the challen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shmueli v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Further, although absolute immunity is an affirmative defense whose availability depends on the nature of the function being performed by the defendant official who is alleged to have engaged in the challenged conduct, see, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Bernard, 356 F.3d at 502-03 ; Hill, 45 F.3d at 660-61 ; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), the nature of that function is often clear from the face of the complaint.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine
W.D.N.Y. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (prosecutorial immunity); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation, et al., 550 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.1977) (act of state doctrine precluded subject matter jurisdiction over defendant’s third counterclaim and appeal from Rule 54(b) judgment would not delay trial or interfere with discovery).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert F. Davis v. James Grusemeyer, Raymond Gurak, Donald Yingling, David v. Brody, and Charles E. Waldron
3rd Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 34 (knowing use of perjured testimony at trial and suppression of evidence); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d *631 Cir.) (falsification of evidence and coercion of perjured testimony from trial witnesses), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir.1979) (filing a baseless detainer, using perjured testimony and suppressing exculpatory evidence); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F.Supp. 1072, 1082 (E.D.Pa.1980) (Becker, J.) (deciding that, because "perjury qua perjury" is not…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pinaud v. County of Suffolk
E.D.N.Y · 1992 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see Taylor, 640 F.2d at 453 . 7.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Day v. Morgenthau (2×)
unknown court · 1990 · confidence medium
When subjected to an illegal search and seizure, special damages need not be alleged because “the victim is harmed by the invasion of his zone of privacy, whether or not the evidence unlawfully obtained is introduced at trial.” Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Day v. Morgenthau (2×)
unknown court · 1990 · confidence medium
When subjected to an illegal search and seizure, special damages need not be alleged because "the victim is harmed by the invasion of his zone of privacy, whether or not the evidence unlawfully obtained is introduced at trial." Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cooney v. Park County (4×) also: Cited "see"
Wyo. · 1990 · confidence medium
Barbera v. Schlessinger, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1338 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989) (soliciting and suborning perjured testimony does not create liability in damages for prosecutorial conduct functionally qualifying for absolute immunity under Imbler); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (falsifying evidence and coercing perjured testimony); Campbell v. State of Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Blake v. Costantino
E.D.N.Y · 1989 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rose, Joseph, in No. 88-1634 v. Bartle, Paul, Asher, Robert, Smyth, Joseph A. Jr., Goodman, Bert, Vance, Oscar, Montgomery County, and Republican Party of Montgomery County. (d.c.civ. No. 86-6255). Reed, Trudy W., in No. 88-1646 v. Bartle, Paul B., Banning, Rita C., Demaioribus, James R., Collectively as the Salary Board of Montgomery County, Bartle, Paul, Individually, Asher, Robert, Smyth, Joseph A., Jr., Goodman, Bert, Vance, Oscar, Montgomery County, Republican Party of Montgomery County, Commissioners of the County of Montgomery (d.c.civ. No. 87-6405). Hill, Frederick B. v. Bartle, Paul, Asher, Robert, Smyth, Joseph A., Jr., Goodman, Bert, Vance, Oscar, Montgomery County, and Republican Party of Montgomery County (d.c. Civil 86-6963). Hill, Frederick B. v. Bartle, Paul, Asher, Robert, Smyth, Joseph A., Jr., Goodman, Bert, and Republican Party of Montgomery County, Montgomery County (d.c. Civil 87-3927). Appeal of Frederick Hill, Kolimaga, Walter, in No. 88-1653 v. Bartle, Paul, Asher, Robert, Montgomery County, and Republican Party of Montgomery County (d.c. Civil No. 87-0804)
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Similarly, in Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1976), this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a complaint alleging that "a federal prosecutor and a cooperating witness had conspired to use perjured testimony ... in order to convict appellants," id. at 832 , reasoning that "[t]he allegations in the complaint implicating [the prosecutor] all related to actions in his role as an advocate, rather than as an administrator or investigator." Id. at 834 ; see also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978) ("charges that the prosecutors induced witnesses to commit per…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rose v. Bartle
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Similarly, in Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1976), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint alleging that “a federal prosecutor and a cooperating witness had conspired to use perjured testimony ... in order to convict appellants,” id. at 832 , reasoning that “[t]he allegations in the complaint implicating [the prosecutor] all related to actions in his role as an advocate, rather than as an administrator or investi gator.” Id. at 834 ; see also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978) (“charges that the prosecutors induced witnesses …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Katz v. Morgenthau (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · confidence medium
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir.1984); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir.1981); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawson v. Abrams
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d at 452-53 ; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33 ("At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawson v. Abrams
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d at 452-53 ; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33 (“At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sarf v. Town of Huntington (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D.N.Y · 1988 · confidence medium
In Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.1980), the Second Circuit held that absolute immunity is available if the injury arises solely from the prosecution itself, but that it is not available if the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barbera v. Smith
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Such protection also applies to the conduct of actual litigation, Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), including the presentation of evidence to a grand jury, Maglione v. Briggs, 748 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.1984) (per curiam), and the conduct of a plea bargain, Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d at 453 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barbera v. Smith
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Such protection also applies to the conduct of actual litigation, Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), including the presentation of evidence to a grand jury, Maglione v. Briggs, 748 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.1984) (per curiam), and the conduct of a plea bargain, Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d at 453 . 13 Absolute immunity is not available, though, when a prosecutor undertakes conduct that is beyond the scope of his litigation-related duties.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman Rudow v. The City of New York, the City of New York Commission on Human Rights, and Lois Whitman
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
See Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir.1986); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.1980) (prosecutor absolutely immune to claims of suborning perjury and falsifying evidence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404-05 (2d Cir.1926) (prosecutor absolutely immune to claim of wholly false prosecution), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 503 , 48 S.Ct. 155 , 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927); Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435 , 440 n. 5 (10th Cir.1983) (distinguishing the scope of prosecutorial authority from the degree of the breach of that au…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Connie Robison v. Susan R. Via and Harold Harrison (2×)
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
For example, it extends to the prosecutor’s seeking an indictment, because exposing him to liability for the initial phase of his prosecutorial work could interfere with his exercise of independent judgment at every phase of the case, see Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. at 1097 , but it generally does not extend to his investigative activities independent of the litigation, because those activities are not integral to the judicial process itself, see, e.g., Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1984); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir.1981); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Ci…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Greg Myers, Etc. v. R. Kathleen Morris, Scott County Attorney, Etc. (4×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Accord Rachuy v. Murphy Motor Freight Dines, supra, 663 F.2d at 58 (fabricating evidence); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (subjecting the complainant to the ordeal of criminal trial by allegedly falsifying evidence and coercing perjured testimony).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weg v. MacChiarola
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · confidence medium
Lee, supra, 617 F.2d at 322; Taylor, supra, 640 F.2d at 453 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barbera v. Smith
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barrett v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 1985 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. Rifkin
N.D. Cal. · 1984 · confidence medium
The knowing use of perjured testimony is also subject to absolute immunity, Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.1978), as is falsification of evidence and coercion of perjured testimony, Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), and concealing exculpatory evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L. Patrick Gray, III v. Griffin Bell (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
We have thus expressed frustration with the rigidity of the analysis, see Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 21 (“To some extent, ... assignment of a particular incident to one of several mutually exclusive abstract categories is likely to involve an element of arbitrariness, especially where the incident in question was clearly not envisioned by those who originally designed the classificatory scheme.”), as have other courts, see, e.g., Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F.Supp. 1072, 1083 (E.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Betts v. Richard (2×)
D. Conn. · 1983 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 632 (7th Cir.1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 , 100 S.Ct. 1987 , 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1214 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 3147 , 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-1265 , modified on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whelehan v. County of Monroe (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D.N.Y. · 1983 · confidence medium
The distinction, based on Imbler , between purely investigative and primarily prosecu-torial functions of the prosecutor, as drawn in Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), if broadly read into the instant case tenably could support an argument that the employees of the Department might be liable for otherwise culpable fault in the early phases of their investigation, culminating in the obtaining of preliminary protective orders.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dick v. Watonwan County
D. Minnesota · 1982 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see also Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221-22 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Winner (4×)
D. Colo. · 1982 · confidence medium
See e.g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kliendienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-1265 , modified 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MacRae v. Motto (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1982 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Kavanagh, supra, 640 F.2d at 452 ; Lee v. Willins, supra, 617 F.2d at 322. 12 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. Fitch
D.N.J. · 1981 · confidence medium
See e.g., Macko v. Bryon, 641 F.2d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (malicious indictments); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1379 (10th Cir. 1980) (information signed by district attorney in malicious prosecution case); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (falsification of evidence and coercion of perjured testimony); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979) (filing baseless detainer, filing an information without investigation, offering perjured testimony, suppressing exculpatory evidence); Daniels v. …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Redcross v. County of Rensselaer
N.D.N.Y. · 1981 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir., 1981); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cerbone v. County of Westchester (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1981 · confidence medium
Id. at 1186; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cerbone v. County of Westchester (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1981 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] A habeas corpus proceeding based upon the same series of events is currently pending before Judge Motley of this Court. 80 Civ. 2647. [2] Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 , 92 S.Ct. 594 , 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 , 198 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1974). [3] Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 , 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1974); Pyles v. Keane, 418 F.Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y.1976). [4] 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). [5] Id. at 430-31…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodney Taylor v. Michael Kavanagh (2×)
2d Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In contrast, activities in which a prosecutor engages that are independent of prosecution, Lee v. Willins, supra, 617 F.2d at 322, are not protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Russotti (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1980 · confidence medium
Where the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach.” Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gutierrez v. Vergari
S.D.N.Y. · 1980 · confidence medium
Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see" Grant v. Cafferri
E.D.N.Y · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (prosecutor absolutely immune from claims of suborning perjury and falsifying evidence).
cited Cited "see" Peterson v. Tomaselli
S.D.N.Y. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mangiafico v. Blumenthal
D. Conn. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted); see also Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.1980) ("[A] prosecutor is immune from a suit to recover for an injury arising solely from the prosecution itself ... [wjhere the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach.”) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 ). 7 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Romer v. Morgenthau
S.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
A prosecutor’s motive is irrelevant since “an allegation that it was done as part of a conspiracy has no greater effect than an allegation that it was done in bad faith or with malice, neither of which defeats a claim of absolute immunity.” Dorman, 821 F.2d at 139 ; Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir.1988) (absolute immunity in transmitting false information to parole authorities); Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir.1987) (extending absolute immunity to prosecutor’s alleged malicious letter to Parole Commission); see also Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.1980); D…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock v. Frank P. Miller, Chief, Law Enforcement Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, (Two Cases) (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Dellums v. Powell, supra note 194, 212 U.S.App.D.C. at 407 , 660 F.2d at 806 (“[n]ever has a prosecutorial official been held liable for causing a prosecution to be brought”); see also Taylor v. Kavanagh, supra note 179 , 640 F.2d at 453 (“there can be no monetary liability for injuries related solely to the prosecution itself’) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980)). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hansen v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1976).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lester Lee
v.
Joseph \Scooter Joe\" Willins
District Attorney of the County of Kings
and Thomas Davenport

617 F.2d 320

Lester LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joseph "Scooter Joe" WILLINS, Kenneth Kaufman, "John
Bailey", "John James", "John Doe" and "Richard
Roe", Police Officers of the City of New
York, Defendants,
and
Eugene Gold, District Attorney of the County of Kings, and
Thomas Davenport, Assistant District Attorney of
the County of Kings, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 808, Docket 79-2178.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued Feb. 27, 1980.
Decided March 17, 1980.

Stuart K. Lesansky, New York City (John S. Kinzey, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert J. Schack, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of N. Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Gerald Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, TIMBERS, Circuit Judge, and WERKER, District Judge.[*]

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:

[*~320]1

In 1977, Lester Lee brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kings County District Attorney Eugene Gold, Assistant District Attorney Thomas Davenport, six New York City police officers, state judges, and his defense counsel. Lee alleged that the defendants had conspired to violate his civil rights in connection with criminal prosecutions brought against him for the murders of Police Officer Elijah Stroud and Lawrence Cooper, a drug dealer, and for unlawful possession of a firearm. Though convicted on the weapons charge, Lee was acquitted of the Cooper murder. In addition, he was tried five times on the Stroud indictment. His first trial ended in a hung jury. His second resulted in a conviction that was reversed on appeal because of improper remarks to the jury by the trial judge and defendant Davenport. When Lee's third and fourth trials ended in deadlocked juries, Lee sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to enjoin further prosecution. District Attorney Gold, meanwhile, obtained a fifth indictment, but the state trial judge dismissed it and ordered Lee released from prison, where he had been incarcerated awaiting trial for five years. Judge Nickerson, to whom the habeas petition proceeding was assigned, permitted Lee to amend his petition to allege civil rights violations by the prosecutors and police, to seek money damages, and to drop his claims against the judges and defense counsel.

2

Specifically, Lee alleged that the prosecutors had (1) induced a defense witness, Juanita Roman, to render herself unavailable to testify in return for dropping felony charges against her, (2) compelled a witness, Marguerita Rhodes, to perjure herself by arresting and incarcerating her for fifteen days without cause and threatening to "take away" her baby, (3) coerced false testimony from Joseph Cox by imprisoning him and depriving him of methadone, (4) sought and obtained five indictments for the same crime, and (5) supervised police officers who "planted" a pistol in Lee's possession. Judge Nickerson granted a motion to dismiss the complaint as against defendants Gold and Davenport, Lee v. Willins, 474 F.Supp. 970 (E.D.N.Y.1979), relying upon the prosecutorial immunity recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); and entered final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We affirm.

3

Imbler held that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983." 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. The Court, however, recognized that absolute immunity from suit might not attach to a prosecutor's acts performed in an investigative or administrative capacity. Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995. Accordingly, as one Court of Appeals has noted, "(t)he crucial inquiry concerns the nature of the official behavior challenged, not the identity or title of the officer responsible therefor." Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 190, 569 F.2d 10, 21 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978). Thus, in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), a district attorney was given only the qualified "good faith" immunity that protects, for example, police officers, for his role in planning a police raid on an apartment owned by the Black Panther Party. Id. at 632; accord, Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-65, modified, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978).

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The Supreme Court in Imbler recognized, however, that "(p)reparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence." 424 U.S. at 431 n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n.33. Thus, "(t)o grant a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity over his decision to initiate a prosecution while subjecting him to liability for securing the information necessary to make that decision would only foster uninformed decisionmaking . . . ." Forsyth v. Kleindienst, supra, 599 F.2d at 1215. Courts, therefore, are left with the difficult chore of drawing a line separating amorphous and vague notions of "investigating" and "prosecutorial" conduct.

5

We believe Judge Nickerson sensibly distinguished these two concepts in his opinion below. Although he recognized that prosecutorial and investigatory activities are necessarily interrelated to some degree, he separated them for purposes of applying the Imbler test for triggering the defense of absolute immunity by reference to the type of harm allegedly suffered. We endorse this useful and sensible approach. Under this analysis, a prosecutor is immune from a suit to recover for an injury arising solely from the prosecution itself e. g. being compelled to stand trial or to suffer imprisonment or pretrial detention. Such harm must always result in substantial part from the protected prosecutorial activities of initiating prosecution or presenting the state's case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. at 985.

6

Where the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, supra. If, for example, a prosecutor violates the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search, the victim is harmed by the invasion of his zone of privacy, whether or not the evidence unlawfully obtained is introduced at trial. Redress for this harm is not barred by Imbler. See J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 450 F.Supp. 1125 (E.D.Pa.1978).

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The complaint in the instant case alleges prosecutorial misconduct, including falsification of evidence, and the coercion of perjured testimony from a number of witnesses. But the injuries to Lee that could result from these acts are, as his amended complaint states, the deprivation of his liberty for five years, his subjection to the ordeal of multiple trials, and the emotional and economic injury resulting therefrom. These are precisely the alleged injuries for which Imbler granted absolute immunity. Since appellees Gold and Diamond are totally immune from suit for damages of this kind, the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Judge Nickerson correctly noted, however, that a prosecutor might not enjoy absolute immunity from suit by a witness who was allegedly threatened and imprisoned to obtain his perjured testimony. Here, Lee claims to have suffered no harm at the hands of appellees that was not a direct result of his prosecution.

8

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation