United States v. John MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
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United States v. John MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Johnson v. State (fladistctapp, 1995-09-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Lewis was then followed by a case on all fours with the present case, United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348, 349 (3d Cir.1980), in which the court affirmed the conviction, even though the predicate felony conviction had been reversed, because it saw no alternative under the "rigorous language" of Lewis .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mayfield
D. Kan. · 1986 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Wilder, 621 F.2d 1077 (10th Cir.1980); and United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348, 349 (3d Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennis Bonfiglio v. John Hodden, Superintendent, Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York
2d Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
E.g., United States v. McCroskey, 681 F.2d 1152, 1153 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 , 103 S.Ct. 383 , 74 L.Ed.2d 515 (1982); United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348, 349 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 73 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed Cited "see" Rice v. U S Dept ATF
3rd Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming a conviction for possession of a firearm where the predicate federal convictions were reversed on appeal after defendant's firearms conviction).
discussed Cited "see" Philip v. Rice v. United States of America, Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
3rd Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir.1980) (affirming a conviction for possession of a firearm where the predicate federal convictions were reversed on appeal after defendant’s firearms conviction).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Bailey
La. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1980), which holds that a conviction for a violation of § 1202(a)(1) is valid even though the predicate conviction is subsequently reversed on appeal.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rice v. United States, Department of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
E.D. Pa. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court held that “[18 U.S.C.App.] § 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds.” In its analysis the court discussed the similarity of the relevant statutory language of § 922(g)(1) and (h)(1) to that of § 1202(a)(1). 445 U.S. at 64 , 100 S.Ct. at 920 ; see also Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 , 103 S.Ct. 986 , 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983). *309 The holding in Lewis was followed in this circuit in United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir.1980).
cited Cited "see, e.g." New Banner Institute, Inc. v. G. R. Dickerson, Director Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms
4th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1980); Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America
v.
John MacGREGOR, Appellant
79-2011.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Mar 25, 1980.
617 F.2d 348
Joel Harvey Slomsky, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant; Peter F. Vaira, U. S. Atty., E. D. Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., Katherine Winfree, William C. Bryson, Mark A. Torres-Gil, Attys. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Ronald G. Cole, Sp. Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Aldisert, Weis, Higgin-Botham.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to decide whether Lewis v. United States, — U.S. —, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), and United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977) (in banc), permit a conviction under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when the predicate conviction was reversed after the firearm conviction. We hold that the conviction will stand and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Appellant MacGregor had been convicted on June 6, 1978, of possessing welfare checks stolen from the United States mails, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, of preparing false corporate income tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), and of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. He appealed those convictions to this court. While his appeal was pending, on December 8, 1978, he was arrested for possessing a firearm and on February 21, 1979, he was adjudged guilty of the convicted felon firearm offense. On June 18, 1979, his predicate convictions were reversed by this court. United States v. Wilson, 601 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1979).

On appeal of the firearms conviction to this court MacGregor raises an argument akin to that previously presented by Graves to this court and by Lewis to the Supreme Court: that a felon’s firearm conviction cannot be permitted to stand if the predicate convictions later prove to be infirm. In Graves and Lewis the predicate convictions were attacked as infirm, but had not in fact been reversed. We conclude that this factual difference does not assist the appellant here because of the sweep of the[*349] reasoning that supports the decisions in Graves and Lewis.

Speaking for the court in Graves, Judge Adams concluded, after examining the legislative history of § 1202(a)(1):

It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Congress expected a convicted felon to undergo the relatively modest inconvenience of a restriction on firearms use until he has obtained a judicial invalidation of his conviction or has secured an executive authorization lifting that restriction.

554 F.2d at 75.

The Lewis Court sustained the philosophy of our court’s majority view [1] in Graves and stated:

The statutory language [of § 1202(a)(1)] is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying pardon or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury.
No exception, however, is made for a person whose outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202(a)(1) contains nothing by way of restrictive language.
. The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section 1202(a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction.

— U.S. at —, 100 S.Ct. at 918 (footnote omitted).

Indeed, although we are not certain, we believe that the only exception to the rigorous language of Lewis would occur in a situation in which the predicate convictions had been reversed on appeal or nullified by executive action prior to the firearms arrest. See — U.S. at — n.5,100 S.Ct. at 918 n.5.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

1

. In Graves four judges dissented from the af-firmance of the firearms conviction under § 1202(a): Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldi-serf, Gibbons and Garth. See 554 F.2d at 83-88 (Garth, J., dissenting in part) and 554 F.2d at 88-93 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).