United States v. Rudolph Condary Baker, United States of Am. v. Wilbur Robin Pridgen, United States of Am. v. Wilbur Robin Pridgen, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
United States v. Rudolph Condary Baker, United States of Am. v. Wilbur Robin Pridgen, United States of Am. v. Wilbur Robin Pridgen, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Juvenile Male (ca4, 2009-01-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Juvenile Male
4th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Moreover, the fact that *466 “Congress intended RICO to be a potent tool in halting the infiltration of organized crime into the American economy,” United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980), demonstrates “the sense of urgency and importance that Congress has placed” on combating criminal organizations, T.M., 413 F.3d at 426-27 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Warner, Lawrence E.
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Warner
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Warner, Lawrence E. (2×)
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Hamilton and Nicola Messere, Also Known as Supercop
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
The alleged RICO en *185 terprise in this case was the Schenectady Police Department, an entity that may properly be considered an enterprise within the meaning of RICO, see, e.g., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir.1979) (police department), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2152 , 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir.1977), ce rt. denied, 435 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 1448 , 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978) (police department); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980) (county sheriffs department); see also United States v. A…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eli Lilly and Co. v. Roussel Corp.
D.N.J. · 1998 · confidence medium
Co., 809 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir.1987) (a court may be the named enterprise in a RICO action); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir.1977) (the Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarettes and Beverage Taxes as the enterprise); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 33 (2d Cir.1981) (New York City Civil Court as the enterprise); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980) (County Sheriffs office as the enterprise); Barr Lab. v. Bolar Pharm.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. William Aubrey Thompson, Thomas Edward Sisk, Charles Frederick Taylor
6th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
The government refers to an “avalanche” of precedent adopting this rule: United States v. Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 30-35 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1198 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., supra, 652 F.2d at 1316-19 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1261-67 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th C…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Peter Angelilli, William Butler, Donald Irish, and Donald Ribotsky (2×)
2d Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See, e. g., United States v. Ahornare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980) (county prosecutor’s office); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 , 101 S.Ct. 857 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (county law enforcement officials); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Attorney); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (county sheriff’s department); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2152 , 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980) (police department); United Stat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., Lee Stoller, John M. Cooper, and John Maeras (2×)
7th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See also, United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) (applied RICO to Pittsburgh magistrates without discussion); and United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 , 100 S.Ct. 1015 , 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980) (Philadelphia Traffic Court) Fourth Circuit: United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Prosecuting Attorney); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Prosecuting Attorney); Uni…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bill R. Clark
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
E. g., United States v. Ahornare, 625 F.2d 5 , 7 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (office of county prosecuting attorney); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (office of county sheriff); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1979) (city police department, individual city police officers), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2152 , 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977) (state bureau of cigarette and beverage taxes), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 , 98 S.Ct. 1256 , 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph
E.D. Pa. · 1981 · confidence medium
Moreover, most courts do have an effect upon interstate commerce, United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. at 1097 , as do sheriff’s departments, United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980), and the offices of prosecuting attorneys, United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 8 (4th Cir. 1980), all of which place interstate telephone calls, purchase supplies and materials through interstate commerce and involve non-citizens of the forum state in litigation.
cited Cited "see" Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V.
D. Maryland · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1980) (Fourth Circuit held that county sheriffs office was an enterprise within the meaning of RICO). 47 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Robert G. Altomare
4th Cir. · 1980 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Constantine \Gus\" Karas
unknown court · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980) (county sheriffs office is an enterprise under RICO); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (city police departments were enterprises under RICO). 6 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Rudolph Condary BAKER, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Wilbur Robin PRIDGEN, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Wilbur Robin PRIDGEN, Appellant
79-5167 to 79-5169.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Mar 27, 1980.
617 F.2d 1060
David P. Ford, Shallotte, N. C. (John R. Hughes, Shallotte, N. C., on brief), John E. Clark, Wilson, N. C. (J. Russell Kirby, Wilson, N. C., on brief), Perry Martin, Rich Square, N. C., for appellant., Jack B. Crawley, Jr., Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., Raleigh, N. C. (George M. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Raleigh, N. C., Laura A. Lipsitz, Third Year Law Student on brief), for ap-pellee.
Haynsworth, Butzner, Jones.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 7 cases
Pinpoint authority: #7,162 of 633,719
Citer courts: D. Maryland (7)
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:

Pridgen, the Sheriff of Wilson County, North Carolina, was convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., by arranging for the payment of bribes in return for protecting houses of prostitution from criminal investigation. He was also convicted, together with Baker, the operator of one of the houses of prostitution, of conspiring to violate the RICO legislation. In addition, Pridgen was found guilty of six violations of the federal tax laws. Pridgen and Baker appealed, and we affirm.

The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), makes it unlawful for persons associated with an “enterprise” affecting interstate commerce to conduct its affairs through a pattern of racketeering. “Enterprise” is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) as including

any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.

Defendants’ principal contention is that this definition was not meant to include a public entity such as the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department. The overwhelming weight of authority, however, supports a contrary conclusion. [1] Indeed, the sole case cited for support of defendants’ position is United States v. Mandel, 415 F.Supp. 997 (D.Md.1976), which held that the state of Maryland was not an enterprise under RICO. The court in that case determined that the overriding concern of the RICO legislation was to combat the infiltration of organized crime into private commercial life. While the correctness of that court’s holding is not before us, since this case does not address the status of a state under RICO, we are constrained to disagree with the Mandel court’s implication that all public entities are beyond the purview of the statute.

On its face, the definition contained in § 1961(4) makes no differentiation between public and private individuals, entities or groups. Under its terms, the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department clearly qualifies as either a “legal entity” or a “group of individuals associated in fact.” Nothing in the legislative history counsels that the statute was intended to apply only to private enterprises.

The legislative history makes it quite clear that Congress intended RICO to be a potent tool in halting the infiltration of organized crime into the American economy. As the Third Circuit has noted, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to exclude from protection that large portion of the economy made up of transactions by public agencies. United States v. Frumento, supra, note 1, 563 F.2d at 1091.

Moreover, Congress made the specific finding that organized crime threatened to “subvert and corrupt our democratic processes.” We think that this finding evinces a concern with the infiltration of organized crime into the public sector. Finding nothing to the contrary in either the legislative history or the statute, we hold that the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department is an “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

We have examined each of the defendants’ remaining contentions, and find no merit in any of them.

AFFIRMED.

1

. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979) (city police department is an enterprise under RICO); United States v. Fru-mento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (state Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes is an enterprise under RICO); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (city police department is an enterprise under RICO).