Robert B. SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McGUFFEY NURSING HOME, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
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Robert B. SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McGUFFEY NURSING HOME, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2005 · …because i could see no other reason. at p. 371 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1987 · …makes out a prima facie case by showing that he was within the statutorily protected age group, that he was discharged, that the employer sought to replace him with a younger person and that he was replaced with a younger person outside the protected group. at p. 371 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1986 · 2 courts · …no evidence 'which might infer that age was even a factor in the decision ✓
70 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel Industries (washctapp, 2005-07-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel Industries
Wash. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
It is also similar to another case, discussed in Grimwood , in which the employee testified that age must have been the reason for his termination "because I could see no other reason." Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
It is also similar to another case, discussed in Grimwood , in which the employee testified that age must have been the reason for his termination “because I could see no other reason.” Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carlson v. WPLG/TV-10, POST-NEWSWEEK STATIONS
S.D. Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
See also Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir.1991) (comment that employee had been around *1000 too long and was too old was direct evidence of age discrimination); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 610-11 (11th Cir.1987) (comment that employer did not think guard could pass a physical at his age was not direct evidence of discriminatory intent); Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 772 F.2d 799, 801 (11th Cir.1985) (statement that plaintiff was not considered for upcoming position because company would be looking for younger person was direct ev…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brook v. City of Montgomery, Ala.
M.D. Ala. · 1996 · confidence medium
See also Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 , 102 S.Ct. 1439 , 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982) (citing as an example of direct evidence a scrap of paper on which is written “Too old-Lay Off”); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (remark that board wanted younger man did not indicate that the plaintiff was terminated because of his age).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 1994 · confidence medium
Our determination will “turn[ ] on whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to provide a basis for an inference that age was a factor in the employment decision.” Id. (citing Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir.1980)); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 , 735 (5th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 1992 · confidence medium
Pace, 701 F.2d at 1391 ; Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980); see also Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470 (Court of Appeals reversed jury verdict for plaintiff because he failed to show any probative evidence challenging the defendant’s articulated reasons); Carter, 870 F.2d at 585 (Court of Appeals reversed jury verdict for plaintiff because plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to cast doubt on defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flynn v. Shoney's Inc.
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261 , 268 n. 2 (6th Cir.1986); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vanya M. HAGLOF, Appellant, v. NORTHWEST REHABILITATION, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Appellee (2×)
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII); Young, 840 F.2d at 829-30 ; Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 803-04 (9th Cir.1987) (applying California law); Grigsby, 821 F.2d at 595-96; Dea, 810 F.2d at 15-16 (merely making out a prima facie case does not automatically save [plaintiff] from a summary judgment motion); Box, 772 F.2d at 1378-80 ; Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997-98 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 , 106 S.Ct. 91 , 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985) (Title VII); Palmer, 748 F.2d at 599 ; Parker, 741 F.2d at 979 ; Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393 ; Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vernon EARLEY and Garey Noe, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORP., Defendant-Appellee
11th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Sys., 701 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1983); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980). 2 Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proof on elements of the prima facie case.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Murray v. Mount Pleasant Independent School District
E.D. Tex. · 1990 · confidence medium
Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jose MEDINA-MUNOZ, Etc., Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee
1st Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See LaMontagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir.1984); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carl B. Hudgens v. MacOn Farmers Cooperative
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
"That a member of the Board wanted a younger man as [Hudgens'] replacement does not mean that he was terminated because of his age." Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mikele S. CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Jose Garcia-Pendrosa, Defendants-Appellants
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 610-11 (11th Cir.1987) (remark by personnel manager to terminated security guard that in order to transfer "you would have to take another physical examination and at your age, I don’t believe you could pass it” did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination); Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 772 F.2d 799, 801 (11th Cir.1985) (supervisor’s statement that plaintiff would not be considered for upcoming position because company would be looking for younger person than plaintiff constituted direct evidence of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc. (2×)
Wash. · 1988 · confidence medium
Simmons , at 371.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Myers v. Glynn-Brunswick Memorial Hospital (2×)
S.D. Ga. · 1988 · confidence medium
Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Howard YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
11th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See also Mauter, 825 F.2d at 1558 ; Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philip D. ROSENFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLINGTON LEISURE PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
A plaintiff discharged by his employer and suing under the ADEA “ ‘makes out a prima facie case by showing [1] that he was within the statutorily protected age group, [2] that he was discharged, [3] that the employer sought to replace him with a younger person and [4] that he was replaced with a younger person outside the protected group.’ ” Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir.1978)), cited in Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d 1383 , 1386 n. 7 (11th Cir.), cert. den…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mary B. GRIGSBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 , 104 S.Ct. 549 , 78 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980). 6 We agree that “[i]n general, summary judgment is an inappropriate tool for resolving claims of employment discrimination, which involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent.” Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 640 ; Beard v. Annis, 730 F.2d 741, 743 (11th Cir.1984); Hayden v. First National Bank, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greaves v. Jefferson State Junior College
Ala. · 1986 · confidence medium
System, supra, to be informative: While establishing a prima facie case in and of itself does not always suffice for an ADEA plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment, see Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980), failure to establish a prima facie case warrants summary judgment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sullivan v. Boys Clubs of America, Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 1985 · confidence medium
The court held the chain of inferences from the Senior Vice President’s statement to the President’s motivation was too tenuous for a reasonable jury to adopt, even though plaintiff’s job was eventually offered to a younger man. 750 F.2d at 1412 (citing with approval Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (“That a member of the Board wanted a younger man as [plaintiff’s] replacement does not mean that he was terminated because of his age.”) (emphasis in original)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maud Lee THORNBROUGH, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBUS AND GREENVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 , 100 S.Ct. 265 , 62 L.Ed.2d 182 (1979)); see also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 , 82 S.Ct. 993, 994 , 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holly v. City of Naperville (2×)
N.D. Ill. · 1985 · confidence medium
See Locke v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1982); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarence Edward Palmer v. The District Board of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College (2×)
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir.1983) cert. denied — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 549 , 78 L.Ed.2d 724 (1983); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rayford C. PACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellee (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
While establishing a prima facie ease in and of itself does not always suffice for an ADEA plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment, see Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980), failure to establish a prima facie case warrants summary judgment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joe Davis White v. Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980), our court accepted that argument with respect to a similar statement: “That a member of the Board wanted a younger man as [the discharged employee’s] replacement does not mean that he was terminated because of his age.” White was 52 when he was hired and 54 when he was fired; the argument that the same Board that would hire a 52-year-old would fire him two years later because of his age is a strained one.
discussed Cited "see" Kinnett v. Hospital Service District Number One of Tangipahoa Parish
E.D. La. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that the plaintiff met his prima facie burden under the ADEA where defendants decided not to renew plaintiff’s contract); Rollins v. Clear Creek Indep.
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Eli Lilly and Co.
N.D. Tex. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (affidavit that board member of defendant employer was overheard to say, while considering a replacement for plaintiff, “we want a younger man this time” insufficient to defeat summary judgment); Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1267 , 117 L,Ed.2d 495 (1992) (“stray remarks” insufficient to establish age discrimination).
discussed Cited "see" Tozzi v. Union Railroad
W.D. Pa. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.1980) (plaintiff’s argument established inference of poor management and decision making, but not basis for an inference of discrimination); see also Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d at 1391-92 .
discussed Cited "see" 45 Fair empl.prac.cas. 116, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,535 Edward J. Mauter v. The Hardy Corporation, a Corporation, and Air and Piping, Inc., a Corporation
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (possibility of reasonable jury reaching contrary inference does not reify to the point even of thin vapor); Pace v. Southern Ry.
discussed Cited "see" Mauter v. Hardy Corp.
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (possibility of reasonable jury reaching contrary inference does not reify to the point even of thin vapor); Pace v. Southern Ry.
cited Cited "see" Morton A. KIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellee
7th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited "see" Roderick LA MONTAGNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN CONVENIENCE PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee
7th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980) (“That a member of the Board wanted a younger man as his replacement does not mean that he was terminated because of his age.”) (emphasis in original).
cited Cited "see" Pace v. Southern Railways System
N.D. Ga. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Long v. FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERV., INC. OF GA.
S.D. Ga. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.1980).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.
N.D. Fla. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., supra, 619 F.2d at 370 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
23 Fair empl.prac.cas. 199, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,034 Robert B. Simmons
v.
McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc.
79-1434.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jun 16, 1980.
619 F.2d 369
1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16605
William F. Prosch, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant., Inzer, Suttle, Swann & Stivender, James C. Inzer, Jr., James C. Stivender, James Scott Sledge, Gadsden, Ala., for McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., et al.
Wisdom, Roney, Hatch-Ett.
Cited by 44 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

This is an age discrimination case. Robert B. Simmons, the plaintiff, a 51-year-old man, contends that the McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., (McGuffey) located in Gadsden, Alabama, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., by terminating him as Administrator of the home. He was replaced by a 34-year-old man. [1]

Mrs. Bessie McGuffey owned and operated the nursing home for many years. In December 1949 Robert Simmons married one of her daughters. In 1954 he went to work for McGuffey as a yard and maintenance man. By 1972 he was Administrator and a non-voting member of the Board of Directors. After the mother’s death in 1973 her three daughters have been stockholders, jointly owning less than 50 percent of the stock. The remainder of the stock, and therefore control of the company, was placed in trust with a corporate fiduciary, Central Bank. The seven members of the Board of Directors consisted of the three sisters, an officer of the trustee bank, the accountant for McGuffey, the attorney for McGuffey, and the plaintiff.

Marital problems between Simmons and his wife flared up in 1975. They were separated in late 1975 and were divorced in January 1976. The district court found that “the circumstances surrounding the divorce were less than amiable [sic]”.

In November 1976 the Board of Directors of McGuffey voted unanimously not to renew Simmons’s contract for 1977. McGuffey’s attorney was not present. Simmons agreed to stay on as Administrator until a replacement could be found. A 34-year-old man was hired in February 1977.

On May 12, 1977, Simmons filed a notice of intent to sue for alleged age discrimination with the Secretary of Labor. After the Department of Labor advised him that its efforts to eliminate the alleged discrimination through informal conciliation procedures had been unsuccessful, he filed suit on December 5, 1977. On January 2, 1979, the district court found that the decision not to renew the contract was based on Simmons’s “strained relationship with three of the stockholders, one being his former wife and the others being former sisters-in-law” and that Simmons had shown no evidence “which might infer that age was even a factor in the decision not to renew plaintiff’s contract.” The Court granted a summary judgment for the defendants.

[*371] “The summary judgment procedure authorized by Rule 56 is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or in which only a question of law is involved.” 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 at 370. “On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, 1962, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176, 177.

A plaintiff suing under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “makes out a prima facie case by showing [1] that he was within the statutorily protected age group, [2] that he was discharged, [3] that the employer sought to replace him with a younger person and [4] that he was replaced with a younger person outside the protected group”. Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 576 F.2d 588, 590. Once this occurs, “the defendant bears the burden of ‘going forward’ to demonstrate reasonable factors other than age for the plaintiff’s discharge”. Id. “Once the defendant-employer comes forward with evidence that the plaintiff was discharged because of reasonable factors other than age, the plaintiff must still bear the burden of establishing a case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bittar v. Air Canada, 5 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 582, 582-83.

Here, as the district court stated in its Memorandum decision, Simmons made out a prima facie case, but the defendants bore their burden of “going forward” by demonstrating that he was discharged because of “reasonable factors other than his age”. Affidavits by the defendants state that Simmons no longer got along with his wife and her sisters. Five members of the Board of Directors stated that:

The decision of the Board of Directors of McGuffey Nursing Home to not renew the contract of Mr. Simmons was based on Mr. Simmons’ performance of his duties as Administrator and his strained personal relationship with three of the stockholders, one being his former wife and the others being former sisters-in-law, and at no time was his age ever considered or made a factor in the Board’s not renewing Mr. Simmons’ contract.

Simmons himself testified that the President of the corporation, one of his wife’s sisters, told him that he was terminated because of his “character”.

Simmons argues that, despite these affidavits, there exists a question of fact whether he was fired because of his age. In his deposition he stated that his age must have been the reason for his termination “because I could see no other reason I could have been”. Simmons’s statement is conclusory and unsupported by any specific evidence. He also cites an affidavit by his daughter, Dianne Pinkston. She stated that she heard one Board member who was considering a replacement for Simmons state that “we want a younger man this time”. The district court found that the daughter’s statement did “not traverse the verified and understandable reason plaintiff’s contract was not renewed, i. e., marital and former in-law problems”. That a member of the Board wanted a younger man as his replacement does not mean that he was terminated because of his age. Neither Simmons’s nor Pinkston’s statement demonstrates the existence of a question of fact.

The district court found that Simmons’s contract was not renewed because of “marital and in-law problems”. It is certainly understandable that, after a messy divorce, a divorcee and her sisters would not want her former husband deeply involved in their family business. No evidence suggests that Simmons, a 51-year-old man, was replaced because he was too old to be the Administrator of a nursing home. The possibility of a jury drawing a contrary inference sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact does not reify to the point even of a thin vapor capable of being seen or realized by a reasonable jury. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

1

. The Act was designed to protect individuals who are at least 40 years of age but less than 65 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631.